

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBERIA

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBERIA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Africa Subcommittee will come to order. And the nature of this hearing is U.S. policy toward Liberia.

Liberia is a failed state. Years of war have taken a devastating toll, and an estimated 250,000 Liberians have been killed since the 1990s. There are some 700,000 that are displaced. In Liberia today, child soldiers are commonplace. It is a humanitarian disaster.

The UN Security Council has approved a mandate for what is likely to become the largest UN peacekeeping operation. This follows the commendable peacekeeping effort of several West African countries that are now in Liberia. These countries realize that Liberian insecurity is their own insecurity.

Establishing a functional democratic government in Liberia, the goal of this peacekeeping operation, is going to be a great challenge. Legal institutions have been smashed. Corruption has shattered the public sector there. Seventy-five percent of Liberia's physical infrastructure has, in fact, been destroyed.

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has spoken of the need to eliminate what he calls the culture of violence in Liberia, and no one has done more to promote the culture of violence than Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor is gone, but not forgotten. Last June, Sierra Leone Special Court Prosecutor David Crane unsealed a 17-count indictment against the then Liberian President charging him with murder, rape, torture, mutilation and other charges. Several Members of this Committee are strong supporters of the Special Court and its mission of bringing to justice those bearing the greatest responsibility for the carnage in Sierra Leone.

Understandably, Nigerians are speaking out against the asylum that Charles Taylor has been given by their government. The Nigerian Union of Journalists and the Nigerian Bar Association have both condemned it. Many others recognize that this asylum is undermining the principle of accountability, to the detriment of Nigeria's struggling democracy and to the detriment of all of West Africa.

There is also a very practical reason to reject Nigeria's asylum. Charles Taylor has made no secret of his intention to return to Liberia. Given his notorious history, we had better take him seriously. Any Taylor return, we know, would be a bloody return. Even while in Calabar, in Nigeria, Taylor is trying to sabotage the peace process, and he is doing it on a constant basis with his cell phone in hand. I do have to ask about the wisdom of supporting an expensive peacekeeping operation in Liberia while this regional cancer roams free and taunts those who are involved in the process back in Liberia, of trying to put a state back together.

I have chaired the Nigeria Caucus in Congress, and I observed Nigeria's historic 1999 election. Today I am asking the Nigerian Government to turn Charles Taylor over to the Special Court. We should also be looking at returning the tens of millions of dollars that he has stolen from the Liberian people. Today, Charles Taylor is living in luxury, sitting on a stolen fortune, while unfortunate Liberians are barely surviving, and the U.S. is set to pay a peacekeeping bill in the hundreds of millions of dollars. This is just plain wrong.

The first U.S. military commitment to an African conflict since Somalia has now wound down. Our troops were well received in Monrovia, and the operation incurred no casualties. They did a good job. U.S. military officials had described this deployment as a security blanket. The blanket has been pulled. I am concerned about the capabilities of the West Africans and the UN peacekeepers to follow. Fighting flared in Monrovia yesterday. I hope that we are prepared to provide these troops with logistical, intelligence, and training assistance.

Lastly, I will raise the issue of timber management in Liberia. Charles Taylor oversaw the destruction of a good part of Liberia's forests, which are the last significant block of forest in West Africa. He stole timbering revenues, which fueled the war. There is a push to undo UN timber sanctions on Liberia. We need to go slow, assuring that sustainable forestry practices are in place and that the revenues are tightly controlled. Liberia isn't near these goals.

Without objection, individual testimony will be included in the record from Peter Seligmann of Conservation International, which has been working for years and years in Liberia. His testimony notes that 25 years ago Liberia was a model of resource management in Africa.

Liberia faces many hurdles. Regaining control over its resources is one of these hurdles.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA) at this afternoon's hearing on U.S. policy towards Liberia:

"Liberia epitomizes the failed state. Years of war have taken a devastating toll. An estimated 250,000 Liberians have been killed since 1990; some 700,000 are internally displaced. Child soldiers are commonplace. Liberia is a humanitarian disaster.

"The U.N. Security Council has approved a mandate for what is likely to become the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation. This follows the commendable peace-

keeping effort of several West African countries now in Liberia. These countries realize that Liberian insecurity is their insecurity.

“Establishing a functional democratic government in Liberia, the goal of this peacekeeping operation, will be a great challenge. Legal institutions have been smashed and corruption has shattered the public sector. Seventy-five percent of Liberia’s physical infrastructure has been destroyed. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has spoken of the need to eliminate the ‘culture of violence’ in Liberia.

“No one has done more to promote the culture of violence than Charles Taylor, who is gone but not forgotten. Last June, Sierra Leone Special Court prosecutor David Crane unsealed a 17-count indictment against the then-Liberian president, charging him with murder, rape, torture, and mutilation, among other charges. Several Members of this Committee are strong supporters of the Special Court and its mission of bringing to justice those bearing the greatest responsibility for the carnage in Sierra Leone.

“Understandably, Nigerians are speaking out against the asylum that Charles Taylor has been given by their government. The Nigerian Union of Journalists and the Nigerian Bar Association have condemned it. Many others recognize that this asylum is undermining the principle of accountability, to the detriment of Nigeria’s struggling democracy, and all of West Africa.

“There’s also a very practical reason to reject Nigeria’s asylum. Charles Taylor has made no secret of his intention to return to Liberia. Given his notorious history, we better take him seriously. Any Taylor return, we know, would be a bloody return. Even while in Calabar (Nigeria), Taylor is trying to sabotage the peace process with his cell phone. I do have to ask about the wisdom of supporting an expensive peacekeeping operation in Liberia while this regional cancer looms and taunts.

“I’ve chaired the Nigeria Caucus in Congress; I observed Nigeria’s historic 1999 election. Today I’m asking the Nigerian government to turn Charles Taylor over to the Special Court. We should also be looking at returning the tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars that he has stolen from the Liberian people. Today, Charles Taylor is living in luxury, sitting on a stolen fortune, while unfortunate Liberians are barely surviving and the U.S. is set to pay a peacekeeping bill in the hundreds of millions of dollars. This is just plain wrong.

“The first U.S. military commitment to an African conflict since Somalia has wound down. Our troops were well received in Monrovia, and the operation incurred no casualties. They did a good job. U.S. military officials had described this deployment as a ‘security blanket.’ The blanket has been pulled. I’m concerned about the capabilities of the West Africans and the U.N. peacekeepers to follow. Fighting flared in Monrovia yesterday. I hope that we’re prepared to provide these troops with logistical, intelligence and training assistance.

“Lastly, I’ll raise the issue of timber management. Charles Taylor oversaw the destruction of a good part of Liberia’s forests, which are the last significant block of forest in West Africa. He stole timbering revenues, which fueled the war. There’s a push to undo U.N. timber sanctions on Liberia. We need to go slow, assuring that sustainable forestry practices are in place, and that the revenues are tightly controlled. Liberia isn’t near these goals. Liberia faces many hurdles; regaining control over its resources is a big one.”

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing was scheduled 2 weeks ago. It fell victim to Hurricane Isabel. David Crane, the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and Jacques Klein, the UN’s top official in Liberia who will head the peacekeeping operation there, were slated to testify then. They could not be with us today, and without objection, their testimonies will be placed into the record.

And I would now like to turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey, for any statement he might have.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me commend you for calling this very timely and critical hearing on U.S. policy toward Liberia.

The beginning of 2003 has been a time of change, transition and progress toward peace in many parts of the African continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo—termed a “heart of darkness” by Conrad many years ago, and a country of great natural wealth and history of visionaries like Patrice Lumumba, and also, though a tyrant, Mobutu Sese Seko—has ended a 4-year war and has formed

a transitional government where all sides, including former rebel forces, civil society, religious societies and all, are in Kinshasa for the first time in 40 years to talk about a government peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the U.S.—the UN's largest in the world at this time, has proven to be a success.

In the spring, Nigeria held its second democratic election since independence and reelected its current President without incident. Rwanda, a country that a genocide of close to a million people occurred 7 or 8 years ago, where two ethnic groups were at each other, had an election that, as a matter of fact, the minority ethnic group in that country, the current leader, President of Rwanda, was elected President, President Kagame. And so we have seen positive events occur, the transition of government to the Vice President in Burundi, who will serve for 18 months. So we were pleased with some of the positive solutions.

However, we have seen the situation in Liberia this year deteriorate, and by midway through the year, the world began to take notice of the growing crisis in Liberia as the rebel groups LURD and MODEL moved closer and closer to Monrovia.

In June when the peace talks began in Accra, Ghana, and President Bush's trip was a month away, the debate began to take center stage. What should the U.S. role be in the Liberian crisis? It should have been no question about the role as many Members of Congress, and in particular the Congressional Black Caucus, talked about the U.S. participating in trying to have a settling position on the situation in Liberia.

We recall back in 1991, when the U.S. was confronted with the first Persian Gulf War, the same thing was occurring, and Charles Taylor was wreaking havoc on the Liberian population. And his forces seized power in parts of Liberia, and then, as you know, the election there, he became the victor. There should have been no question about the role that the U.S. should have played in those days because there would not have been a Charles Taylor had we intervened to prevent him from gaining military force and then forcing the people of Liberia to vote for him as President.

We know about the historical ties when the United States Congress voted \$100,000 to President James Monroe and the American Colonization Society to begin this experiment in Liberia. The United States has had economic, military and political interests in Liberia since the beginning of 1822. In 1847, the people of Liberia declared their independence, and they selected the colors of the American flag: Red, white and blue. They modeled their Constitution after the Constitution of the United States. And companies flourished, like Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, where billions of dollars were made, and during World War II it was very critical to the United States in our war effort since the U.S. was cut off from the sources of rubber from the Pacific region.

And so as a strong supporter of mutual defense, allied during the cold war, the Voice of America signals were sent from Liberia. But then in 1980, Samuel Doe seized power in a coup, and President Tolbert and many of his ministers were executed. However, because of the cold war, U.S. military aid during Doe's ruling decade exceeded what Liberia had received collectively over its 150-year history. And so there is a role, there was a role there. There is a

responsibility of the United States since we have had such a strong hand in that nation.

But in conclusion, let me say that I was disappointed at the slow pace that the U.S. became involved. We sent an assessment team even a month before President Bush's trip to Africa, and the assessment team assessed and assessed and assessed for weeks and weeks and months. We sent three ships. They were almost like the Love Boat as they slowly went around Africa to finally get to Liberia. And then, as an old song said, they didn't sit on the dock of the bay, but they sat in the boat watching the tide roll away as this country was wreaked with so much havoc.

And so we were disappointed that there was not more assertion, that there was not more activity, that there was not more of a leadership from the United States. But we were pleased that we sent in 200 troops that were on the ground for a week or so. We know that the United Nations Security Council have recently passed a resolution approving 15,000 troops, and Special Envoy Klein, who was supposed to come but, as you know, was unable, as we heard from the Chairman, has made the request. So we are hoping now that the United States will be supportive.

I understand that the Government in Monrovia has no funds to try to move forward, as I heard a report from the mayor of Monrovia, who I expect to be here, if she's not here already. And so as I conclude—there you are. Okay. How are you, Ms. Mayor?

So as I conclude, we have a lot of work to do. I have some other remarks, but I will have it included in the record. And I would hope that we will be able to get some answers today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We will include those in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for calling this timely and critical hearing on U.S. policy toward Liberia.

The beginning of 2003 had been a time of change, transition, and progress towards peace in many parts of the African continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo, termed the "Heart of Darkness" by Conrad and a country of great natural wealth with a history of visionaries like Patrice Lumumba and the brutal tyranny of Mobutu Sese Seko, had ended the 4-year war and formed a transitional government with all sides, including all rebel factions, in Kinshasa for the first time. Rwanda held non-violent elections and Burundi saw a relatively peaceful transition of power. The peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the UN's largest in the world at the time, had proven to be a success. In the spring, Nigeria held its second democratic elections since independence.

But mid-way through the year, the world began to take notice of the growing crisis in Liberia as the rebel groups LURD and MODEL moved in closer and closer to Monrovia. In June when the peace talks began in Accra, Ghana, and President Bush's Africa trip was a month away, the debate began to take center stage: What should the U.S. role be in the Liberia crisis?

There should be no question about what role the U.S. should have played in 1991 when Charles Taylor was wreaking havoc on the Liberian population as his forces seized power and the world turned to the U.S. calling for it to take its responsibility. There should have been no question about the role the U.S. should have played in the days leading up to Charles Taylor's departure when more than 1,000 lives were lost. After all, Liberia as we know it was created in 1820 with a grant of \$100,000 from the U.S. government by President James Monroe and the American Colonization Society. Their plan was to send America's growing population of freed blacks

back to Africa. Since then, the U.S. has had a hand in Liberia's economic, military, and political operations and has greatly enjoyed the benefits of that close relationship.

In 1847, the people of Liberia declared their independence. They gave their country a flag and a constitution modeled on that of our own. American companies, such as the Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, have made billions off of Liberia's land.

In 1942, the republic allowed the United States to station troops on its soil. Liberia also was a key Cold War ally. A mutual defense pact was signed and the US established a massive air base and built communications facilities to handle intelligence traffic and relay a Voice of America signal throughout the continent.

Samuel Doe seized power in a coup from President Tolbert in 1980. In spite of his brutal, horrendous dictatorship, Doe received more in U.S. military aid than all previous Liberia leaders combined. Doe's destabilization of the country paved the way for Charles Taylor and other rebel leaders to try their hand at rule by force and devastation. So the U.S. is complicit in the state of Liberia today.

Though even our closest allies such as Britain were expecting the U.S. to lead a peacemaking force in Liberia, President Bush and his advisers decided to send only 200 troops which were on the ground for a few short days. As we know, the three U.S. warships that took weeks to arrive off Monrovia's shores like the Love Boat slowly making its way from the Red Sea, finally sailed away yesterday.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution two weeks ago approving 15,000 troops which Special Envoy Jacques Klein requested. The U.S. troops should have stayed long enough to see the transition from ECOWAS to the UN and from Interim President Moses Blah to Gyude Bryant, the businessman, who was chosen by the delegates at the peace talks in Ghana to head the two-year National Transitional Government.

Just as there was no question about the U.S.'s responsibility in 1822, 1991, and this past July, there should be no debate over our role in helping Liberia today as it transitions towards peace, democracy, and reconstruction.

Liberia should be considered for emergency funding for its reconstruction as the President is requesting \$87 billion for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. ROYCE. We have two witnesses on our first panel. First is Walter Kansteiner, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and it is good to have him with us. Prior to assuming his duties at the Department of State, Mr. Kansteiner was a founding principal of the Scowcroft Group; Director of African Affairs on the National Security Council staff; an African specialist on the Secretary of State's policy planning staff; and a member of the Strategic Mineral Tasks Force for the Department of Defense. And through these various positions, he gained more than 20 years' experience in African issues and emerging market issues, and we are certainly delighted to have the Assistant Secretary with us today.

Also, we have Ms. Theresa Whelan. She serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defense. She has served as the Director of the Office of African Affairs for 2 years before becoming the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Ms. Whelan served as Countries Director for Southern Africa from 1994 to 1997, and Countries Director for West Africa from 1991 to 1994.

I am going to ask that we recess now for 10 minutes. This should be enough time to make this vote and the next vote, and we will ask our witnesses and our audience to bear with us here. And there should not be any further interruptions as these are the last two votes of the day.

So, Mr. Kansteiner, Ms. Whelan, we will be right back. Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing is reconvened. We will go to Mr. Walter Kansteiner.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER H. KANSTEINER III,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is always a pleasure to appear before you and your Committee.

For the past year, U.S. policy toward Liberia has been guided by some very simple principles: Stop the killing, help humanitarian aid flow, and help begin to construct new governance for Liberia. We have an opportunity to help this small country in West Africa. And, Mr. Chairman, as you know, opportunities to shape the future of a country in a region don't come often. Quite frankly, we have had a couple opportunities in the last few decades in Liberia, and with the future of Liberia and we missed those opportunities. Ultimately, I think, we cannot afford to miss another opportunity for this country.

This past summer our government asked itself some very tough questions and I think came up with some very appropriate and reassuring answers. One was should American boots, as we say, "boots on the ground," should American troops ever go to Africa? And could it ever be worthwhile? And could it be honorable, and could it be successful? And the answer to all of those questions was yes, indeed, it can be. American boots on the ground in Africa does make sense in the right circumstances, and it can be honorable, and it certainly can be successful.

We asked the question about projecting force, and we discovered that even if the military footprint is relatively small, that force projection can bring excellent results. We learned some good lessons and asked ourselves some hard questions about diplomacy. We found out that long, hard hours of diplomatic negotiation among rebel groups and tough governments, in fact, pays off. And we also found that Foreign Service officers' bravery is very real and very powerful.

And let me just spend a moment to thank those professional diplomats in the Foreign Service that stood in Monrovia. Along with our Ambassador, John Blaney, our entire Embassy staff refused to abandon their post, and they endured shelling and automatic weapon fire, and they kept our flag flying. And, you know, the symbolism of the U.S. flag flying over that Embassy, the only Embassy left open in Monrovia, was not lost on the Liberians. And I am proud of them, and I am proud to be part of that African Bureau that did that.

Now that Monrovia is calmer, we can start addressing some of the humanitarian crises. Of particular concern is the protection of some half million internally displaced people. We know that there is going to be a lot of hard work ahead of us. These internally displaced people will begin to move, and they should begin to move back to their homes, and we, the United Nations and the NGO community, must help them get there.

The United States has played a significant role in mitigating this humanitarian crisis in large part due to the U.S. contributions. The UN right now is feeding some 400,000 people. The U.S. Government has provided \$40 million to international and nongovernment organizations for water sanitation and shelter programs, disease control, medical services, some \$17 million for food, and this is

really just the beginning. Measles, malaria, cholera are still serious health issues that face Monrovia and all of Liberia.

Security is key to resolving this humanitarian crisis and preparing the way for a political transition. In this respect, the ECOWAS states that you, Mr. Chairman, spoke of, and that Congressman Payne referred to in his opening statement, is meeting that security challenge. I am proud that the United States provided critical support to the 3,600 ECOMIL peacekeeping troops. Quite frankly, without this U.S. assistance, those intervention forces never would have been deployed to Liberia and never would have been able to be the peacekeepers that they, in fact, are.

We committed some \$26 million to transport all the contingents and to fund contracted logistical support for all of ECOMIL. Yesterday we saw that ECOMIL force become what we call blue-helmeted and, in fact, become part of the UN peacekeeping operation.

Mr. Chairman, you refer to the joint task force having departed, but I assure you the United States will remain involved. We are going to support the peacekeepers, and we are going to help restructure and train a new professional Liberian Army.

On the UN front, the United States drafted and endorsed the UN Security Council resolution 1509, which, in fact, establishes the peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII authority. It calls for up to 15,000 peacekeepers, 250 military observers and a robust police component. The United States is seconding a number of officers to UNMIL, and we are looking for ways to assist in this very important demobilization and disarming and police training.

While we await the full UN deployment in Liberia, we keep a close eye on Charles Taylor. We recognize that Nigeria granted Taylor exile for the sake of regional peace. And we also, Mr. Chairman, recognize that for that same regional peace, he must be watched and watched very carefully. We are working with Nigeria and the international community to help ensure that Taylor no longer has influence in Liberia today.

We also seek continued cooperation from President Moses Blah. As you know, President Blah has pledged to step down in just a couple of weeks, on October 14, and the transitional government will come in place. So far President Blah's government has supported the deployment of peacekeepers and the distribution of humanitarian assistance and the observance of the Accra Accords. Under those agreements, the Liberian delegates in Accra selected a new head of state that will be inducted on October 14, and that is Mr. Gyude Bryant. This new, young transitional government that comes into power on the 14th of October is going to need all of our help, and when I say all, I mean the international community, I mean the UN, and I mean the United States. We have to be the catalyst for this. The world is looking to us. They are watching us. We have to be the leaders. We have to be there with resources, with encouragement, with people on the ground. Mr. Chairman, this State Department is ready to do so. I look forward very much to working with the Congress in finding the appropriate resources to make this involvement happen.

In conclusion, may I just say that since August, Liberians have had spontaneous and, I think, very heartfelt public expressions of joy at the intervention of U.S. troops. They are excited about our

newfound involvement in their country, and I think we owe it to them to respond to their response. Both leaders of the former government and fighters among the rebel groups have told us explicitly that they are willing to give up their arms, and they are willing to seek peace, and they are willing to see their country go through a true transformation only because of U.S. involvement.

So, sir, I look forward to working with you and your Committee to see this opportunity through. We have a window that is open. Let us not miss the chance on this one. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, and we certainly agree with you on the importance of that involvement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER H. KANSTEINER, III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss Liberia. For the past year the U.S. government has had three overarching priorities in Liberia: to stop the killing, to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid, and to achieve a comprehensive, profound change in the way the country was governed. We have worked long and hard, in cooperation with likeminded Liberians and the international community, in pursuit of these goals.

We are greatly encouraged by the results. We actively supported and made possible the successful deployment of West African peacekeepers and played a key role in producing the Accra Accords. We brokered the rebel withdrawal from Monrovia, opening the way for renewed humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of suffering people. We did this with a small—but crucial—military footprint. Liberia has taken the first steps toward stability. Largely through our efforts, the killing of innocent civilians has been substantially reduced, and assistance is starting to reach those in need.

In my testimony today I will highlight the next steps to expand these gains. But first I would like to discuss briefly the history of Liberia and its unique relationship with the United States.

Liberia and the United States have deep and longstanding ties. This land on the coast of West Africa was founded at the initiative of Presidents James Monroe and Andrew Jackson, as well as Daniel Webster, Francis Scott Key, Henry Clay, and George Washington's nephew Bushrod. In 1819, Congress provided \$100,000 for the effort.

In 1847, Liberia became the first independent African republic. Liberians patterned their constitution, flag, attire, place names and architecture on U.S. models. Liberia was a key ally during World War Two, when we used Liberian territory as a re-supply center for the campaign in North Africa. During the Cold War, Liberia served as a relay station for Voice of America broadcasts, for tracking shipping, and for communications surveillance. We also helped create Liberia's shipping registry. Today five percent of Liberia's population is descended from freed slaves. The remainder of the population of three million people comes from 16 ethnic groups.

Descendants of the original American settlers, or "Americo-Liberians," ruled over the indigenous population until 1980, when Samuel Doe and a group of noncommissioned officers overthrew the government. A decade of predatory rule contributed to the conditions for the 1989–1996 civil war, and Doe's brutal death.

The new government, led from 1997 until August of this year by Charles Taylor, also terrorized the Liberian people. Rather than work to improve the lives of Liberians, Taylor supported the bloody Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, fomenting unrest and brutal excesses in the region. Liberia's new rebel groups, "Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy" and "Movement for Democracy in Liberia", draw from factions that fought against Taylor in the early 1990s, and on support from neighboring countries that Taylor's forces attacked using arms purchased through the trade in Sierra Leone's conflict diamonds.

Today, we seek to help Liberians change the violent and negative course of their recent history. During this summer's fight for Monrovia, the capital, Ambassador Blaney and our Embassy staff kept our flag flying and refused to abandon their post, courageously enduring shelling and automatic weapons fire. They offered a ray of hope for war-weary Liberians by not abandoning them to the combatants. Meanwhile, in support of the International Contact Group on Liberia, we facilitated negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement. President Bush insisted that Charles

Taylor step down and leave Liberia. The presence of U.S. troops and our financial commitments were critical to the success of our diplomacy, and the United States will continue to participate in efforts to bring peace to Liberia.

Now that Monrovia is calmer, addressing the humanitarian crisis is the first order of business. Of particular concern is the protection of 500,000 Internally Displaced Persons, 280,000 Liberian refugees in neighboring countries and 50,000 Sierra Leonean and Ivorian refugees within Liberia, many of whom have fled their homes more than once.

The United States has played a significant role in mitigating the humanitarian crisis in Liberia. USAID's Office of Food for Peace has already committed \$16.7 million in P.L. 480 Title II Food Assistance, or more than 24,000 metric tons of food. With our help, the UN World Food Program is feeding more than 400,000 people. Overall, the U.S. Government has provided \$40 million to international and non-government organizations for water, sanitation, and shelter programs; for disease control and prevention; for medical services and work to combat sexual and gender-based violence; for logistical support and security for humanitarian workers; and, for food stocks. However, much remains to be done. Measles, malaria, cholera, and diarrhea are serious health issues. Food security and reintegration of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons are also outstanding issues.

Security is key to resolving the humanitarian crisis, and preparing the way for the political transition. In this respect the Economic Community of West African States—ECOWAS, led by Nigeria and seven other regional countries, is meeting the challenge. The United States provides critical support to the 3,600 ECOMIL peacekeeping troops, without which the intervention forces never would have deployed to Liberia. We have committed \$26 million to transport all the contingents and to fund contracted logistics support and equipment for ECOMIL. A UN peacekeeping operation, UNMIL, began operations October 1, subsuming ECOMIL units, at the same time that the direct support role by U.S. Marines deployed to Liberia ended, as ordered by President Bush.

Although the U.S. Joint Task Force established to support West African peacekeepers now has departed, the United States will remain involved in other ways in supporting the peacekeepers, and in restructuring and training a new and professional Liberian military. In order to further support Liberia's August 18 peace agreement, we drafted and endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1509, which establishes a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII authority. In keeping with the UN Secretary General's recommendations, it calls for a force of up to 15,000 peacekeepers, with 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, a robust police component of up to 1,115, and a significant civilian component and support staff. The United States is seconding nine officers to UNMIL (two headquarters staff officers, seven military observers).

While we await the full UN deployment in Liberia, we keep a close eye on Charles Taylor and seek to ensure that he creates no further mayhem. During his Presidency Taylor controlled every aspect of Liberia's political system and economy; we have every reason to believe that if he has the means he will try to use his old connections in an attempt to undermine the fragile peace. We recognize that Nigeria granted Taylor exile for the sake of regional peace. We are working with Liberia and the international community to help ensure that Taylor no longer has any influence in Liberia, and we support Nigeria's stern warning to Taylor not to have any contacts with Liberia.

We also seek continued cooperation from President Moses Blah, who assumed office upon Charles Taylor's resignation. President Blah has pledged to step down on October 14 in favor of a two-year transitional government. So far, his government has supported the deployment of peacekeepers, the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and the observance of the Accra Accords. Under those agreements, the Liberian delegates in Accra selected among the non-combatants a head of state, Mr. Gyude (pronounced "Judy") Bryant. The combatants, political parties, and civil society divided cabinet positions and within the next few weeks in Monrovia, they will select ministers and candidates for an interim unicameral legislature.

The Transitional Government will need a lot of help. The UN will bring significant, but not enough, resources to the table, and it will take time for the UN effort to become fully operational. The international donor community will respond to Liberia adequately only if the United States helps Liberia. Continued US assistance for Liberia is critical in areas such as humanitarian aid; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants; restructuring of the security services; economic recovery; environmental protection; national reconciliation; and good governance. We need to continue to support programs to help refugees and displaced persons return safely to their homes and to set the stage for free and fair elections in October 2005.

Since August, Liberians' spontaneous and heartfelt public expressions of joy at the intervention of U.S. troops have provided yet another example of the deep connection Liberians feel toward the United States. They profoundly hope that their friendship with the United States will help lift them out of their current political and humanitarian crisis. Both the leaders and fighters among government and rebel forces have stated explicitly that they are willing to give up their arms and seek peace only because of U.S. involvement.

A successful political transition leading to a stable Liberia will serve U.S. strategic interests. U.S. follow-through on Liberia will affect our relations with Nigeria and the other 14 countries of ECOWAS. The historically unique U.S.-Liberia relationship can be used in furthering the Global War on Terrorism. Peace and security in Liberia will have a profound impact in the areas of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors. Liberia's disintegration, conversely, would have created a new terrorist and criminal training ground.

Liberia's stability is important not only for our relations with our African partners whom we depend on increasingly for security and energy assistance, but also for our relations with Europe. Specifically, the United Kingdom and France, which have invested significantly in stabilizing Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, have publicly called on the U.S. to take the lead in resolving the Liberia crisis. Indeed, had the United States walked away from the country it created, many in the world would have doubted the depth of our commitment to Africa. While humanitarian relief and the avoidance of further violence constitute more than sufficient reasons for us to remain engaged in Liberia, our strategic interests are also significant.

In sum, the United States has demonstrated leadership and humanitarian compassion. The situation, however, is still fluid, and Liberians need to hear and see that the United States will stay the course. Continued U.S. assistance and limited but visible U.S. support for the other elements as outlined above, including security, will send a clear message that we will remain involved in Liberia, and greatly boost prospects for the success of the Transition Government, ECOMIL, and the UN. It would also encourage all parties to the conflict to work toward rebuilding Liberia, ending the industry of war. Such U.S. actions would prompt international support for creating a new Liberia, and represent for us a memorable foreign policy success story.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with Congress, your Committee, and others to promote U.S. interests in Liberia and peace and stability in West Africa. I will be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. ROYCE. We will now go to Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan. We have read your testimony, Ms. Whelan, so if you want to capsulize that and keep that to 5 minutes, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. WHELAN. I will try and keep it to 5 minutes or less.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss with you and your Committee U.S. policy toward Liberia and the Department of Defense's role.

The Defense Department's activities in Liberia build upon our security cooperation programs which are designed and developed to develop the capabilities of allied and friendly militaries for self-defense and coalition operations. In early June the Department of Defense deployed approximately 1,800 personnel offshore Liberia to assist if needed in securing the U.S. Embassy and evacuating Americans and foreign nationals due to the threat posed by advancing rebels and undisciplined government forces.

Our forces withdrew on 17 June when the rebels halted their offensive and the security situation in the capital appeared to stabilize. Subsequently, the President indicated his willingness to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, in mediating peace talks and considering an ECOWAS

peacekeeping force for Liberia once a cease-fire was in place and a peace agreement was signed. The President offered U.S. military support to this West African effort under certain conditions, namely the departure of Charles Taylor from office and from Liberia, a cease-fire between rebel groups and Liberian Government forces, and the firm commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of the troops for any peacekeeping effort.

Following the signing of the cease-fire on 17 June, ECOWAS agreed to deploy an interim peacekeeping force into Liberia known as ECOMIL, the ECOWAS military mission to Liberia. ECOWAS requested U.S. and international donor support for funding logistics and a quick reaction force to back up an ECOMIL force that would number roughly 3,600. At this point the President tasked DOD to provide liaison assistance to ECOMIL to facilitate its deployment to Liberia and to provide the quick reaction force to back up ECOMIL. This became the primary mission of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

The U.S. mission has been to assist ECOMIL to mitigate the humanitarian situation and to help the conditions for transition to a UN stability force as soon as possible. The plan was for the U.S. mission to end once the UN established its mission in Liberia, which occurred yesterday, setting the groundwork for U.S. troop withdrawal.

We knew from our previous cooperation with ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast that it could field a credible force for the Liberia mission with targeted assistance from other countries. Many of its member states have been trained and equipped through our military cooperation programs, such as Operation FOCUS RELIEF and the African Crisis Response Initiative. We also knew that this force would need to rely totally on donor assistance for funding and logistical support to include tactical and strategic airlift.

The Department of State addressed these weaknesses through the use of peacekeeping operations funds to establish a U.S. commercial contract logistics task force. In the last 90 days DOD has provided the following forces to support U.S. policy in Liberia: A 50-person Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team, which remains in Monrovia from Rota, Spain, deployed in August to secure the U.S. Embassy; an 18-person Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team deployed from Stuttgart, Germany, to assess the humanitarian situation in Monrovia and to look at the condition of the airport, seaport, road and bridge systems; a five-person Forward Surgical Team deployed from Stuttgart, Germany, to support the deployed DOD forces and U.S. Embassy with medical care; three- to four-person Liaison and Facilitation Teams, deployed to the 8 troop-contributing countries throughout ECOWAS, and to the ECOMIL headquarters in Monrovia, and to the peace talks in Accra, Ghana. These teams assisted ECOMIL in its deployments and in developing equipment requirements for their troop-contributing countries.

The U.S.S. Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group with its 2,100-person 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived off the Liberian coast on 13 August. Elements moved to shore for temporary assignment, such as supporting ECOMIL forces when they moved

to secure the seaport. U.S. Navy specialists conducted assessments of the seaport to evaluate its capability. Throughout, the quick-reaction force routinely conducted presence and demonstration overflights with its helicopters and aircraft.

The U.S. European Command also used elements of its Southern European Task Force to provide a 40-person joint task force headquarters to conduct planning and liaison with ECOMIL.

Since we are running short of time, to conclude, I would note that we have seen in Liberia evidence that our programs to support West African peacekeeping troops have worked to achieve those goals. Specifically, ECOMIL has Operation FOCUS RELIEF-trained and equipped forces as well as African Crisis Response Initiative-trained and equipped individuals. Also, the new African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance program, created based on lessons learned from focus relief and the ACRI program, was useful in predeployment training for the Ghanaians. ECOMIL is also leavened with officers who are former students from our international military education and training programs.

In conclusion, we have seen our African security cooperation efforts bear fruit in this combined U.S.–ECOWAS endeavor in Liberia. There is far more work to be done. UN peacekeepers are critical to short-term success in Liberia, and continued U.S. leadership in training programs will also continue to pay dividends in regional stability. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Ms. Whelan.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOD POLICY TOWARD LIBERIA

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you very much for this opportunity to discuss with you US policy toward Liberia and the Department of Defense (DOD) role.

Department of Defense Role in Liberia

The Defense Department's activities in Liberia build upon our security cooperation programs, which are designed to develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalitions operations. In early June, the Department of Defense deployed approximately 1,800 personnel offshore to assist, if needed, in securing the US Embassy and evacuating American and foreign nationals due to the threat posed by advancing rebels and undisciplined government forces. Our forces withdrew on 17 June when the rebels halted their offensive and the security situation in the capital appeared to stabilize.

Subsequently, the President indicated his willingness to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in mediating peace talks and considering an ECOWAS peacekeeping force for Liberia once a cease-fire was in place and a peace agreement was signed.

The President offered US military support to this West African effort under certain conditions: the departure of Charles Taylor from office and from Liberia; a cease-fire between rebel groups and Liberian government forces; and the firm commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of the troops for any peacekeeping effort.

Following the signing of the cease-fire on 17 June, ECOWAS agreed to deploy an interim peacekeeping force into Liberia known as ECOMIL—The ECOWAS Military Mission to Liberia. ECOWAS requested US and international donor support for funding, logistics, and a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to back up an ECOMIL force that would number roughly 3,600.

At that point the President tasked DOD to provide liaison assistance to ECOMIL to facilitate its deployment to Liberia, and to provide the quick reaction force to

back up ECOMIL. This became the primary mission of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

The US mission has been to assist ECOMIL to mitigate the humanitarian situation and to help set the conditions for transition to a UN stability force as soon as possible. The plan was for the US mission to end once the UN established its mission in Liberia, which occurred yesterday, setting the groundwork for US troop withdrawals.

We knew from our previous cooperation with ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast that it could field a credible force for the Liberia mission with targeted assistance from other countries. Many of its member states have been trained and equipped through our military cooperation programs such as Operation FOCUS RELIEF (OFR) and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). We also knew that this force would need to rely totally on donor assistance for funding and logistical support to include tactical and strategic airlift.

The Department of State (DOS) addressed this weakness through the use of peace-keeping operations funds to establish a US commercial contract logistics task force.

Specific DOD Support

In the last 90 days DOD has provided the following forces in support of US policy in Liberia:

- A 50-person Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team (FAST) from Rota, Spain deployed in August to secure the US Embassy.
- An 18-person Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) deployed from Stuttgart, Germany to assess the humanitarian situation in Monrovia and to look at the condition of the airport, seaport, and road and bridge systems.
- A 5-person Forward Surgical Team (FST) deployed from Stuttgart, Germany to support the deployed DOD forces and US Embassy with medical care.
- Three-to-four person Liaison and Facilitation Teams (LAFT) deployed to 8 Troop Contributing Countries throughout ECOWAS and to the ECOMIL Headquarters in Monrovia and the peace talks in Accra, Ghana. The teams assisted ECOMIL in its deployments and in developing equipment requirements for the Troop Contributing Countries.
- The USS IWO JIMA Amphibious Readiness Group with the 2,100 person 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived off the Liberian coast on 13 August. Elements moved ashore for temporary assignments, such as supporting ECOMIL forces when they moved to secure the seaport. US Navy specialists conducted assessments of the seaport to evaluate its capability. Throughout, the quick-reaction force has routinely conducted presence and demonstration overflights with its helicopters and aircraft.

US European Command (EUCOM) used elements of its Southern European Task Force (SETAF) to provide a 40-person Joint Task Force Headquarters to conduct planning and liaison with ECOMIL.

DOD has agreed to provide personnel to the UN mission to Liberia (UNMIL).

The total number of DOD personnel deployed to support this effort reached almost 5,000 at its peak. Forces remaining in Liberia now number less than 100 and will continue to reduce this month.

DOD Long Term Policies Supported

As noted earlier, DOD's Liberia support mission builds upon DOD's security cooperation programs that develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations and, in Africa in particular, create a capability for peace-keeping operations and enhance regional stability and security.

We have seen in Liberia some evidence that our programs work to support the above goals. Specifically, ECOMIL has Operation FOCUS RELIEF-trained and -equipped forces as well as African Crisis Response Initiative-trained and -equipped individuals. Also, the African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), a new program created based on lessons learned from Operation Focus Relief and the African Crisis Response Initiative was useful in pre-deployment training for the Ghanaians. ECOMIL is also leavened with officers who are former International Military Exchange Training (IMET) students. Finally, US programs complement similar programs with our allies, notably the UK, France, and Portugal in this regard.

In conclusion, we have seen our Africa security cooperation efforts bear fruit in this combined US/ECOWAS endeavor in Liberia. There is far more work to be done. UN peacekeepers are critical to short-term success in Liberia and continued US leadership in training programs will continue to pay dividends in regional stability.

Mr. ROYCE. I am now going to ask a question of Secretary Kansteiner, and it has to do with a comment made by Jacques Klein, the UN representative in Liberia. He recently reported that Charles Taylor, the former President, calls the Liberian transitional government two or three times every day, and he added that Taylor continues to undermine the political process, and he says Taylor is clearly rebuilding his network. He is like a vampire, his words, until you drive a stake in his heart, he won't die. A Sierra Leonean human rights activist has said of Taylor's current practices there, he is like Saddam Hussein. You know he is gone, but he is not dead. It would be naive to think he is not a real player in the picture.

And, Secretary Kansteiner, as you know, the Chairman and other Members of the International Relations Committee wrote the Secretary in June, during speculation of Taylor's exile, and they warned there is no reason to believe that Taylor's willingness and ability to foment conflict and destabilize his neighbors will be any less virulent if he is sent to Tripoli or Rome or Paris or Abuja or elsewhere. Well, he ended up in Calabar, Nigeria, which, I understand, conditions there are better than Abuja.

I would like to know what we are doing to bring Taylor to justice. And as I said in my opening statement, this is critical not just for the sake of justice, but there are real practical reasons for doing this. Unless we get him, he threatens not only the investment we are being asked to make in Liberia, but he also threatens the investment we have made in Sierra Leone. And it seems only right to press the Nigerian Government to do what most Nigerians, as I understand it, want to see done, and that is to have Taylor turned over to the Special Court.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The reports that we have, in fact, verify what you suggest, that Taylor is in regular contact with what is essentially his old government that—you know, it is his Vice President, now President, Blah that sits in the chair for the next 12 days. That changes on October 14 when the transitional government comes in, and that is a good thing.

I might add that I believe that his behavior, that is this contact, and his seemingly somewhat capabilities of influencing events in Monrovia, wanes every day. Every day he is gone from Monrovia, his clout, his power, his ability to make things happen is lessened. The fear of him is that much weaker. The desire to help him, please him, obey his orders, is that much less.

Nonetheless, I totally agree with you. His behavior seems to be outside the bounds of the Nigerian hospitality. When the Nigerians provided him exile, there were certain rules that apparently transpired, and his noninvolvement in things Liberian was one of those rules. So he seems to be in violation with this type of behavior.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you this, though. When you say it appears that his influence is lessening by the day, it also appears that all Liberians, with the exception of Charles Taylor, will be eligible for positions in the new national transitional government. And many cronies of Charles Taylor appear headed for high posts. Likewise, top rebel leaders are going to gain key positions. How does this bode for building a responsible government in Liberia?

And what about Elie Saleeby, the Governor of the Central Bank, who, I understand, is still clinging to that position? I would like to ask you about that.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, again, the complexion of the government changes in 12 days. There are, according to the Accra Accords, rules that the Liberians have placed on themselves on who is going to be participatory in that government headed by Gyude Bryant. And there are numerous Liberians that I think are very capable that have not been involved in the political situation, either on the rebel side or on the government side, that I hope come to the fore, in fact play a very real role.

Mr. Chairman, let me go back to one point that I don't think I have adequately answered, and that was your question about what are we doing vis-a-vis the Nigerians, what we are talking to the Nigerians about. And I just want to assure you that we have urged the Nigerians to not only keep a close eye on Charles Taylor, but to consider transferring him to the court in Sierra Leone, because ultimately Charles Taylor needs to stand in front of that court and let the charges be heard.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Kansteiner.

Let me ask about a recent report in which the United Nations documented that Taylor's government had misused funds, had embezzled money from several bank accounts, and they included in this report six U.S. financial institutions where money has been parked. Should we consider freezing these accounts so that the money can be used to rebuild Liberia and not end up supporting Charles Taylor in a rather posh exile? I think the UN peacekeeping operation is going to be costly in Liberia, and we might as well get what we can from Taylor and from his associates, right?

Mr. KANSTEINER. I agree. And in perhaps a closed session I could describe what some of those next steps are.

Mr. ROYCE. I know you were on the right side of a previous argument, but I hope we can move faster than we moved on Mugabe's assets. I know we can sometimes get concurrence on this, but somehow we don't seem to move quickly.

The next question has to do with the weapons that Charles Taylor has stored in Liberia, and we hear reports about the magnitude of this. I wanted to ask you about that.

Mr. KANSTEINER. The question of weapons is one of the big issues for this country. The demobilization and disarmament, is an absolute must if we are going to take this opportunity that we all talk about. We not only have to take the weapons that have been in the hands of Charles Taylor's militias, for sure we have to do that. But we, the international community; we, the United Nations; we, the United States, in support of those institutions, we also have to disarm the entire society, quite frankly. I mean, we have to break this cycle of "grab a gun and go pillage and grab what you can."

So, yes, I think we need to stay focused on the disarmament throughout the entire society.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

I wanted to ask Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan a question about the departure of U.S. troops from Liberia, which really precedes the deployment of UN peacekeepers in any significant num-

bers. Yesterday fighting flared in Monrovia, and my question is who will provide quick reaction capacity now if West African peacekeeping troops stumble as they originally stumbled in neighboring Sierra Leone?

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to the question, yes, U.S. forces have departed. However, there are still 3,600 ECOMIL troops in the greater Monrovia area; Senegalese, Ghanaians, all very capable peacekeeping contributors. Two battalions of Nigerians are there as well; as are Gambians, Guinea-Bissauans, Togolese. So Liberia is not absent an international force that can help maintain order.

The quick reaction force for the present is being provided by a Nigerian company that has armored vehicles as part of its equipment. There is also an agreement to get support from the UNAMSIL helicopters, attack helicopters, in Sierra Leone should that be needed. However, over the course of the next couple of weeks, the UN forces will be flowing in. There is a Bangladeshi brigade that will begin flowing in in the next 2 weeks, so there will be a significant increase over time of international force presence in Liberia, and that should help keep the lid on the situation.

And I would note that while there was an incident at a red light district yesterday, that ECOMIL did respond, was able to restore order, and that things today are reported to be totally calm.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.

We will now go to our Ranking Member Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And I would like to just formally once again introduce the mayor of Monrovia, Mrs. Ophelia Saytumah. If you would stand. Glad to have you here with us, and thank you for coming.

Let's see. Mr. Kansteiner, currently we have the ECOWAS troops there, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Togo, and, of course, Nigeria. I understand up to date we have made \$21 million available. Is there any way that the State Department or USAID or someone, Department of Defense, could make funds available, because I am sure that it is woefully inadequate to help support the effort. Do you have any idea?

And secondly, the problems in Monrovia, sewage system, water, potable water and so forth, I understand that there has been no money budgeted for this at the present time. Someone said maybe \$75 thousand, but that was a mistake. Could you tell me how that fits in, and where we are going, and maybe what you see in the near future in the request for an appropriation?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Yes, sir. On the security side, we have spent about \$27 million thus far on bringing these multinational troops to Liberia. Of course, our UN assessment, our 27, 28 percent of that assessment, is yet to come down. But assuming the UN gets close to the 15,000 ceiling, and we might not, as the UN might decide that they only need 12- or 13,000. So we have to wait and see. Of course, we will pay our assessment of the 27 percent, which will be a sizable figure, quite frankly.

On the humanitarian-reconstruction-redevelopment side, about \$40 million has been spent. We have got tens of millions more in the pipeline, but we need—and this is a very rough figure—but we need about \$200 million in fiscal year 2004, and I don't know

where we are going to get it. And we need to work with you all, and we need to figure out how we can take advantage of this opportunity, because if we are going to ever spend the money, this is the year to spend it. This is our chance.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

I would like to—believe it or not I would like to commend the Department of State for its advocacy. I was in Amman, Jordan, on June the 21st at a meeting dealing with economic forums and so forth and had an opportunity to ask Secretary Colin Powell about would the U.S. intervene, and what was his position. And I think he was very supportive of U.S. intervention in Liberia. And so I do appreciate that.

Let me get to the Department of Defense. Now, you withdrew. There is a transition going on October the 4th, so I add up 117 people that the Department of Defense was able to spare, looking at your remarks. Okay. We did 50 people on FAST, 18 people on HAST, 5 people on FST, 3 people on the LAFT, and 2,000 on a boat. What was the reluctance of the Department of Defense to put some boots on the ground in Liberia if we have a \$400 billion budget?

We have our hands full in Iraq, there is no question about it, but I think it was absolutely disgraceful that Secretary Rumsfeld continually arguing against deploying a single person in Liberia. It is disgraceful, it is unconscionable, and it just makes me feel that if it is a black person dying in Africa, Rumsfeld doesn't think they are worth our men on the ground.

Now, you are not Rumsfeld, but I am so sick and tired of his pontificating no policy in Iraq and continually arguing against having any kind of humanitarian issue, any kind of persons on the ground. A thousand people died while the assessment team was in there. What was there to assess? Could you answer that? I count 117 people.

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Congressman.

No, I am not the Secretary, but to answer your question, there are actually a total of 4,900 personnel deployed in the region.

Mr. PAYNE. How many is on the ground? How many stepped into Monrovia?

Ms. WHELAN. How many total stepped into Monrovia? There were, between the fast team, between—

Mr. PAYNE. That was 50.

Ms. WHELAN. The fast team is 50 and is still there. Our quick reaction force, which did deploy for 10 days to the airport, we did have in excess of 200 on the ground.

Mr. PAYNE. They stayed for a week.

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, they did, in support of an ECOMIL operation to go take the seaport as designed. Our mission was—we carried out our mission. It was the mission that the President set for us. Our mission was to support ECOMIL; not to take over for ECOMIL, but to support ECOMIL.

Mr. PAYNE. If that was the mission, that was the false and wrong mission in the first place. We were asking the United States to join with ECOWAS and go into Liberia together, the same way that the British, who supported the United States in Iraq, went into Sierra Leone with their troops, the same way that the French went into

Cote d'Ivoire with their troops, with help from the other troops, the same way that they went into Bunia and Eastern Congo, French troops with African troops coming in. And the greatest defense team in the world found that it could not send 1,000 people, 500? They sent 40 people?

Ms. WHELAN. There were 4,900 people involved in the whole operation spread throughout West Africa during the time. We had forces deployed in Dakar supporting this. We had forces deployed in Sierra Leone supporting this. We had forces deployed. We had teams deployed in all of the countries that contributed to ECOWAS. We had our forces, as you said, deployed offshore positioned to go onshore should they be needed. The good news is they weren't needed. They were there to go onshore if they were needed, but ECOMIL was capable of handling the situation and demonstrated that they were capable, which I think is a credit to our cooperation with them and our security cooperation programs which have built the capacity that you saw demonstrated by the Nigerians, that you saw demonstrated by the Senegalese and the Ghanaians and the Beninwa and the Guinea-Bissauans, who have conducted a very successful operation.

Mr. PAYNE. After 1,000 people died. If they had gone in in June when we suggested it, I even suggested to the President himself that I don't think that one single shot would be fired at America. I know for—I would have staked my career that one shot wouldn't have been fired at a United States marine. They didn't even shoot at the Nigerians, and they don't even like them. They like us. And we stood around and let 1,000 people die during the summer while this great execution went on.

I will yield back Mr. Chairman. I rarely get annoyed, but this made no sense. It was, I feel, disgraceful. And I think that—and if I get the opportunity to see Secretary Rumsfeld, I will tell him the same way that I am—unfortunately, you are the messenger. You know, you just happened to be there. You don't look like him, thank God.

Ms. WHELAN. I will report that back to the Secretary, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. PAYNE. Please give him my remarks, not my regards.

Mr. ROYCE. We will now go to Mr. Tancredo from Colorado.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Whelan, you mentioned that there will be troops, more ECOMIL troops, going into Liberia, and when do you anticipate that they will actually hit that 15,000 authorization level?

Ms. WHELAN. My understanding is that the UN plans to hit the 15,000 by March 1904.

Mr. TANCREDO. Given the reports that we have had about forced labor in the countryside, once again, starting some of those stories that end up being so ugly when they finally get here, and we hear of various kinds of atrocities, given the status of the country at the present time, which certainly, one would have to say is—you know, the best way to describe it is still a basket case, then do you think that, number one, that number is appropriate in order to maintain the status quo, and number two, to actually improve conditions? Do you think that 2004 is a date soon enough for this all to happen?

Ms. WHELAN. With regard to the number, the UN military planners came up with that number, and so I will not pass judgment on that number. But I would note that in Sierra Leone, which is roughly comparable in size to Liberia, that there were roughly about 17,000 plus troops for the UN mission in Sierra Leone. So in that context I think they were capable of addressing the security situation in Sierra Leone once the UN got its ceiling increased. This was later on. This was not initially. Initially the UN had a much smaller number in Sierra Leone, which, as everyone knows here, created significant difficulties for that UN mission. When they increased their ceiling, it went well over 17,000. They were able to put the lid back on the security problem in Sierra Leone.

I think extrapolating from that you can make a reasonable judgment that the UN's estimate of 15,000 for Liberia is an adequate number at this stage. Obviously if the UN feels it is not adequate in the future, they can come back and adjust that number and seek to have that number adjusted. But in our judgment it appears adequate.

Mr. TANCREDO. And when we think back to other operations there in Liberia, of ECOWAS troops in the 1990s, we had some problems. There were problems of the way they comported themselves. And what, if anything, do you think is being done to avoid that kind of a problem?

Ms. WHELAN. I would note that in the 1990s the mission in Liberia was not a UN mission, it was an ECOMOG mission run by ECOWAS. The Nigerians were in charge, and, yes, there were problems, although one, again, must give ECOWAS credit because they did that primarily on their own with very little international support, if you look at the 10-year history.

But in this particular case, the bulk of the UN contributors are actually not going to be West Africans. You are looking currently at 3,600 West Africans, and you are looking at a total UN force of 15,000. Most of the contributors are actually coming from outside of Africa. They are experienced peacekeepers, such as the Bangladeshis, the Indians, the Pakistanis. So I think that you will see a UN operation conducted in the appropriate manner, and you will not see abuses.

Mr. TANCREDO. Will there be—is it your opinion, either one of you, that their primary purpose is to maintain the peace as opposed to actually bringing about some major element of change, major element of salutary change? And, for instance, we certainly have heard about international criminal networks that are operated inside Liberia, and you can have a force there that will contain the situation, but how do you actually get to—I mean, can we dislodge them? Is that possible? Would it be under the auspices of this commitment, this troop commitment, or are we going to just leave that up to the government that takes control?

Ms. WHELAN. I am going to toss part of that question to Assistant Secretary Kansteiner. But with regard to the security aspects of the question, the UN mission in Liberia is a very broad mission. Security is one part of it, and then there are all kinds of other aspects to it, including helping reconstruct the Government of Liberia, get a police force, et cetera.

As far as the security mission and the 15,000 forces that will be committed to that security mission, their responsibilities will be primarily to establish a secure environment in which the other elements of the UN mission as well as international organizations, NGOs, et cetera, can work to help with regard to reconstruction of Liberian society to include addressing criminal issues and other police-related issues.

Mr. KANSTEINER. There are other jobs that the UN is willing to take on, and I am grateful that they are. These tasks include the demobilization, disarming, breaking of these gang cartels. It is really helping stand up a new government. And Jacques Klein has got a tremendous amount of energy and is very focused on all of these DDRR-type issues that, in fact, will provide the structure for a new government.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Meeks of New York.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and let me just subscribe to what my friend said. I never seen him upset before, Mr. Payne, but I think this is a serious issue in which we are currently involved in. And Mr. Chairman, I would like afterwards—I had an opening statement—to submit it for the record.

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection.

Mr. MEEKS. The question really comes up—a lot of it is, are the people of Liberia suffering any less than those of Iraq? If you look at our two policies, are the children who are more accustomed to carrying a rifle than a schoolbook, are they any less in need of a childhood than an Iraqi child; the natural resources of diamonds, gold and timber and agriculture any less able than oil to one day transform Liberia into a self-sufficient country?

I ask these questions because I try to understand why the Administration's policies feel that American taxpayers can pay. There is no question—Mr. Secretary Kansteiner said we don't know where the money is going to come from. We can find \$87 billion to rebuild a nation that actually throughout history has not even made a fraction of the same contribution to America as those individuals from Liberia. The question is especially relevant when the estimated price tag for intervention in Liberia is only \$275 million.

We talk about having multilateral forces. Well, the international community has already agreed to provide the majority of the troops for the peacekeeping and such that the U.S. doesn't even have to request the assistance of international troops. Therefore, it becomes a question of value of lives on the African continent.

There are other things taking place on the continent now. I know there is supposed to have been an agreement on the border dispute, and now things don't seem to be happening there. The question is, what is the true commitment to saving the lives of individuals who happen to be of color, particularly when you look at Liberia and the closeness that it has had with the United States of America. Before the ECOWAS and the UN can have their troops on the ground, we are pulling out. It does not send the right message.

My question I guess first to you, Mr. Secretary, is what can we do to make sure that others in the international community will just see our—not see our retreat from Liberia as an example of what they should do. Unlike the other governments, as Mr. Payne has indicated, they marched in because of the connection between

those countries and Africa and themselves with those troops, the African troops, to make sure they had a better life. I put that to you, Mr. Secretary Kansteiner.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

What we can do is be the leader. What we can do is, when it comes to a pledging conference that the UN will probably call for Liberia at some point in the next few months, we not only show up with a checkbook but we show up with ideas; we show up with plans on how we can actually take this opportunity to rebuild this little country or help rebuild this little country. We take the chance to work with the other donor countries not only to provide resources but in the security case to provide troops.

The Irish, for instance, are right now seriously considering providing a headquarters battalion for Monrovia for the UN peacekeeping operation. That is terrific. We need to be working with Dublin encouraging them to do that. That is great news. But they are looking for our leadership in this. They are looking at what are the Americans doing, and we have to project that leadership, and we have to demonstrate that we are interested, we do care, we are going to spend the money. We are going to find the \$200 million, and we will. I think working together we will find it. I am pretty confident about that. The world wants to see that; and then they will come, they will follow.

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask you this, maybe this will help us, what was the result of the weeks of assessments carried out by the Department of Defense. Do you know the results of that, their assessments?

Ms. WHELAN. The assessments were of dual nature. There was the humanitarian assistance team—assessment team that was in Liberia for a little over—a couple of weeks, which did provide a report which was utilized by AFTA and other U.S. Government agencies as a part of all of the data that they were gathering on the situation. There were also assessment teams and facilitation teams that were sent to the troop-contributing countries for ECOMIL. Their purpose was to go and help those countries get ready for their deployments, help them plan for their deployments, help them assess the readiness of their equipment, the readiness of their troops, advise them; and that is exactly what they did. So during that time they were working with those countries, helping prepare those countries for their movement into Liberia.

We also helped ECOWAS plan for this mission. We had U.S. military planners in Ghana; we had them in Dakar during the ECOWAS summit. They held an impromptu Foreign and Defense Ministers summit to come to an agreement on the ECOMIL mission. We had planners with them there.

So we were constantly working with ECOWAS to facilitate what they were trying to do with regard to their regional organization, taking responsibility for regional security problems that impacted directly on all the members.

Mr. MEEKS. Would you say that was a robust force?

Ms. WHELAN. Yes. I mean, we had teams in eight countries; and we were facilitating ECOWAS conducting the mission. We were not conducting the mission for them. We were working with them so that they could conduct the mission as they desired to do.

Mr. ROYCE. We have one more panel—

Mr. MEEKS. When will that report be accessible to the Members of the African Subcommittee for both the House and Senate? The *L.A. Times* recently reported that the word “robust” force was stricken by the Administration or squashed by the Pentagon, and I would like an opportunity to see what the assessment was and what the report stated. When do you think the Members of this Committee will have an opportunity to see that report?

Ms. WHELAN. Are you speaking with regard to the survey team report?

Mr. MEEKS. The results of the assessments, the report that they talked about, the assessments from the weeks or the months or however long you were there that you determined what the situation was on the ground in Liberia. The *L.A. Times* said there is a report that was completed. Certain things I understand were redacted from the report as a result of pressure from the Pentagon. I would like to see the report or any report that came out in that regard.

Ms. WHELAN. I am not familiar with the *L.A. Times* report, sir. We will take the question and get back to you.

Mr. ROYCE. We have one more panel we are going to go to, but first we want to go to Congresswoman Barbara Lee for her questions.

Ms. LEE. I want to thank the Chairman for the hearing today and thank both of you for participating.

I, too, myself, associate with the very clear remarks of our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, and also of Mr. Meeks and just want to take this maybe a little bit further in terms of a broader question as it relates to Africa.

As a Member of this Subcommittee, I have noticed that the peacekeeping and democracy building accounts in the Africa budget continue to decrease, while the incidents, of course, of civil conflict that they were talking about in Liberia and unrest on the continent is on the increase. I just want to know basically what is this Administration’s position on the issue of peace, democracy and long-term sustainable growth on the continent of Africa? I mean, what is it?

Secondly, let me say, just as it relates to the \$200 million that you mention, Mr. Kansteiner, that it is probably going to be hard to find, but \$87 billion showed up from nowhere. Where—I think we need at least \$500 million for 2004. Why can’t we shave \$500 million off that \$87 billion?

I know African Americans, millions of us, pay taxes in this country; and I am sure there would be widespread support for at least for \$500 million going into Liberia off that \$87 billion. That may be an easy way for you, in terms of the supplemental coming down, for you to make sure that not only is the \$200 million there but at least \$500 million.

Mr. ROYCE. The total is probably close to \$400 million.

Ms. LEE. I am thinking \$500 million. Let us say \$500 million a year.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Let us go for a billion.

Ms. LEE. We have some development costs I think that we need to pursue during this moment of opportunity.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I think there are going to be opportunities that arise that you can't always budget for 18 months, 2 years ahead of time, quite frankly. I am hoping that we are looking at a very successful Sudan peace agreement that is just right around the corner. There will be some resources needed to sustain and bolster that.

Ms. LEE. Eighty-seven billion dollars. Maybe five hundred million dollars.

Mr. KANSTEINER. I don't think it will be hard to find the \$200 million. I think we will find resources for Sudan, too. If you go back and look at what our peacekeeping operations dollars spent, not what we budgeted for 2003 but what we actually spent in 2003, those peacekeeping operation funds were considerably higher than they were in 2002 and 2001. Now partially that is because we had some conflict resolution that we participated in and in fact engaged in and partially because it was opportunities at hand and we have to strike while the iron is hot.

Ms. LEE. Where are you going to find the \$200 million? Where are you going to put it? Is it going to be in the supplemental? Is it—find some discretionary money over there?

Mr. KANSTEINER. I will leave it to the appropriators and the people in the State Department that in fact work those appropriation numbers.

Ms. LEE. You have asked for it.

Mr. KANSTEINER. We will be asking.

Ms. LEE. Let me just ask you in terms of the UN special court for Sierra Leone. My understanding is there is no money left to prosecute people like Charles Taylor as it relates to the reconciliation process.

Mr. KANSTEINER. I believe the UN court's budget is under some stress. Our commitment was a \$15-million, 3-year commitment. That was 2001, 2002 and 2003 monies. We in the Africa bureau kicked in \$5 million per year. \$15 million, that was our obligation. That was what we promised. That was our obligation, and we fulfilled it.

The court seems to realize that it is not enough. They don't have enough to continue on. There are some building costs, and they were building courthouses, and they had some very legitimate costs. So they have added expenses that they weren't prepared for and didn't realize. So they have come back and asked, if there is any way the U.S. Government can kick in more.

We are looking at it. We have met our obligation of the \$15 million. We were happy to do it.

The court is a very important mechanism; and, in fact, Charles Taylor is indicted under that court. How that court can get the necessary resources that will be needed—it is going to be far more than \$5 million from us or \$2 million or whatever we find. That is a bigger question, and perhaps the UN needs to help out there, too.

Ms. LEE. When will we know, given this indictment, whether or not we are going to at least help with this effort?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, our \$15 million, the last tranche of that, that last \$5 million in 2003 was transferred to the court about 3 months ago. I don't know if they have blown through that money

or what, but we will be happy to look in the next few weeks and see if there are some additional resources that we can find for them.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Lee. And I would mention that, compared to the international criminal tribunal that tried Mr. Milosevic or other international courts, this Committee has been impressed with the cost-effectiveness of the court in Sierra Leone.

We are now going to our second panel, and we are going to again thank Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner and Deputy Assistant Secretary Theresa Whelan for their testimony today.

Before you leave, Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, I will be submitting a question for your response concerning the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute. So, Walter, I look forward to our continued work together on seeing that that flashpoint doesn't explode, and I will appreciate your quick response on that question.

I will ask our two panelists to take their seats.

Let me begin with Ms. Nohn Kidau. She served as President of the Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia and has served since 2001. She was a participant at the Accra, Ghana, peace conference; and last spring, Ms. Kidau helped organize a conference on the future of Liberia that included representatives of most major Liberian parties and leaders from Liberian civil society as well. She is an accountant by training, as am I.

Mr. Alex Vines has worked for the New York-based Human Rights Watch over the last decade with a focus on Africa. He is currently a senior researcher for the Business and Human Rights Program. Since last September, Mr. Vines has also been head of the Africa Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. In April 1991, he took a leave of absence from Human Rights Watch and joined the UN panel of experts on Liberia that was established under Security Council Resolution 1343. Mr. Vines served on 3 subsequent panels as an expert until May 1993.

Mr. Vines, we will go with your testimony first; and then we will go with Ms. Nohn Kidau.

STATEMENT OF ALEX VINES, SENIOR RESEARCHER, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Mr. VINES. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on Liberia.

As we have already heard, conditions remain worrying in Liberia as we are reminded by the shooting in Monrovia yesterday. Last weekend, two U.S. warships left waters off Liberia's coast and sailed home, followed this week by a third ship. Yet the Administration defends its actions by claiming that Liberia is stabilized and U.S. forces are no longer needed there. But field research by Human Rights Watch in Liberia even last month shows that currently there are large numbers of marauding armed bands continuing to commit murder, rape, force recruitment and looting in many parts of the country. There is a more detailed description in the submission I have given you.

Protection of the civilian population remains an urgent priority, and a significant U.S. presence on the ground as part of an inter-

national force would have had a profound psychological effect as well as making recruiting of other forces from other countries for the peacekeeping operation easier. Even now, a visible U.S. presence such as a return of U.S. Navy ships at key moments in the peace process would signal that the U.S. is still watching. This worked very well in Sierra Leone when the British did this with their warships from time to time at key moments of the peace process.

The Administration should seek funds from Congress to support the country's reconstruction, including the rebuilding of its judicial and law enforcement institutions. It should back the UN peacekeeping force with human and logistical support. The U.S. could show leadership by quickly contributing personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation; and, as I have already said, civilian protection remains a key priority.

We have heard about the indictment of Mr. Taylor, and Human Rights Watch believes this is a defining moment. We do encourage the U.S. Administration to urge the Nigerian authorities to hand Mr. Taylor over to the special court. We believe that is absolutely essential.

We have also heard about UN sanctions, and I should mention a little bit about them. They have played an important role in the progress toward ending the war in Liberia. They are coming up for review in a month's time in November and could still play a role in supporting efforts to obtain security and stability on the ground in Liberia and in the region.

The Liberian sanctions were at their core designed to shore up the peace process in Sierra Leone. They did fully achieve this objective. But their original justification on Liberia was to cut off Charles Taylor's support for the Sierra Leone rebels. This is no longer valid following the peace process and successful elections in Sierra Leone.

I must note that the effectiveness of sanctions have also been poor and deteriorating over time.

Taylor's forces and the rebel groups have obtained large amounts of arms and ammunition. Indeed, one has to note that Liberia's neighbor, Guinea, has helped undermine the Liberian sanctions through their support for the LURD rebels. Guinea's support of the LURD rebels became all too visible in July, 2003, during the mortar shelling of central Monrovia.

The LURD mortars were very likely to have originated through Guinea; and Guinea, as the Committee knows, sits on the Security Council at the UN and is a very active Member in the Sanctions Committee. We believe at Human Rights Watch that the U.S., as a key member of the Security Council, should ensure that Guinea is properly reprimanded for its support of violation of UN sanctions and its continued support of the LURD from what we see.

Obtaining a consensus on the Security Council for the new basis for Liberian sanctions which is not contingent on events in Sierra Leone was not possible in 2002 and may still be difficult. We believe that there needs to be some rethinking about how sanctions are progressing.

Yesterday, the current panel of experts on Liberia monitoring the sanctions submitted their report to the Sanctions Committee. Over

the next month, the UN Sanctions Committee will discuss its findings in the run-up to the Security Council's review in early November.

The U.S. is a permanent member of the Security Council and can have influence over the debate there, and I suggest that there are some key issues that the U.S. could vanguard. One is that the export of diamonds through the Liberian government should be permitted once a credible certification scheme compatible with the Kimberley process is established.

I would also say there should be a suspension of the travel ban on many of those named on the current list, but it is important to signal that people like Mr. Taylor and key names as sanction busters and human rights abusers should remain on that list.

Finally, the arms embargo shouldn't be lifted. It should stay for the foreseeable future at least until 2005.

We also think that the panel of experts itself should probably be reconfigured, a smaller panel that is very targeted on the current needs of Liberia, rather than based on the previous needs of Security Council 1343 would be a good idea.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to sum up by talking about the very important issue of misuse of revenue by the Taylor government and the challenge that that provides. The reform of the management of Liberian sources of revenue, including the timber sector, is critical for the reconstruction of the country. This is especially true given that the transitional administration that takes over in mid-October has divided the management of the key sources of revenue such as forestry, mines, ports and the maritime registry between the protagonists in the civil war.

For the last 6 years under Charles Taylor, much of the country's wealth was diverted or disappeared, making Liberia one of the poorest nations in the world. Tens of millions of state revenue disappeared through extra-budgetary expenditures or through ad hoc tax exemptions. Rubber, timber and the maritime revenues were key; and, according to the IMF, Liberia's revenues, if properly managed, would generate around U.S. \$79 million a year if tax revenues included.

What I think needs to happen is that—the Security Council passed Resolution 1408 in May, 2002, which called for an audit of revenues particularly deriving from shipping and the timber industry. This was the first time that the Security Council had required an audit of this type. Unfortunately, the Liberian government never conducted any sort of financial audit; and this would be a good step forward if the U.S. could ensure that an internationally verifiable audit regime is introduced for both maritime and timber revenues by the forthcoming transitional government.

We also would like to see—the Liberian government also needs to ensure that the Bureau of Maritime Affairs has its bank account only in the Central Bank of Liberia in order to ensure transparency regarding its use. Although Liberia announced that it would do this in 2001, in fact nothing has occurred. The revenue generation of Liberia is an important challenge, and this is a window of opportunity here to ensure that the wealth of Liberia benefits its poor rather than benefits elite groups who then use it in a highly unaccountable manner.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vines. We thank you and Ms. Kidau for making the trip here and for your testimony. We have put it in the record, and you both made some very good suggestions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vines follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEX VINES, SENIOR RESEARCHER, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on Liberia. I have worked for the New York-based Human Rights Watch for over the last decade with a focus on Africa. I am currently a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch's Business and Human Rights Program. Since last September I have also been the Head of the Africa Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. In April 2001 I took leave of absence from Human Rights Watch to join the U.N. panel of experts on Liberia established under Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001). I have served on three subsequent panels as an expert, until May 2003. I testify before you on behalf of Human Rights Watch, but also with the benefit of the insights I gained over the last two years from being on the U.N. panel of experts on Liberia.

I shall focus in this testimony on the immediate need for civilian protection. I wish to first provide you with a summary from Human Rights Watch's field investigation in Liberia less than a month ago. I will also discuss the issue of sanctions. Finally, I will talk about the important question of Liberia's management of its revenue and especially its maritime registry. In each case I will highlight recommendations for U.S. policy toward Liberia.

I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Current Human Rights Conditions

Conditions remain worrying in Liberia, despite assurances by the West African-led peacekeepers that the situation has stabilized. President Bush pledged that America would "help the people of Liberia find the path to peace," on his way to Africa this summer. Three ships with thousands of U.S. Marines steamed for Liberia's shores. And on August 15, after the departure of Liberia's brutal leader, Charles Taylor, a "vanguard" force of 200 Americans landed in Monrovia, raising hopes among Liberians that the United States would aid them at last.

Ten days later the Marines withdrew to their ships, leaving an ill-equipped and undermanned West African force in Liberia's capital. Last weekend two U.S. warships left waters off Liberia's coast and sailed home, followed this week by the third ship. This leaves just about 100 U.S. troops in Liberia, providing security at the U.S. embassy and working as coordinators with the 3,250 peacekeepers. Was this just a token gesture without the risk of assuming any responsibility?

The thinking behind this deployment appears to be the product of compromise between the State Department's vision of wider American global interests and the Pentagon's narrower view. The administration defends its actions by claiming Liberia is stabilizing and U.S. forces are no longer needed. It is true that West African peacekeepers have helped reduce violence in Monrovia, Kakata and Buchanan. The problem is that peacekeepers have barely moved into the unstable countryside where U.S. forces could make a significant difference.

The U.N. took over the peacekeeping responsibilities in Liberia yesterday and a force of 15,000 has been proposed, but it could take months for the force to reach full capacity. In Sierra Leone, the delayed deployment of peacekeeping troops following the 1999 Lomé peace accord contributed greatly to the collapse of the country back into war in April 2000. Currently marauding armed bands continue to commit murder, rape, forced recruitment and looting in many parts of the country.

Ragtag government militias and fighters from both rebel groups—Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the splinter group made up of ex-LURD members called the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—operate with little discipline or command-and-control. They loot in part because they are hungry and not being paid.

Hundreds of thousands of persons have repeatedly been uprooted as they fled the countryside in terror of these armed groups. Those groups are also seeking to secure the last spoils of battle in expectation of the territory being secured by peacekeepers. Soldiers systematically extort money and other goods from those seeking refuge and have blocked them from moving to safety. Fleeing civilians are also vulnerable to rape and abduction by the armed groups. Thousands of people remain in hiding in the bush where adequate food, water, shelter and medical care are

scarce or non-existent. Most of the population remains in grave need of basic necessities, particularly outside the capital, Monrovia. In Bong County, fighting between government forces and the LURD rebels has caused the mass displacement of the population.

Rape and other sexual violence against girls and women remain pervasive and is committed by all parties. The sexual violence, which is also committed against young boys, often accompanies the widespread looting.

Both the government militias and rebel fighters rely on child soldiers, most of whom are between thirteen and sixteen years old, but some are as young as six. Many have been forcibly recruited. Human Rights Watch researchers saw many soldiers that appeared to be below the age of eighteen (perhaps as young as thirteen) at government and rebel checkpoints.

A comprehensive peace agreement signed on August 18, 2003, included a pact by the government and rebel forces to grant access to humanitarian organizations throughout the country. However, the insecure situation continues to impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in greatest need.

Protection of the civilian population remains an urgent priority. All sectors of Liberian society, from civilians to civil society groups, and even the combatants from all the warring parties, have repeatedly called for a prompt and expansive deployment of ECOMIL (the 3,500 West African peacekeepers now operating under a U.N. mandate and known as UNMIL) and other international forces.

A more robust U.S. military deployment could have gone a long way to ending much of this misery. Liberia is not Somalia or the Middle East. The U.S. is much respected and welcomed in Liberia, probably more so than in most other countries in the world. A significant U.S. presence on the ground as part of the international force would have had a profound psychological effect on Liberians and the leaders of the armed factions. It would have deterred further violence on the ground and also make recruiting more forces from other countries for the peacekeeping operation easier.

The administration should seek funds from Congress to support the country's reconstruction, including the rebuilding of its judicial and law enforcement institutions. It should back the 15,000 strong U.N. peacekeeping force with human and logistical support. It is not too late for the U.S. presence on the ground to be beefed up. The U.S. could show leadership by quickly contributing Marines to the U.N. peacekeeping operation. Civilian protection, facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and establishment of conditions for the safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and support for disarmament and demobilization efforts are immediate priorities.

For more recommendations, as well as a detailed description of ongoing human rights abuses, see the September 9, 2003, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, "Liberia: Greater Protection Required For Civilians Still at Risk," available as a link from www.hrw.org/press/2003/09/liberia091603.htm.

The Indictment of Charles Taylor

A defining moment came on June 4, 2003, when the Special Court for Sierra Leone "unsealed" its indictment against Charles Taylor. He is charged as one of the people who bears "the greatest responsibility" for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during Sierra Leone's brutal civil war. His alleged crimes include murder, taking hostages, rape, extermination, sexual slavery, and the use of child soldiers.

The indictment set off a chain of events that resulted in Taylor accepting an offer of exile from President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. President Bush repeatedly told Charles Taylor to leave Liberia. In a deal supported by West African leaders and welcomed by the U.N., Taylor handed the presidency to an interim government. In mid-October, that government will be replaced by a transitional government of national unity, whose chairperson will lead the country until elections are held in late 2005.

Taylor now resides in a hilltop mansion in Calabar, in southeastern Nigeria. However, Human Rights Watch believes that exile must not shield Taylor from prosecution before the Sierra Leone Special Court. International law does not accept amnesty for atrocities that amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes. The Special Court's statute and implementing legislation provide that neither amnesty nor a suspect's official capacity is a bar to prosecution.

The U.S. administration should urge the Nigerian authorities to hand over ex-President Charles Taylor to the Special Court.

II. SANCTIONS ON LIBERIA

The Role of Sanctions

U.N. sanctions have played an important role in progress toward ending the war in Liberia. They are coming up for review within a month (November 4, 2003) and could still play a role in supporting efforts to obtain security and stability on the ground in Liberia and in the region.

An arms embargo was placed on Liberia in 1992 following a request from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) after they had intervened militarily in the Liberian civil war to prevent Charles Taylor and his NPFL rebels from taking power. However, Liberia became an example of the lack of implementation of sanctions. It even took two years for a Sanctions Committee to be established to monitor their enforcement. Because of the failure of enforcement, the sanctions had no impact, even though they were maintained on Liberia after Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997.

In March 2001 this changed. In response to a report presented by the Panel of Experts established to monitor sanctions applied to the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other forces operating in Sierra Leone, the Security Council decided to approve new sanctions on Liberia to start in May 2001. The basis for these sanctions was President Taylor's support for the RUF in Sierra Leone in violation of the existing sanctions. Security Council Resolution 1343 reauthorized the arms embargo on Liberia; imposed a travel ban on key officials, their spouses, and business associates; mandated the freezing of all financial assets of the RUF; and called for the expulsion of RUF members from Liberia. An embargo was also imposed on all of Liberia's diamond exports, and in July 2003 an embargo on the export of timber was also added.

A new panel of experts was also created to monitor compliance with the Liberian sanctions. Drawing originally from the Sierra Leone panel of five, it has since been renewed five times for periods ranging from five weeks to six months.

Security Resolution 1343 was the first time that the Council imposed sanctions on one country for its refusal to comply with sanctions on another. The Liberia sanctions were at their core designed to shore-up the peace process in Sierra Leone. They fully achieved this objective. The diamond embargo in particular resulted in an almost complete cessation of the trade in illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone to Liberia. The sanctions assisted with the trade axis re-aligning itself to Freetown. Patterns of diamond trading also changed, with some Liberian rough gems passing through to Sierra Leone to be sold from there.¹

Events in Sierra Leone in late 2000 and 2001 also show that the threat and imposition of sanctions on Liberia probably contributed to the RUF's decision to sign an unconditional ceasefire in November 2000 and their re-affirmation of the agreement in May 2001. Sanctions were not solely responsible for this positive development. Hundreds of troops from the United Kingdom sent in May 2000 to support the U.N., as well as sustained Guinean military operations against the RUF in Liberian territory also played a role. Sanctions on Liberia within this context helped to weaken Monrovia's support of the RUF. This in turn assisted the RUF's efforts to transform itself into a political party that peacefully contested the parliamentary and presidential elections in December 2002.

Mandate of Sanctions Needs to Change

By early 2003, following successful elections in Sierra Leone, the original justification of Security Council Resolution 1343 for sanctions on Liberia had been superseded by events on the ground. In late 2002 and mid 2003 the Panel of Experts submitted reports demonstrating that the mandate for the panel was increasingly outdated and that if the sanctions were to continue they needed to be underpinned with a new basis.²

The effectiveness of the sanctions had also deteriorated over time. Increasingly the Liberian government violated the sanctions imposed on it. For example, the travel ban was routinely violated and weekly sanctions-busting flights of arms and

¹United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001)*, paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, U.N. document S/2001/1015 (New York: United Nations, October 26, 2001).

²See U.N. Liberia panel reports: United Nations, *Report of Panel of Experts on Liberia in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1408 (2002)*, (United Nations: New York, October 25, 2002), U.N. document S/2002/1115; United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002)*, paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia, (United Nations: New York: April 19, 2002), U.N. Document No. S/2002/470; United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003)*, concerning Liberia, (United Nations: New York, April 24, 2003), U.N. document S/2003/498.

ammunition arrived in Monrovia. The Panel also found its investigations in Liberia became more difficult to carry out. People were less willing to speak to the Panel, and the government became more defiant, obstructive, and hostile to the Panel's work. Public sympathy for sanctions also had declined in the face of a growing rebel insurgency backed by neighboring Guinea.

The Guinea Connection

Liberia's neighbor Guinea has helped undermine the Liberia, though support for the LURD rebels. Guinea's support of the LURD rebels became all too visible in July 2003, during the mortar shelling of central Monrovia. Dozens of mortar rounds fell on a compound across from the U.S. Embassy, where thousands of civilians had taken shelter. Scores of civilians died and over 2,000 people were wounded by mortars and stray bullets in the attack.

The supply of these mortar rounds is telling. In late June, the LURD ran out of ammunition and were forced to abandon an offensive in Monrovia. Three weeks later, re-supplied with ammunition, including mortar rounds, LURD attacked again. Their bombardment led to many of the casualties around the U.S. embassy.

The LURD mortars very likely came through Guinea, a recipient of U.S. military aid. Human Rights Watch documented LURD's links to Guinea last year and called on Guinea and the United States to hold LURD accountable for its abusive conduct of war (See, "Back to the Brink: War Crimes by Liberian Government and Rebels," May 2002, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/liberia0402-04.htm>). In April of this year a U.N. panel of experts, which had also linked Guinea and LURD, reported suspicions that flights into Guinea for a mining company carried weapons that were later transported to LURD by sea and land.

Guinea's support of the LURD has been widely documented, not least in U.N. panel reports, but only in July this year did the U.S. government strongly call on Guinea to cease its support for the LURD. Human Rights Watch is also concerned about the nature and level of U.S. military assistance to Guinea in recent years, in light of Guinea's known ties to the LURD.

Guinea is currently a member of the Security Council and has shown a keen interest in U.N. monitoring of the sanctions on the Liberian government. Yet Guinean support of the LURD is in violation of U.N. sanctions. Guinea has thus far evaded international condemnation, or any serious consequences, for its record of support to an abusive insurgent group and violations of the sanctions on Liberia. Particularly since Guinea sits on the Security Council, its violation of these sanctions needs to be condemned in the strongest manner-including by the United States. Moreover, the U.N. Security Council should consider imposing secondary sanctions on all regional governments found to have been involved in the Liberian war.

A New Basis for the Liberia Sanctions

Obtaining a consensus in the Security Council for the new basis for Liberia sanctions was not possible in 2002. Instead, the status quo was preferable for a handful of states that had regime change as their ultimate goal. The involvement of Liberian troops in support of rebels in western Cote d'Ivoire in September 2002 also resulted in France ending its opposition to a U.S.-proposal for timber sanctions on Liberia. The agreement in the Security Council to add timber sanctions were used to signal to Charles Taylor's supporters to drop him and by Liberia's rebels as encouragement for their efforts to remove Taylor.

Next Steps on Sanctions

On September 30, the current Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions against Liberia submitted their report to the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. Over the next month at the U.N., the Sanctions Committee will discuss its findings in the run-up to the Security Council's review of Liberia in early November.

Liberia's sanctions are currently in force to May 2004 and will be reviewed in November 2003. In anticipation of the review of the Liberia sanctions, a debate is already underway about the future of the sanctions regime on Liberia. At this stage, the fate of timber sanctions is difficult to predict. The U.N. Special Representative for Liberia, Jacques Klein, has called for a lifting of the sanctions. However, environmental and conservation groups oppose lifting sanctions and wish to see them transformed into an industry reform mechanism.

With respect to the other sanctions on Liberia, the experience adjusting the sanctions regimes on Sierra Leone and Angola is instructive. In Sierra Leone, the Panel of Experts was not reappointed in 2001 and much of the travel ban was lifted in 2002 in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections in December. However, an arms embargo remains in place on Sierra Leone for non-state actors.

The Sierra Leone diamond embargo imposed in 2000 finally expired on June 4, 2003, and could prove to be a model for Liberia. Diamond exports started in late

2000 following a trilateral mission of the United Kingdom, the United States and Belgium in July 2000 to inspect a Certificate of Origin Monitoring System for imports of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. The certification regime was approved by the Security Council on October 6, 2000 and exports started shortly afterwards. Since then there has been an upsurge in diamond exports. The value in exports increased 160 percent in 2001 followed the introduction of the scheme. In 2002 this increased further to 351,859.23 in carats. More than 1,000 diamond-mining licenses have been issued in 44 chiefdoms. However, smuggling still accounts for over 50 percent of the trade. Such a scheme could be replicated in Liberia—hopefully with a stronger monitoring process to halt smuggling. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy has already engaged in discussions about establishing a credible Kimberley Process diamond certification scheme.³

As a permanent member of the Security Council, the U.S. can have significant influence over the direction of the sanctions debate on Liberia. The following are steps that should be supported:

- The export of diamonds through the Liberian government should be permitted once a credible certification scheme is established and, as in Sierra Leone, the Sanctions Committee should monitor progress over several years prior to an eventual lifting of the diamond embargo.
- Suspension of the travel ban on many of those named on the current list is important to signal progress in the post-Taylor period; however, key names—such as those of known arms dealers, Charles Taylor, and other persons implicated in gross human rights abuses—clearly need to remain.
- The arms embargo needs to continue for the foreseeable future, at least until 2005, after presidential and parliamentary elections.

Ensuring that the arms embargo is properly respected should be a key task of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. The example of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) could help here. The Milops operation and its Military Intelligence Office cell at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown played a critical role. It was a nerve center producing daily, weekly and monthly briefings on political and military developments. The system relied heavily on personnel from the United Kingdom. In Liberia, this could be a key strategic area where the U.S. contributes skilled personnel and logistical support.

A Future Panel of Experts

The monitoring of these sanctions in this review period could call on the Sierra Leone and Angola experience for guidance. The number of experts on the Liberia panel could be reduced in November, below its peak level of six experts. Numbers of experts do not necessarily equate with better reporting, and a reduction in size provides cost-saving in addition to signaling a positive response to political developments. Human Rights Watch further recommends, as it has in the past, that the Security Council establish a permanent sanctions unit in the U.N. Secretariat to ensure continuity and the preservation of institutional memory with respect to the monitoring of U.N. sanctions regimes.

- A smaller investigative panel should be appointed in 2004. It should have a mandate of several months to submit a report prior to the review of sanctions in May.
- The U.S. should support and promote the creation of a permanent sanctions unit in the U.N. Secretariat.

III. MANAGEMENT OF REVENUE

Misuse of Revenue by the Taylor Government

The reform of the management of Liberia's sources of revenue, including from the timber sector, is critical for the reconstruction of the country. This is especially true given that the transitional administration that takes over in mid-October has divided the management of the key sources of revenue, forestry, mines, ports and the maritime registry between the protagonists in the civil war.

For the last six years, under Charles Taylor, much of the country's wealth was diverted or disappeared, making Liberia one of the poorest nations in the world. Tens of millions of dollars of state revenue disappeared, through extra-budgetary expenditures or through ad hoc tax exemptions. Rubber, timber and maritime revenues were key and, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), could generate U.S. \$79 million a year if tax revenue is also included.

³ Ibid.

The sanctions-busting arms trade to Liberia depended on the ability of clients or their patrons to pay, whether in cash or precious gems. Liberia's weapons purchases from 1999 to 2003 were mainly financed by off budget spending by the Liberian government. Payments were made from revenue that bypassed the central bank and was therefore not accounted for in the budget. Taylor favored maintaining major off-budget agencies—the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA), the Forestry Development Authority (FDA) and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC)—headed by his close associates.

The U.N. Liberia panel of experts, on which I served, documented nine payment instructions for a total of \$7,500,000 from 1999 to 2001 to nine different bank accounts. These were all off-budget expenditures from the timber industry. Two of these were used as payments for defense-related expenditure.

On May 6, 2002, prior to the introduction of timber sanctions in July 2003, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1408 (2002). That resolution called for an audit of the revenues derived from the shipping registry and the Liberian timber industry. It represents the first time that the Security Council has required an audit. The relevant portion of the resolution states:

“Calls upon the Government of Liberia to take urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of Liberia from the Liberia Shipping Registry and the Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes, and not in violation of this resolution, and to report back to the Committee on the steps taken and results of such audits not later than three months after the date of adoption of this resolution.”

The Liberian government did very little in response to the resolution. It commissioned a systems and management audit, one that avoided any financial analysis. There remains an important opportunity to ensure that the timber revenues are appropriately audited and managed. The U.S. should encourage and provide technical assistance for a full audit and the creation of a system to ensure this revenue is used for “legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes.”

Maritime Revenues: A Case Study

Maritime revenues have been problematic. Liberia has hosted a United States-based maritime shipping registry since 1949. Liberia today has the second largest maritime fleet in the world. The registry has traditionally had a high proportion of tanker tonnage. In recent years, the prime concern has not been about the technical quality of the registry but what happens to the money generated from it. From 1949 to 1999, the registry earned around U.S. \$700 million for the Liberian government. During the 1990–1996 civil war in Liberia and during the interim period following that war, revenue from the registry represented some 90 percent of the Liberian government's total income. In 2003 this was once again the case. Maritime revenues provide on average some U.S. \$15 to 18 million a year, although in 2003 the IMF estimated this had declined to U.S. \$13 million.

Transactions by the United States-based Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry (LISCR) to off-budget accounts were also used to pay for illegal arms shipments. After LISCR ceased the practice in August 2000, other off-budget outlays of maritime funds were utilized.

The U.N. panel also documented in detail how the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs assisted sanctions-busting efforts, notably by arranging payments from the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA) funds and providing logistical support. The U.N. panel concluded in its October 2001 report that the Liberia's commissioner of maritime affairs and the BMA were “little more than a cash extraction operation and cover from which to fund and organize off-budget expenditures, including for sanctions-busting, and that the funds would need to be protected from Bureau misuse.”

Human Rights Watch gave a detailed testimony on misuse of Liberian maritime revenues to the House Armed Services Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine on June 13, 2002. It can be found at: <http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-06-13vines.html>.

Accounting for the Maritime Revenue in Monrovia

The U.N. panel investigations found that the maritime funds were remitted directly to a tripartite account held at the Ecobank in Monrovia; the commissioner of maritime affairs and the minister of finance are signatories with a third determinational signatory controlled by the Executive Mansion—the Liberian presidency.

Following a recommendation by the International Monetary Fund, in October 2001 the Liberian authorities directed that government bank accounts be moved from commercial banks to the Central Bank of Liberia. The Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA), however, still maintains its own three-signatory account, and payments by LISCR were not made directly to the Central Bank but through a Liberian Embassy and a Bureau of Maritime Affairs account in the U.S.

This makes tracking what happens to the money once it reaches the BMA difficult—all the more so, because Liberia’s auditor general last audited the BMA over a decade ago, in 1988. When the U.N. panel tried to examine the accounts of BMA in April 2002, it was not able to do so. The panel was informed that a generator had broken down and that it would be repaired only after the panel had left Liberia.

Liberia’s Ministry of Finance admitted that in 2001, due to increased defense expenditure, there had been significant diversion of maritime funds for extrabudgetary use by the Executive Mansion. The figures provided by the Ministry of Finance for 2001 provided much higher remittances than those registered by the Central Bank of Liberia. This significant discrepancy is mainly due to high extrabudgetary demands on these funds by the Liberian presidency. The Finance Minister from September 1999 to July 2002, Nathaniel Barnes, also admitted that “the revenue was largely diverted,” for the “war effort. But there was no kind of accountability.”⁴

In September 2000, following an IMF staff visit to review the January-June 2000 Staff Monitored Program (SMP), the IMF expressed concern about the shortfall in maritime revenue and wrote that “the continued decline in maritime inflows is troublesome and should be reviewed closely so that remedial measures can be taken if necessary.” In December 2001, IMF again noted after its Article IV consultations that reported payments from the shipping registry to the government differed from collections at the Ministry of Finance by some U.S. \$2 million, reflecting deductions at source by the BMA or timing differences in the transfer of funds from offshore accounts. The IMF in its 2002 Article IV report of February 2003 noted that its mission had been “unable to attain any meaningful financial information . . . even of an unaudited basis, for the BMA and that there had been no action for a independent financial audit of it.”

Table 1 shows almost U.S. \$4 million discrepancy between the funds received by the Ministry of Finance and those recorded by the Central Bank of Liberia during 2001 and early 2002.

Table 1: Maritime Remittances 2001–2002

Month	Ministry of Finance	Central Bank
Jan-Feb	3,242,090	387,272
Mar-Apr	1,530,211	489,091
May-Jun	2,545,237	1,198,181
Jul-Aug	1,116,149	0
Sep-Oct	1,003,581	3,356,363
Nov-Dec	2,570,022	1,657,000
Jan-Feb 02	2,682,096	2,488,000
Total U.S. \$	13,312,386	9,576,907
Discrepancy equals U.S. \$ 3,736,479		

The main problem with the Liberian shipping and corporate registry is what happens to the money once it is transferred to an account controlled by the Liberian government.

The Need for Independent Oversight and Transparency

The publication of three U.N. panel of experts’ reports (S/2001/1015 of October 26, 2001; S/2002/470 of April 19, 2002; and S/2002/1115 of October 25, 2002) has heightened international attention on how the Liberian flag of convenience is run and what happens to the funds it generates.

The U.N. panel in its October 2001 report recommended that the U.N. Security Council committee should set up an escrow account for all revenues generated from the shipping and corporate registry. It also encouraged the IMF and the government of Liberia to reach an agreement to audit these funds and to designate those funds

⁴Tim Weiner, “Ex-Leader Stole \$100 Million From Liberia, Records Show,” *New York Times*, September 18, 2003.

for development purposes. Sadly, the recommendation of setting up an escrow account was never taken up by the Security Council.

The Liberian Ministry of Finance on November 23, 2001, announced that it would audit and ring-fence the shipping and corporate registry. On receipt of income from the registry, the Ministry of Finance would channel the funds through the Central Bank of Liberia and would segregate those funds for infrastructure, social, health and welfare development and support programs.

This was followed on December 3, 2001, by a letter from the Ministry of Finance to the IMF requesting assistance to set up a financial monitoring mechanism. The IMF replied on December 14, welcoming the initiative, but ruled that it was enterprise specific and therefore outside the IMF's mandate. The Ministry of Finance and LISCR then approached the nongovernmental anti-corruption group Transparency International for assistance, but Transparency International also turned down the request on the grounds that such an exercise was outside its mandate. However, they recommended that the ministry approach Crown Agents, a United Kingdom-based company that specializes in port management, auditing and project management.

Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002) called for an audit of the revenues derived from the shipping registry, as noted. Serious negotiations with the Crown Agent Consultancy, Inc. began in mid-July 2002 but by August had collapsed over the Liberian government's insistence on a strict liability clause in any contract. In September the government then announced first-stage bids for auditing maritime and forestry. This turned out to be a management audit and systems design—which would not look at any figures. The government awarded the contract to Deloitte & Touche, who withdrew from the contract in December on the advice of its New York and London offices. The government then continued with a local firm called Voscom Inc.

A full independent audit of the funds received by the Liberian government still has not been conducted. However, this audit will only be as effective as its terms of reference allow. An audit should be retroactive to 1997, run for a number of years and be publicly available for independent scrutiny. This audit trail should also include how the funds are then allocated and spent.

- The U.S. should ensure that an internationally verifiable audit regime is introduced for both maritime and timber revenues by the forthcoming transitional government in accordance with Resolution 1408.
- The Liberian government also still needs to ensure that the BMA has its bank account only at the Central Bank of Liberia in order to ensure transparency regarding its use of shipping revenue. Although the Liberian government announced in October 2001 that this would be done, it has taken no action to date to comply with this promise to the IMF.

Mr. ROYCE. Now we are going to Ms. Nohn Kidau and ask you to keep it to 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF NOHN KIDAU, PRESIDENT, MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN LIBERIA

Ms. KIDAU. I am deeply gratified and humbled by the opportunity to address this august body on behalf of the Liberian people. The Liberian people have endured so much pain, death and destruction for nearly 2 decades. I feel today with anxiety about the hearing, hoping that it will serve as a springboard from which a blueprint can continue to support the United States—

Mr. ROYCE. You know the good news, Ms. Kidau, we have read your testimony because you submitted it in advance. So what I would like to ask of you is if you would, in your own words, in the next couple of minutes just tell us how you feel and just tell us your observations. You are the President of the Movement for Democratic Change. You have something to say. We are going to listen to the next few minutes. Don't worry. We read this last night.

Ms. KIDAU. I have two things that I want to ask you. I ask the United States of America take the lead and play an active role in

the future of Liberia and that the United States of America backs up its role and leadership so that—with the necessary resources so that peace and stability can come to Liberia and Liberia be used as a showcase for democracy.

As you know, I was part of the peace accord in Accra, and I believe that the peace agreement was worth it, and if it is implemented, we will have peace in Liberia. As you know, no agreement is worth the paper it is printed on without a means to enforce the agreement.

Liberia—the point that I want to make here is that Liberia should not be viewed as a burden on the United States; rather, as a friend that you have in Africa. We were there for you during the cold war. In my opinion, Liberia is the only country in the whole world that is as loyal to the United States as we are. You created Liberia and the population—you create a Liberia. Contrary to the popular belief that Liberia was created by freed American slaves, Liberia was actually created by the American Colonization Society, the ACS. The freed American slaves were never a member of the ACS. For that, the whole world looks to United States to take the lead and to lift Liberia out of the civil war, just like the French did for Ivory Coast and Great Britain did for Sierra Leone.

Most important here is disarmament. Nothing is going to work in Liberia unless combatants are disarmed and they are demobilized and that they are reintegrated into society.

There are a lot of internally displaced people. There are a lot of refugees that are going to be returning to Liberia. They are going to need—you need to put some resources behind that. Otherwise there will be no peace in Liberia, and that is the main point of this whole hearing—this testimony.

I will also ask that you please permit my lengthy testimony to be a part of your record.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kidau follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NOHN KIDAU, PRESIDENT, MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN LIBERIA

Chairman Ed Royce, members of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Congress of the United States of America. I am deeply gratified and indeed humbled for the privilege extended me to address this august body on behalf of the faceless, innocent people of my country, Liberia. I join my countrymen in salute of this great country for the critical role it has played and continues to play in our search for lasting peace and stability for our beloved Liberia. The people of Liberia, having endured so much pain, death, and destruction for nearly two decades now, especially those of the past 13 years, are filled with anxiety about this hearing, hoping that it serves as a springboard from which a blueprint for continued support by the US government for peace in Liberia will come.

We only ask two simple but critical things:

- 1 That the United States of America takes the lead and active role in Liberia's future;
- 2 That the United States of America backs up its role and leadership with the necessary resources to make Liberia a showcase for democracy in all of Africa.

I would like to acknowledge at this time the contributions of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, in particular its Director, Mr. Todd Howland and Dr. Abdelilah Kadili, who have provided important support to us throughout our struggle. Special thanks also go to Professor Katherine S. Broderick, Dean of the University of the District of Columbia School of Law, Professor William L. Robinson and Professor Fariborz S. Fatemi, co-chairs of the Liberia Support

Group created by the Center for Human rights to support the work of Archbishop Francis.

The Liberia Support Group has endeavored to chart a course of action that would bring maximum publicity to bear on the situation in Liberia, as well as make certain that the international community is, at all times, apprised of the circumstances as they exist. This testimony is an attempt to further buttress this objective by providing a realistic view of the Liberian conflict and efforts to resolve it, and to help bring lasting peace to our war-torn country.

THE VIABILITY OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

The peace agreement reached in Accra, Ghana between the warring factions, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD, Movement for Democracy in Liberia, MODEL, and the Charles Taylor Government, GOL, sets the stage for implementing lasting peace in Liberia. It is my considered opinion that the peace agreement, though flawed, represents our best hope for achieving peace in our country, Liberia. I refer to the document as being flawed because it allocates too much power to the warring factions, but given the prevailing circumstances under which this agreement was reached, there seemed to be no other alternative to move the process forward so as to affect a cessation of the fighting.

As you are well aware, no agreement is worth the paper it is printed on without the means to enforce the terms of the agreement. Likewise the viability of the Liberian Peace Agreement is dependent upon the availability of a force with a mandate to enforce its terms. The document is in no way a panacea for addressing the atrocities that have been perpetrated on an innocent populace; however, within the framework of this agreement lay the desire of the Liberian people to rise up from the ashes of destruction and rebuild our country brick by brick.

Another factor that influences the viability of the peace agreement is the lack of funding to foster reintegration programs for refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as former combatants. In my opinion, this is one of the keys to the success of this agreement. Without the means to adequately address the needs of these people, we run the risk of having them remain indefinitely in limbo, thus creating an environment conducive to starting more strife. We appeal to you, to assist us in this regard to provide for our people the basic necessities to begin life.

Since the beginning of hostilities in Liberia, in December 1989, there have been numerous attempts at resolving the conflict between warring factions. These efforts, at best, have achieved only temporary cessation of the fighting. This conflict has resulted in the deaths of approximately 250,000 Liberians, according to estimates by the United Nations.

Our best hope for peace came in the form of an agreement attained by forcing the warring parties to attend a peace conference in the Ghanaian capital, Accra. The conference was organized under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and attended by members of the international community, including representatives of the government of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and other friendly governments. The former head of state of Nigeria, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, served as facilitator of the conference, while the President of The Republic of Ghana, H.E. John Kuffour, Chairman of ECOWAS, served as host and general chairman. The results of this conference are proving to be the best vehicle yet for attaining lasting peace in Liberia, providing the framework for putting into place an interim government charged with the responsibility of leading the country to democratic civilian elections.

Liberia should not be viewed as a burden on the United States and the international community—we are a founding member of the United Nations, and the closest friend of the United States in Africa. We were there for you during the cold war and we played a role, however small, in your victory. It was Liberia whose signature broke the tie to create the state of Israel. Above all, Liberia and the United States have a unique relationship dating as far back as the 1800s. For that, the world looks to the United States to take the first step and lead the efforts to lift Liberia out of the ashes of the bloody civil war and save it from itself just as France did for the Ivory Coast and Great Britain for Sierra Leone.

Liberia needs you now more than ever before. You cannot and should not abandon Liberia now when it needs you most. The world is not only watching you, but it is calling on you to do right by Liberia so that there can be lasting peace in the West African Sub-region.

ARCHBISHOP FRANCIS' VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS:

The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group were instrumental in helping to put together a series of events that

eventually led to intense pressure being brought to bear on Taylor which culminated in his resignation and departure to Nigeria. One such event was the recent visits Archbishop Michael K. Francis, the Robert F. Kennedy 1999 Human Rights Award Laureate, made to the United States in February and July, 2003. Archbishop Michael Kpakala Francis, the most outspoken critic of the brutal Taylor years, provided a very detailed insight of the ills of the Taylor administration.

During his first visit to the US, from February 27 to March 7, 2003, at the invitation of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia (MDCL), Archbishop Francis gave a very powerful and moving address in which he outlined the atrocities being committed by the Taylor administration against the citizens of Liberia. He also met with Mr. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, members of the United States House of Representatives, as well as Members of the United States Senate, the Director of The Agency for International Development and representatives of local and international human rights organization. In each of these meetings, Archbishop Francis insisted on the need for the U.S. to adopt a more proactive role towards the situation in Liberia. He also made it clear to all that peace and security were considered *sine nonne qua* to free, fair and democratic elections in Liberia.

Archbishop Francis visited the United States a second time from July 27 to 30, 2003. He then met with Mr. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor's Assistant for Africa, Senator Ted Kennedy and other members of the U.S. Senate, as well as members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Archbishop Francis also met with the Secretary General of the United Nations Mr. Kofi Annan. There again Archbishop Francis made the case for a strong and unequivocal intervention of the U.S. in the warring situation in Liberia. These two visits helped to spur calls from Members of Congress, the UN Secretary General, the press, as well as from some European and African leaders for intervention by the United States.

Liberians salute Archbishop Francis, recipient of The Robert F. Kennedy 1999 Human Rights Award, laureate and a Champion of Human Rights in Liberia for his gallant efforts toward peace in our country.

UN REPRESENTATIVE JACQUES PAUL KLEIN

The appointment of Mr. Jacques Paul Klein as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General to Liberia is certainly a positive development for Liberia. Liberians are very excited about the prospects for peace that this man brings to the country. It is our hope and expectation that the international community with the backing of the US government will provide him the support he needs to succeed.

political presence such as the UN Special Representative is useful in enhancing the following:

- The transitional government and the parties to the conflict are all acting in accordance with the terms of the peace agreement;
- The transitional government is creating minimum conditions to hold credible elections;
- The transitional government and the international community are working in full coordination to ensure the integration of ex-combatants into the legitimate institutional, political and security framework of the country and providing training and opportunities for their integration into the socio-economic frame work of the country;
- Assisting the newly elected government and legislature in consolidating peace;
- Providing that the national media and civil society with the necessary means, tools and financial resources to play an effective role in the consolidation of the peace process and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law;
- *Effectve civilian governance capacity* depends upon skilled technicians and professionals setting up the critical structures of state and civil society particularly civil administration, police and judiciary and must ensure that minimum state structures for effective governance are re-established;
- *Civil Administration*: Particular effort should be made to obtain civil administrators from ECOWAS countries to act primarily in an advisory capacity but may need to act in an executive capacity;
- *Police*: Critically needed to monitor, advise, and restructure the national police force. Police from primarily common law countries should be recruited.

One leading bi-lateral partner should be identified to provide long-term development and training support;

- *Legal practitioners:* Judges, lawyers, prosecutors of common law background are to monitor and advise the re-establishment of the national judiciary. One lead agency/bi lateral partner should be identified early on to provide long-term development and restructuring of the judiciary. Transitional justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be placed under the authority of the International Criminal Court;
- *Electoral experts:* must be assigned to ensure the training and oversight of National Elections Officers to conduct elections.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

There are strategic objectives being cited repeatedly by Archbishop Francis and others in Liberian civil society, through several leading organizations in the country and from around the world. These objectives were reiterated by Archbishop Francis during meetings held with representatives of the US government earlier this year. They are in fact recognized by Liberian organizations as the best way to ensure that the country is definitely out of the civil war and headed toward peace and democracy. The strategies include the need to:

- Consolidate the cease fire and stabilize the security situation on the ground,
- Ensure the demobilization of the militia and their proper reintegration into the civil society,
- Create a secure environment over the entire country,
- Contribute to consolidating national unity and assist in establishing a viable transitional government,
- Assist in the preparation of free, fair, transparent and democratic elections

Their achievement requires a thoughtful planning process; one that, far from any rush to quick fixes or semi-solutions, takes into account the realities on the ground and the complexity of the situation; and factors in the importance of the help Liberian society needs to heal its wounds, and make peace with decades of civil war and social unrest.

The United Nations, individual members of the Security Council and other parties involved should neither consider that the cease-fire is a finality of and by itself and therefore abandon the process any time soon, nor should they rush to try to achieve any other objective short of those already defined by Liberian civil society. Adequate consideration needs to be given to, on one hand investing as much time as the planning phase requires, and on the other, providing the process with the necessary means, tools and most importantly, financial resources to guarantee its real success.

SPECIAL TASKS AHEAD AND REQUIREMENTS:

The United Nations and the parties involved should ensure that the following requirements are met and that the ensuing tasks are fully implemented as they constitute essential conditions to free, fair, democratic and transparent elections.

- The militia is disarmed, demobilized and its members reintegrated into the Liberian society;
- A new army is created, and its members are trained to protect the Liberian people and to respect their fundamental rights;
- A stabilization force is put in place so as to guarantee not only the security of the Liberian Nation, but also the security of the voters and those seeking elective office;
- A national census is conducted;
- The Election Commission is restructured, its membership replaced, and the new members appropriately trained,
- An enabling environment conducive to free, fair and democratic elections is created;
- The voters are registered in such a way as to ensure everybody's freedom to participate in the elections without fear or intimidation;
- Priority is given to voters' education.

REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

The implementation of these tasks requires:

- A UN Security Council mandate that authorizes the dispatch of a robust military presence that would stabilize the country and deter anyone who would pose a threat to the peace, and create a secure environment;
- The military force should be provided the necessary resources, authority and flexibility to undertake the following:
 1. Disarm and demobilize all combatants;
 2. Provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees;
 3. Support the establishment of law and order and assist in the restructuring of the military and security forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In addition to the challenges we have listed above, we specifically recommend the following for effective governance and security during the transitional period.

1. Consider the young people who, either willingly or unwillingly, joined the killings in the 1990s as well as those involved in the current insurgencies as victims. Their plight must not only be considered a priority, but also the international community should commit substantial resources for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This problem is the “landmine” in the peace process. There can be no lasting peace in Liberia until it is dealt with head-on and resolved. The future of Liberia is at stake because its younger population is less educated than its older population.
2. There is, indeed a need to cut off the line of communication between Charles Taylor and the current government of Liberia to stop his micro-managing of the affairs of that government. Taylor is in continued contact with his allies giving them orders to undermine the peace process. That must stop now.
3. We strongly encourage you to stay closely engaged in our efforts in fashioning an interim process to fix the country and ready it for the political process. We do not only request that you support a process that puts the national interest above all else, but also we believe strongly that honest and reputable Liberians from within the ranks of Liberian civil society who commit not to participate in the national elections will be useful instruments for national reconstruction. We believe that these individuals will seek the national interest and do everything possible to secure the future of our country.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP ON LIBERIA AND ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

We appreciate the efforts of the International Contact Group on Liberia, comprised of Britain, France and the United States, (ICGL), and the ECOWAS, for their role in bringing peace to Liberia, as well as making possible the removal of Mr. Taylor from Liberia. We are very happy to note that on Friday, September 19, 2003 a resolution passed unanimously in the Security Council, authorizing the deployment of 15,000 troops for peace keeping in Liberia.

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

In addition with the ongoing war the mediator, facilitators and organizers of the peace conference refused to begin the talks unless an unconditional cease-fire was in place. There was nearly a two-week deadlock in the peace process, as the three warring parties (the Government of Liberia, (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, (MODEL), struggled over the terms of the cease-fire. Endless hours were spent trying to convince the belligerents to sign the cease-fire agreement. Finally, on June 17, the accord was signed.

Included in the cease-fire agreement were timelines set for certain things to happen so that the cease-fire could hold. A joint verification team, (JVT), should have immediately been deployed to verify each warring party's position. Once that was done, ECOWAS would have immediately established and deployed an interposition force in Liberia, to secure the cease-fire, create buffer zones to separate the aggressive forces, provide a safe passage for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to ready the country for an international stabilization force to go to Liberia to keep the peace. As you know, the cease-fire was constantly violated—making it nearly impossible to make any progress.

LACK OF FUNDING

The lack of adequate funding played critical role in delaying the process leading to the signing of the accord. This problem still hampers this process. ECOWAS had requested that a \$100 million fund be established for the implementation of a mandate for peace. As you may be aware, there was very little money available at the time. The U.S. Government pledged an initial sum of \$10 million dollars, while The European Union pledge an initial sum of \$6.4 million dollars. With initial funding available, as soon as a ceasefire agreement was secured, the first Nigerian Troops began arriving in Liberia to secure territory given up by warring factions.

DIVISION AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES

In Accra, Ghana, there were initially the group of eight, ("G-8") political parties, (those who had not been bought by Taylor), and a group of nine, ("G-9") political parties (those who were basically in Taylor's pocket). The "G-8s" seemed more objective and tended to work well with the civil society. Both the G-8s and the civil society worked with all warring parties to bring all the opposition political parties together. The "G-9ers", of course, worked alongside the ruling party and the Government of Liberia. Their moods changed with what was happening in Monrovia. When Taylor seemed weak, they would soften their position, but when he seemed strong, they would become unwilling to cooperate with the rest of us. We managed to reduce G-9 to G-3 and increased G-8 to G-14 at one time. Then finally, all 17 opposition political parties came together, even though the bond was very fragile.

Before the peace agreement was reached, there were various strands of opinions that are important to mention as an evaluation of the evolution of the talks. The major points of disagreement lied within the structure of the transitional government as indicated below:

- a. Term of office for the transitional government;
- b. Numbers of cabinets to be activated during the transition period;
- c. Numbers of cabinets to be activated during the transition period;
- d. Transitional head and vice head(s);
- e. The question of whom serves as president or vice president(s);
- f. Number of seats in the unicameral transition legislature;
- g. Distribution of the unicameral transition legislative seat;
- h. The process of selecting the transitional president and vice president(s).

THE CHALLENGES

While we are ever thankful for all that has been achieved thus far, there is a great deal more to be done to avoid risking the time, efforts, and other resources that have been invested in this process and reverting back to fighting. We cannot and we must not jeopardize what we have achieved. Yes, the cost may be great, but the alternative is unthinkable. H.E. Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa could not have put it any better when she said in a speech on March 1, 2003 that "The cost may be great, but the cost of doing nothing will undoubtedly be even greater for the Government of Liberia, for the Government of the United States, and for the international community, and most importantly, for you the citizens of Liberia . . ."

Since the start of the Liberian conflict in December of 1989, Liberians have been bearing the brunt of the human suffering. Yet, as keen observers know, the conflict has been and remains in no small measure an international one. In the 1990s, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal were in the thick of efforts to restore peace in Liberia. Nations which were not only involved in the Liberian peace process, but also have been affected immeasurably by the violence sown in Liberia include, among others, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Gambia. All of these nations suffered untold civilian or military casualties either in Liberia or on their own territories.

Our goal now is not to go back in time, but to focus on the second chance Liberians have been given to reclaim their nationhood. Liberians want a place among the community of civilized nations. Additionally, they want to put behind them, forever, the culture of violence that has engulfed Liberia and the sub-Africa region and caused unspeakable human suffering. But even more importantly, Liberians want to put behind them those practices that have been the cause of violence—political and social injustice, dictatorship, class manipulation and the squandering of national economic resources.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot overemphasize the need for the United States Government to heed the calls of innocent Liberians and the international community at-large and take the lead now in bringing some form of normalcy to Liberia. We count on you to ensure that the peace process moves forward and reaches a successful out-

come. As I have indicated, the United States should take the leadership to bring peace, security and democracy to Liberia. If the United States can spend billions of dollars and sustain human and material casualties in the conflict in Iraq, we have no doubt it can put a fraction of those resources to help out a friend of more than 170 years. We do not want another bloodbath in Liberia.

Bringing the belligerent parties in Liberia to the negotiating table, where they were able to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement, signed on August 18, 2003, was certainly an important achievement that brought hope back to the hundreds of thousands of traumatized and war-wary Liberians. Members of the International Contact Group on Liberia and representatives of the different countries that helped with the process are certainly to be commended for their efforts, which led to this important breakthrough.

It should, however be stressed that the peace agreement and the formation of a transitional government is but the necessary first step of a laborious and lengthy process aimed at establishing democracy and the rule of law in Liberia. Members of the Contact Group and representatives of the governments involved in the negotiations are therefore to be strongly reminded that the process could well fail if other important steps are not taken to begin laying down the infrastructure that the country needs to move toward democracy and the respect of the rule of law.

The situation on the ground is by all counts still very precarious as was demonstrated by the eruption of hostilities only a few days after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. The ceasefire could be broken again at any time and send the country spiraling back into violence. The strengthening of the process hinges on the measures the United Nations and those members of the Security Council involved in the peace negotiations are willing to take, and the efforts they are willing to dedicate in order to keep the country from sinking into a worse situation. The success or failure of the process depends largely on the targeted strategic objectives, on the amount of planning the parties involved are willing to undertake, and a clear definition of the tasks ahead as well as fulfilling the requirements for their implementation. Finally, the success of the process depends on the full participation of Liberian and international Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs, particularly those which have been at the forefront of the struggle, such as the Justice and Peace Commission and the Inter Religious Council of Liberia, both headed by Archbishop Francis.

I would like Mr. Chairman to have your permission to include in the record the testimony of Mr. Cyril Jones, a Liberian lawyer, law professor and member of the Liberia Support Group; and also a letter the Human Rights Directors sent to Secretary Powell about the situation in Liberia.

Once again, I thank you on behalf of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group. We hereby assure you of our continued commitment to the establishment of durable peace and democratic governance in Liberia. Thank you.

Ms. KIDAU. I have also submitted two other documents, one from Cyril Jones and one from—the one that was written to Secretary of State in Liberia.

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection, we will do that.

[NOTE: The information referred to was not submitted to the Committee.]

Mr. ROYCE. There was one particular point that you made in your testimony that others didn't focus on and that was the allocation of so many positions within the transition government to people that were involved in the warring factions and your concerns to what that would lead to. Would you take a moment to explain that concern for the Committee?

Ms. KIDAU. Well, the concern was that there are so many positions given to them where positions should not be given to warring parties. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs—that is the Secretary of the President, but it is given to the warring party. Minister of Finance. Those were key ministries that were given. And the maritime affairs. Those were key positions that were given to the warring parties, and it makes it seem as if they were rewarded for fighting the war. But, you

know, under the circumstances that is what we had; and that is what we have to live with.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you again for your testimony.

I also wanted to ask a question of Mr. Vines, and that had to do with the question of how much money was pilfered from Liberia, your best estimate, by Charles Taylor and whether your organization would support an effort to try to collect this money, collect these stolen assets that really belong to the Liberian people, but also maybe how difficult do you think that an operation would be to try to go after that money now.

Mr. VINES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed, it was an issue that I spent much time pursuing while I was on the UN panel of experts. I was successful in tracking money related to the shipping registry's misuse, and this is why—and it ties to the comment by my noble colleague here that one of our concerns is that there needs to be a proper revenue system set up in Liberia itself and Monrovia in that, even in post Taylor, bad habits will die hard. Unless there is a proper system of scrutiny, the warring factions that have now been rewarded with positions in the transitional administration may well fall into the habits that were a benchmark of the Taylor administration.

Turning to your point on how we track the money, there needs now to be forensic research and access to all the accounts that are available in Monrovia. The Central Bank of Liberia, the ministry of finance and particularly the accounting and the off budget agencies—those are the bureau of maritime affairs and the Liberian petroleum refining company—a lot of money went through those probably to the benefit of the executive mansion. This needs to be reconstructed.

It may be actually a good thing that some sort of independent investigation is commissioned. That could actually happen through a part of the wrap-up process at the UN to investigate exactly what happened to the money. We know that money has been frozen in Switzerland already. Some of that is offshore Liberian businesses which have nothing to do with Mr. Taylor. It is part of the corporate registry.

Mr. ROYCE. Ball park.

Mr. VINES. I would say tens of millions. We are probably talking about \$100 million in total. Mr. Taylor wasn't as wealthy as people would like to believe, either. He did have cash problems, and that was reflected in the procurement patent of arms and ammunition.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you about Elie Saleeby. If I understood the Assistant Secretary's testimony correctly, there is going to be a fresh start in 12 days, but there again you are talking about the governor of the Central Bank. Is there any special authority that the United Nations would need to get at these records? I am sure you are going to play a role in trying to audit this.

Mr. VINES. It needs a mandate in the Security Council that will come up in November. So if the United States, as part of its activities in the Security Council, can pursue this, that would be a very good thing for what may be the final mandate before May next year for a proper investigation of where has the money gone. All Liberians would like to know that.

Mr. ROYCE. We will follow up on that.

Then the last, I was going to ask you about the organizations in Nigeria that have spoken out against President Obasanjo's harboring of Charles Taylor; and we have human rights organizations, journalists and so forth. Why do you think the President continues to harbor Taylor in Nigeria under these circumstances? Isn't it—and your organization is calling today—from your testimony calling him to turn over Taylor to the special court.

Mr. VINES. I think that the more harassment President Obasanjo has on this issue by international NGOs, civil society groups inside Nigeria, demarches and papers by countries about the need for Mr. Taylor to face justice by the special court, probably the more anxious he will come to eventually handing him over.

Mr. ROYCE. Which leads to one other question. Should we be concerned about Taylor leaving Nigeria for a third country, given this debate at this moment?

Mr. VINES. We certainly should be worried that he would go to a third country where we have even less leverage over—I mean, Libya would like to improve its relationship with the United States, as we know, so that probably wouldn't be a destination on this issue at the moment. But there may be other places that Mr. Taylor could go.

Another scenario, a lot of the Taylor assets have moved up to Nimba and the Bong area, and Mr. Taylor may be considering meddling in that area of Liberia. I would hate to think of him going back to the rain forests of Liberia and trying to be troublesome in this period that we have between the Navy ships sailing away and what we heard from Mr. Kansteiner that UN will only be in full position in Liberia by March of next year.

Mr. ROYCE. In closing, for that very concern and given the evidence that he has been on a cell phone destabilizing Liberia, that is the reason why Nigeria should at this juncture turn him over to the special court before something like that happens.

Mr. VINES. Absolutely. The safest place for Mr. Taylor to be is to share the prison company of various other individuals who have been indicted by the special court. We can then guarantee that he won't be on his mobile phone and won't be a threat.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vines.

I will go to our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

I, too, have a concern with—Mrs. Kidau, maybe you might be able to respond. With the flare-up in Monrovia and with the UNMIL troops being insufficient, do you believe that there could really be a new outbreak? As we indicated before, when the UN sent troops in Sierra Leone, they were—I think they were UN or Nigerian troops. They didn't have enough. They were overtaken by the rebels. Matter of fact, their weapons were taken; their vehicles were taken. My question is, if we don't have enough force on the ground, that this whole business could flare-up again. What is your opinion?

Ms. KIDAU. I agree that there would be more problem if there is not enough forces on the ground especially to go into the interior of the country to disarm those who are still fighting at this time. They are still fighting in the interior of Liberia. I don't know for

what reason it would be. I don't know that they are supposed to stop fighting, or maybe they are just intimidating people.

I thought I read something about how the civilians in those areas were asking the UN not to give any food because, once they get food, they worry that the fighters will go in and harass them, shoot out and then take everything that they have. So, as hungry as they were, they were asking that the UN didn't give them food. So it is necessary to disarm these people.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. Vines, there are some concerns—I met with some Liberians, Mr. Cole here from New Jersey and others that had a feeling that, you know, the political crowd, generally speaking, is not the group that would be transparent and that you are going to just bring in former political people and remnants of Doe is still around, remnants of the old Tolbert government, remnants of the Taylor government. What do you think the prospects for fair and free elections and governance is for the future of Liberia?

Mr. VINES. Well, the first thing is the situation, of course, needs to be stabilized in Liberia itself. We do have a transition process to the end of 2005 depending on events on the ground. Several years would be enough to make a playing field more level than the last elections in Liberia, but it will depend on ensuring that there is proper independent monitoring of the process way before the election dates themselves. A tendency of elections in this part of the world has been that monitoring comes rather late and rather too close to the election dates.

I don't think I want to be overpessimistic. I think Liberia really has a great opportunity here. Within 2 years, as long as the international scrutiny and assistance is sufficient, I think Liberia can pull off a successful election, which is good for the country and good for the region, in the manner in which we were excited to see the results of the elections last year in Sierra Leone which was a very peaceful and exciting election which has bridged into a country that has emerged from a very horrific period of war itself.

Mr. PAYNE. Final question is, there are some people—and, you know, I am glad that there is not total pessimism—however, there are some people that have suggested that a trusteeship type—maybe not the same type that the UN trusteeships—not necessarily always been viewed very positively in the developing world, but if there can be some kind of—even an African Union type trusteeship or trusteeship in the UN, which we haven't seen in a while, what do you think, either one of you, think about a trusteeship type, someone coming in, sort of running the government for 5 years or so until things straighten up?

Ms. KIDAU. There is a need for a quarter change in Liberia, quarter change from violence to peace and from corruption to accountability. But I think there is a way you can do it without having someone take away the country. We can maybe set up a group of people that monitor the government and make sure that it is accountable and that is abiding by the rules that were set up in Accra, and that is going to work if we do that. If we really stay close to the issues and make sure that they work, I think it would be better. I don't think Liberians would want a trusteeship at this time.

Mr. VINES. Yes, Congressman, I would agree, too.

I think if there are systems of verification—for example, with the revenue trail, if there was an order trail that indicates how funds were used and allocated and spent, that would be a break from the past, and it would change things. It is possible. Liberia is small. These things are possible. With political will and assistance, these things can be achieved.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Vines, we are going to ask you and certainly ask Ms. Kidau if you fashion some ideas that you—in terms of transparency that you think would be helpful in the Security Council resolution, we would like to assist in trying to make certain that we get that transparency in reference to that resolution.

Mr. VINES. Mr. Chairman, we at Human Rights Watch would be happy to provide a draft text that would assist you.

Ms. KIDAU. We will do the same.

Mr. ROYCE. We appreciate your attendance today, and this hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking member for calling today's hearing. My hopes are that today's hearing will be the first step on the road to alleviating the suffering of the Liberian people.

As we know, Liberia is at a pivotal point in its history. If peace is to become a mainstay in Liberia, the international community must remain involved. I ask today, what the role of the U.S. will be in instilling long term peace and stability in Liberia.

Years of war have resulted in the deaths of 250,000 Liberians and the displacement of nearly a million more. The very fabric of Liberian society has been torn asunder. Instead of students, schools now house the victims of war.

This present day picture of Liberia differs significantly from that of the Liberia founded by free Black Americans from the U.S. in 1820. A Liberia whose aid was instrumental in success during WWI and II. A Liberia who is responsible for the success of Firestone and its great contribution to the American economy.

I ask today that we work to return the favors granted by Liberia by ensuring the creation of lasting peace and stability in the country.

And although our troops are withdrawing as I speak, this means that some form of U.S. presence must remain in place until UN peacekeeping forces can be firmly established in the country and the infrastructure of Liberia rebuilt, such that it can become a self-sufficient democratic nation.

It means that we must seriously consider the long lasting effects the freedom of Charles Taylor can have on Liberia and the precedent it would set for those who would choose to rule unjustly across the African continent.

We have agreed to do no less in Iraq. Why not perform these services for a country that was founded based upon our own democratic principles, who is only struggling to return to that base.

Are the people of Liberia suffering any less than those of Iraq? Are the children more accustomed to carrying a rifle than a schoolbook any less in need of a childhood than an Iraqi child? Are the natural resources of diamonds, gold, timber, and agriculture any less able than oil to one day transform Liberia into a self-sufficient country?

I ask all these questions in an attempt to understand why our President feels American taxpayers can find \$87 billion to rebuild a nation that throughout history has not even made a fraction of the same contribution to America. This question is especially relevant when the estimated price tag for intervention in Liberia is \$275 million and the international community has already agreed to provide the majority of troops for peacekeeping, such that the U.S. does not even have to request the assistance of the international community in restoring Liberia.

Ladies and Gentleman, I can see no reason why we should not make this commitment to a country that historically created itself in our own image and only seeks to return to those roots.

I ask today that we consider what the greater costs might be to both Liberia and our nation in the future if we fail to select a policy that addresses the underlying causes of war in Liberia. We have seen how generations of terrorists can grow from the soil of poverty, absence of education, and the appearance of zealots.

Ladies and gentleman, let's work together to ensure that Liberia will not become another fertile ground. Let's provide the \$275 million necessary to ensure that the

peacekeepers charged with protecting our legacy have sufficient training and supplies. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Payne, I am very happy that we are having this hearing today.

I believe peacekeeping is critical at this time in Africa, specifically the Western Region of Africa. Currently, conflicts in Cote D' Ivoire, the Congo, and Liberia have shaken a region that has historically partnered with the United States to promote peace and democracy.

Daily, we see the desperate conditions that remain as a result of the civil conflict in Liberia. We watched the bodies mount at the U.S. embassy, the child soldiers take up arms, and water and food became scarce; while the Administration's rhetoric produced a lack luster peacekeeping effort.

Today, Liberia needs more than temporary military assistance; they need significant peacekeeping force which will allow the transitional government to take office in an environment of security and opportunity. The United States must play a role in helping create the conditions for peace, prosperity, and long-term democracy. The Bush Administration has pulled out U.S. peacekeeping troops and now is the time to commit financially to the U.N. and Ecomil effort.

I can't begin to describe the conditions in which we have left our historically tied brothers and sisters in Liberia.

A million people have been displaced by the organized violence that has racked the country and the region. Almost one in ten Liberians is HIV positive. The economy has been shattered. Unknown numbers have been killed, raped and left starving in not only the capital but the entire country.

Our response must be a multi-faceted and long-term effort.

Peacekeeping is part of this program, but in thinking about such a mission we must consider the larger meaning of peace.

"True peace," Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. taught us, "Is not merely the absence of tension; it is the presence of justice."

It is also the presence of food, water, electricity, and medicine.

We address the current instability and prospects for democracy by addressing all these needs.

On July 8th, I joined members of the International Relations Committee and the Congressional Black Caucus in offering a resolution expressing our strong conviction that the United States should assume a leadership role in the international community to help establish a ceasefire and successful economic and political transition in Liberia.

Although our troops came and went, the situation on the ground remains perilous.

To restore peace and ensure freedom, we must develop a comprehensive strategy that includes security and peace throughout all of Liberia (not just the capitol of Monrovia), support the transitional government and democratic elections in 2005, and finally we must revive our commitment to Africa financially and diplomatically. Diplomacy is the mechanism to bring about a peace, and a U.N. peacekeeping mission is the way to preserve it.

This strategy must incorporate programs designed to promote democracy; preserve human rights; restore electricity and other basic services; expand healthcare access, including HIV-AIDS treatment and prevention; and address the social, economic, and political results of fourteen years of civil war and misrule.

As an advocate of peace and a person of faith, I believe I have an obligation to Liberia and to all the people who are desperately fighting for peace, so they may someday enjoy freedom.

I welcome our panelists, and all who are in attendance from the Liberian community. Thank you and I look forward to this discussion.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID M. CRANE, CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE IN SIERRA LEONE—A FUTURE MODEL OF
SUCCESS FOR LIBERIA

We live in a world today where threats to our security and to the security of other countries are growing in number and complexity. The threats include international terrorism and drug trafficking, the development and deployment of weapons of mass

destruction, environmental transformations, and global economic upheavals, which are placing whole societies at risk.

I have come back to Washington from West Africa to speak about another clear and present danger to people around the world—war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as the lurking danger of impunity on the African continent.

A survey of today's headlines shows that these atrocities are all too frequent in modern conflict and internal power struggles. The absence of justice is too often the norm rather than the exception in lands where atrocities proliferate. Combatants know nothing about the laws of war. Typical among the victims are women—often in the thousands—raped and slaughtered for their mere existence. Typical among the perpetrators are children—often as young as six—abducted and forced to commit unspeakable acts of barbarity.

I am here today to tell you about a successful effort to respond to this assault on humanity—the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a hybrid international war crimes tribunal. It can be a future model for success in Liberia.

For the past year, I have served as the Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Appointed to the position in April 2002 by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, I have been in Sierra Leone working with a talented team of international and national professionals to bring “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for the atrocities during the country's civil war to justice. The Special Court is a groundbreaking bold new experiment to combat impunity and construct justice in a devastated society recovering from a decade of war in West Africa.

In over thirty years of public service, I have never witnessed such pure evil. And I have never before served on a more noble or important mission.

I arrived in Sierra Leone in early-August 2002. Criminal investigations began two weeks later. On March 3, 2003, I signed eight indictments. These indictments were confirmed by a trial chamber judge on March 7 in London. At noon on Monday, March 10—just seven months after our arrival—members of my investigations team, along with the Sierra Leone Police launched “Operation Justice,” taking down simultaneously all five indictees who were in Sierra Leone at the time, including the sitting Minister of Interior, Samuel Hinga Norman.

To date we have twelve indictments. Twelve of the worst criminal actors Africa and the world have ever seen are now “off the street”. They will not terrorize West Africa again. We have eight of them in custody in our detention facility. Two indictees are outside of Sierra Leone with outstanding warrants for their arrest (Charles Taylor, exile, and Johnny Paul Koroma believed murdered by Taylor), one has died of natural causes while in custody (Foday Sankoh), and one was murdered on orders of Charles Taylor while the President of Liberia in May of this year (Sam Bockerie). Further indictments will follow.

Sierra Leone is one of the most horrific and challenging crime scenes in the world. Thousands of civilians have been murdered, raped, hideously mutilated, or terrorized. The magnitude of massacres, mutilations, torture, and destruction of civilian property is so great that its full extent is still unknown. I have personally seen the children whose limbs have been chopped off by drug-crazed child soldiers under the command of greedy individuals. I have walked through the mass grave sites that litter the country's hauntingly beautiful landscape.

The character of the Sierra Leone conflict is indicative of what will likely confront the international community in the future and was mirrored in neighboring Liberia: an undisciplined force of child soldiers, led by revenge-seeking rebels and former government soldiers who exercise no restraint whatsoever in the prosecution of their campaign for power; of funding derived from control of a natural resource, such as diamonds; of foreign governments collaborating with war criminals; of the humanitarian crisis wrought by such criminal behavior. How we choose to respond to the “Sierra Leones and Liberias of the world” is telling of our own character as the world's only remaining superpower and the responsibility that title entails.

What is the Special Court for Sierra Leone?

The Special Court is an innovative step in the evolution of international war crimes tribunals designed to prevent future atrocities. I believe it is a model that can work to combat impunity in Liberia at the appropriate time.

The Court is a new kind of “hybrid” tribunal that is independent of the United Nations and any state. Established through an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone in January 2002, the Court is both international and national.

The Court's Registrar, Robin Vincent from the United Kingdom, and I were appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General in April of last year. My Deputy Prosecutor Desmond DeSilva QC, was appointed by the Government of Sierra

Leone. The Chambers of the Court are a combination of international and national judges. All eight judges were sworn-into office in early-December 2002. Geoffrey Robertson, a distinguished human rights advocate from the United Kingdom, was elected the President of the Court.

Our mandate is to try those who “bear the greatest responsibility” for serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the laws of war; crimes against humanity, including widespread or systematic murder, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, torture, and other inhumane acts; and certain crimes under Sierra Leone law. These crimes were also perpetrated in Liberia. Cases can be brought against anyone who committed such crimes or were responsible for these crimes committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996 to include any head of state. Our mandate is very specific and we have three years to finish it.

Unlike the two existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the Court’s budget is drawn entirely from voluntary contributions rather than assessments from UN member-states. The entire three year budget for the Court, including the construction of a permanent court site, was set initially at \$57 million. It will now most likely be around \$75 million over its three year life, on the average of around \$25 million per year. Compare this with the Rwanda war crimes tribunal of around \$110 million for just one year. Thus far, over 30 countries have generously provided financial or in-kind contributions. With an annual budget that is about a tenth of what the other tribunals spend each year, the Court must be more efficient and operate with a leaner staff and less resources. The Court currently faces a grave financial crisis. Pledges and contributions for this year to date only cover half of the approved budget by the Management Committee based at the United Nations in New York. The Court currently has enough operating funds until the end of the calendar year. After that we are simply out of business.

The Special Court sits in the country where the violations occurred. I believe this is exactly the right place for the Court to be—in the heart of Sierra Leone, delivering justice directly to the people who suffered during the civil war. This can be done in Liberia as well. Our courtroom will be open to the public and proceedings will be broadcast live over the radio. An ambitious outreach and public information program is already in place to keep Sierra Leoneans informed and engaged in the work of the Court. This is, first and foremost, their Court.

The Court hopes to make a lasting contribution to promoting accountability and the rule of law long after its work has finished. Thus, capacity-building and legacy activities constitute an important part of our work.

The Court will also break new ground in another area as well, child soldiers. A whole generation of Sierra Leonean boys and girls has been lost due to the war. Children were particularly victimized during the civil war. I intend to send a clear message to the world that the international community will not tolerate the recruitment and enslavement of children. For the first time in history, child abduction and recruitment will be prosecuted as a war crime. This crime has been alleged in our indictments.

While gender crimes were replete in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the character of crimes committed in Sierra Leone took place on a much larger and twisted scale. From the start, we included gender crimes in our prosecutorial strategy. They have been thoroughly and actively investigated and our indictments include them as core charges against those who bear the greatest responsibility.

We have focused, as well, on the role of illicit resources in fuelling the conflict. The war in Sierra Leone was a civil war, but it was equally a regional and international conflict. The international community has too often misunderstood or underestimated the regional dimension of conflicts in Africa, but the recent attention on conflict diamonds and shifting locations of on-going tension in West Africa makes it impossible to ignore.

All too often, massive civilian carnage has been associated with those conflicts. Consider for a moment the thousands of maimed civilians in Sierra Leone, who have paid for that conflict with their limbs. If we are serious about wanting to prevent atrocities, we need to be willing to take on difficult issues such as the linkage between illicit diamond trading and atrocities.

The diamond trade is attractive to rebels and terrorists alike. The role of Liberia and other African states in supporting the rebels in Sierra Leone and throughout West Africa also requires continued attention and response. Without foreign support, including gunrunners and other criminal organizations, the rebels would have been a much weaker force. I have publicly stated that the case I’m investigating is local, regional, and international in scope. Those found to be involved in this joint criminal enterprise will be brought to justice.

The Way Ahead

As alluded to earlier, this model for success can be implemented in Liberia at the appropriate time. It must be stressed, however, like in Sierra Leone, true peace can only be achieved in Liberia when there is accountability for what appears to be war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Charles Taylor's reign of terror.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone is accomplishing the task that the international community, the people of Sierra Leone, and indeed the United States have asked it to do. We've done it efficiently, effectively, taking off the street at this point in time, as I have stated earlier, twelve of those who clearly bear the greatest responsibility for the tragedy that took place in West Africa.

The United States has invested a great deal in ensuring the Special Court is a success. It is an investment that is paying off for not only the United States but for the people of Sierra Leone and West Africa. This committee has particularly stood shoulder to shoulder with us in our efforts to return the rule of law to West Africa. Along with your colleagues in the Senate, you are allowing us to show the world that this bold and noble experiment is working and working well.

Our investigation against this joint criminal enterprise, led by Charles Taylor continues worldwide. There will be more indictments and trials are anticipated to begin around January, 2004 only 16 months from the time we stepped off the airplane in Freetown. We will be done in 2005 as mandated.

However, we will never be completely finished, nor will there be true peace for Sierra Leone, Liberia and West Africa until Charles Taylor, war criminal and terrorist, is brought to justice and handed over to this international war crimes tribunal. His seventeen count indictment for murder, terror, rape, sexual slavery, looting, burning, maiming, mutilation, and enslavement, among other alleged crimes, stands as an eternal flame against injustice and impunity.

We are appreciative of African, UN, and US leaders for refusing all efforts by Taylor to have this indictment dropped prior to his departure this past August. Their actions sent a signal that warlords will pay some price for their actions. But that signal is weak unless he actually faces these charges. Note the clear directive by the United Nations Security Council in their resolution of 6 May 2003, S/Res/1478 (2003), calling on all states to cooperate fully with the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Simply put, Charles Taylor must be turned over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. There can be no impunity in the 21st Century. Carving out an exception for wayward African leaders who commit horrendous crimes insults the people of that continent, undercuts the principles laid out so carefully at Nuremburg, and ignores the cries for justice by hundreds of thousands of the murdered dead, raped, maimed and mutilated victims; and the millions of displaced human beings throughout West Africa as a result of Charles Taylor and other members of this joint criminal enterprise.

Today, according to the United Nations, Charles Taylor continues to foment terror and exert influence over events in Liberia as he sits in exile. Even on the day he left he was emptying the treasury of Liberia of millions of dollars as he boarded a plane for exile and disgrace. In other words Taylor is violating the very conditions of that exile. Quoting Jacques Klein, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Liberia, Taylor continues to undermine the political process. Klein stated recently: "If he violates the terms of his stay in Nigeria, Nigeria will have to reassess his presence . . . I hope Taylor will be judged and punished . . . justice ha(s) to be done." Recall Taylor's chilling words as he left a devastated Liberia: "I'll be back."

Conclusion

I strongly believe the Special Court model will succeed and in time such a war crimes tribunal can succeed in Liberia.

Over the past thirteen months, I have traveled throughout the country to meet with my clients—the people of Sierra Leone. In "town hall meetings" I listen to concerns and thoughts on how I should approach my mandate of prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility for the heinous atrocities committed in this country. Victims, perpetrators, and witnesses have overwhelmed me with stories from the war.

Their stories fit a familiar pattern: the rebels burned down entire neighborhoods, lined up men, women, and children and, one-by-one, chopped off their arms and/or feet, lips, ears, buttocks and breasts. Some were spared mutilation, at least for a while, and abducted to serve as slave labor to the rebels and as soldiers themselves. Large numbers of young girls and women were raped and kept in sexual slavery

until killed. I met one young woman without an arm; her three-year old son missing a leg.

I will not forget their stories. These cases remind us that the war crimes agenda is more than the pursuit of abstract goals and interests. It is about real people who are real victims.

We are at a moment in world history when the international community can make a critical difference in waging peace by supporting efforts to bring war criminals to justice. America has led the way since the Civil War to codify international rules to govern armed conflict and to outlaw the slaughter of civilians. Our soldiers fought to defend those principles in two world wars and throughout the Cold War, and they stand prepared to sustain those principles today.

You should all be very proud of America's commitment to the Special Court. You should be proud of your fellow Americans working in Sierra Leone, along with a large staff of Sierra Leoneans, and others from throughout Africa and around the world, to fight impunity and promote justice in West Africa.

Sierra Leone and Liberia desperately need to eliminate a culture of impunity that undermines all other efforts to bring peace, stability, and reconciliation to that tortured land. Accountability forms the cornerstone of any just and sustainable peace—and in Sierra Leone, we have begun the long march towards accountability.

This is a cause and mission as noble as the undertaking by another American Chief Prosecutor, Robert Jackson, at the end of World War II at Nuremberg who said:

“We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of their own people only when we make all men answerable to the law.”

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUES PAUL KLEIN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COORDINATOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA

For the past twelve years the people of Liberia have lived in hellish limbo, suffering at the whim of warlords and despots, exploited by a criminal kleptocracy without help or relief in sight. Their lives and their country are held hostage by armed drugged thugs who destroy the state and engulfed the region in chaos. The ravages of self-centred political and criminal ideologies spread the conflict beyond Liberia's borders and caused enormous suffering and havoc in the neighbouring states. Thousands of its citizens do not have access to life's basic necessities of shelter, water, food or even rudimentary medical care. This massive humanitarian and political crisis calls for immediate intervention.

Founded in 1820 by Freed Black slaves, Liberia became in 1847, the oldest African Republic. Relations between Liberia and the United States are more than just historical. The Constitution of Liberia and its flag were modeled after the US. Even its capital Monrovia was named after former President James Monroe. A founding member of the of the United Nations, Liberia played a key and critical role in the fight against fascism—Roberts field was built as an entrepot for allied aircraft transiting to Europe; Liberia also produced the majority of the free world's rubber supplies that ensured allied victory after the plantations of Southeast Asia were overrun. Time and again when Liberia was called upon for help or assistance, it gave—does it deserve no less now that they need our help? If Liberia can be rebuilt, it can become an engine for stability in the region. On the other hand, continued instability in Liberia will undermine neighbouring states and the sub-region.

Today Liberia is not even listed on the UNDP human development index. Seventy-five percent of its citizens are living below the poverty line; the unemployment rate is eighty-five percent; literacy is at thirty-eight percent; fifty percent of the population is under fifteen years of age. Added to this is that seventy percent of the belligerents are child soldiers, coerced, psychologically traumatized, manipulated and exploited by self-appointed military leaders. We have a phenomenon not known elsewhere in the world where the younger population is less well educated than their parents.

We have an obligation to assist in putting an end to this cycle of brutality, violence, corruption and instability that has destroyed the social fabric of society and has also spilled over the borders of Liberia and profoundly affected the region. This effort will require dramatic, engaged and bold solutions. Liberia and the region need to be stabilized and brought into a larger African framework where it can be given the political support, the encouragement and mentoring required to help it become a stable and self-sustaining member of Africa and the international community.

The efforts of ECOWAS leaders under the chairmanship of President John Kufuor of Ghana and personal involvement of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria have created the conditions for peace in Liberia. Through the concerted political action and the commitment of troops, ECOWAS has underscored its importance and its energy as the regional organization committed to ensuring peace, stability and development in West Africa.

There is urgent need to build on the efforts of ECOWAS. The international community must act now by making a strong commitment to help Liberia. It must be prepared to commit the resources and the personnel needed to help the people of Liberia rebuild their country. And, whilst the international community must provide the resources, this must also be a partnership with the citizens of Liberia for they ultimately have the responsibility for ending the conflict and healing and rebuilding their nation.

An essential part of the healing and rebuilding process is the bringing to justice of those who have committed violations of international law. Without justice, there can be no healing. Without justice, those who believe that they can act with impunity will be tempted to do so again. Without justice, Liberia cannot bring to closure this dark past and look to a brighter future. Ultimately, until you punish the guilty, you cannot absolve the innocent.

I arrived in Monrovia on 14 August to see first hand the situation on the ground. From 21 August, I had the opportunity to lead a UN multi-disciplinary assessment mission in Liberia. This mission gathered useful information that was used to prepare the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, which has been issued as UN document (S/2003/875).

From 24 to 29 August, I met with President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Prime Minister Lamine Sidime of Guinea and members of the diplomatic community, the Commander of the French Forces in Cote d'Ivoire, the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and United Nations officials. On 1 September in Monrovia I met with President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and his Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji. In my meetings all pledged their support and full cooperation with UNMIL and stressed the need for regional cooperation. It is this cooperation that is crucial if United Nations efforts in Liberia and the region are to be successful.

During this period I also worked with UN agencies and other partners on the ground on arrangements to address priority needs of the country, which include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, establishing a safe and secure environment for refugee return; addressing law and order issues; gender issues; seriously attacking cross-border criminal activities.

SECURITY

I must commend the rapid deployment of ECOMIL to Liberia, and take this opportunity to salute the troops from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin and Togo in the highly visible and volatile situation that they originally faced. Subsequent to the deployment of ECOMIL with support from the off shore assets of the United States, stability has begun to be restored in and around Monrovia. Clearly, however, much more remains to be done.

The multi-national force that is now presently in Liberia. On 19 September, the Security Council is expected to approve the establishment of United Nations (UNMIL) force in Liberia, which will replace ECOMIL on 1 October. This UN Force must be credible, well trained and fully equipped. Its leadership must be focused, impartial and experienced and professional. Without these ingredients the mission will be in jeopardy. Troops will be asked to carry out extremely difficult tasks such as securing the capital and other major towns, ensuring combatants respect the Peace Agreement, monitoring the borders, establishing cantonment sites for disarmament, overseeing demobilization and ensuring that a safe and secure environment is established for all members of the Liberian population. Therefore, well-led, trained and equipped forces can make the difference between success and failure, between peace and chaos.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

One of the major challenges facing us will be the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of all ex-combatants. United Nations experience in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, the Congo and Mozambique should serve as lessons learned. Firstly, there cannot be disarmament and demobilization without reintegration, rehabilitation and reinsertion into society.

Therefore, it must be stressed, adequate and secure financing for the programme is critical and must include the maintenance of cantonment sites, supporting ex-

combatants and their families during the process, and providing alternative means of vocational training, employment and education. In this respect, particular attention must be focused on:

- a) Child ex-combatants who face greater difficulty in re-entering civil society and will require special assistance in compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This assistance will focus on family reunification along with special medical, shelter, and education and technical assistance facilitated by UNICEF and other child protection agencies until such time as they can be safely reintegrated into civil society;
- b) Female ex-combatants also face difficulties. They need to receive specialized medical treatment, shelter, education and re-training and counseling assistance; and
- c) The medical rehabilitation of all ex-combatants will be required. Those with physical disabilities must be given high priority assistance.

It should also be noted that most of the ex-combatants have neither completed formal education nor have they acquired the necessary technical skills to compete in the economic development of Liberia. Without the prospect of participating in the economic life of the country, most of the ex-combatants will revert to criminal activities to sustain a livelihood. It is crucial that programmes be created to ensure that ex-combatants have a fair chance to secure employment or educational opportunities if they are to be peacefully reintegrated into Liberian society.

HUMAN RIGHTS

On the human rights front, the armed conflict in Liberia has been characterized by egregious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law including, deliberate and arbitrary killings, extra-judicial executions, disappearances, torture, widespread rape of women and girls, sodomizing of young boys and men, arbitrary arrests and detention—sometimes incommunicado, forced conscription, recruitment and use of child soldiers, arson, widespread and often malicious looting, systematic and forced displacement as well as deliberate targeting of civilians.

Government security forces including the Special Operations Division (SOD), Anti-terrorist Unit (ATU) Special Security Service and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) have been responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) have also been responsible for violations.

There has been a severe deterioration and gradual attrition of the institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights, including courts and police. Although a National Human Rights Commission was established in 1997 its weak mandate and other structural defects made it susceptible to Government control.

UNMIL, as an integrated mission will encourage and coordinate international protection efforts and the promotion of human rights in Liberia. I will give priority to the improvement of the human rights situation and the protection of civilians, especially women and children.

RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Police Reform

One of the yardsticks by which UNMIL's ultimate success will be measured is its contribution to reforming and restructuring the criminal justice system to better reflect the communities they serve and to provide confidence for returnees. I have placed a high priority on this process.

In all of these endeavors our focus is to ensure that police performance meets international standards of policing and human rights. This requires co-location of CIVPOL officers with local police for the purpose of monitoring and mentoring. But the key to self-sustaining police reform is professional training. We will institute the essential programmes of human dignity and transitional courses and basic and specialized courses such as leadership, management, community policing, firearms and traffic training. Our aim will be to create an effective educational infrastructure within one year so that the local police can become self-sustaining in their training programmes, thus freeing up our resources for the more extensive programme of co-location.

Judicial Reform

We will also work to ensure objectivity in the judicial system that has been rendered dysfunctional through political intimidation and lack of resources. As I have said often, if police reform is not accompanied by judicial reform, it is like trying

to clap with only one hand. This is a bitter lesson learned from my last two missions. Those entrusted with this programme and the new Judicial Review process, must be competent professionals who have the confidence and trust of the local judicial community. The overall management of judicial reform and review remains the responsibility of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) with assistance provided by expert international organizations, under the lead of the United Nations through the expertise and resources of the United Nations Development Programme.

Until citizens know and believe that the courts are truly independent bodies with enforceable decisions, with an effective police force trained to international standards of policing and human rights, only then can there be a guarantee of the rule of law.

Corrections

UNMIL will, in partnership with the (NTGL), provide substantive assistance in areas related to the prison system, and will center its efforts on: prison reform, training and development of prison service personnel. This will naturally include monitoring functions to ensure international standards of human rights are protected and ingrained.

A team of correctional system experts will provide assistance, advice and mentoring support to regional institutional and headquarters prison personnel, including administration, human resources and finance, and the Ministry of Justice. As with Police reform, prison reform will entail co-location and monitoring in the prisons and the headquarters with their national counterparts. Also necessary and key to the reform and development of the prison system will be the redevelopment of a national training capacity. This reform of the criminal justice system will not come cheap.

To accomplish these objectives funding of civil institutions is crucial. I am proposing to call a conference of potential donors and seek international assistance for the reform and development of civil institutions. These activities will encompass tasks ranging from basic training for civil servants to the provision of essential equipment and infrastructure. I also intend to seek funding for the salaries of civil servants to bridge the interim period until the Liberian Government is able to collect revenue to support its activities. The prompt payment of salaries is a key element in building professionalism and discouraging public employees from seeking bribes to supplement their incomes.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As indicated earlier, I have witnessed first hand that Liberia's conflict has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe impacting not only on Liberians but refugees from Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. Humanitarians often refer to "*forgotten emergencies*." Liberia is one of the worst examples; it has been almost completely neglected. The international community imposed sanctions, but they did not give humanitarians the resources they needed to help Liberians.

For the international community to become re-engaged, it took fighting in the streets of the capital and media attention. Media interest is now waning and going back to Iraq.

The entire population of 2.7 million has been affected by fighting. 500,000 people are displaced. Many of them were displaced several times. 300,000 more have fled to neighboring countries. There are parts of Liberia—Lofa County for instance—that have not had any aid for three years.

Funding for the current emergency appeal stands at about 50% of the relatively paltry \$69 million we have asked for. (Funding requirements for next year expected to be roughly \$100 million. I'm urging donors to step up.

As indicated above, security is vital. Without security Liberians are raped, intimidated, and extorted and murdered. Without security, the humanitarian community can't deliver assistance to the people who need it.

While ECOMIL is doing a good job of deploying outside the capital, there are only some 3,000 of them on the ground and they have logistical constraints. Agencies are negotiating access one location at a time. They are running cross-line and cross-border operations. They are gaining access to more and more locations farther and farther away from Monrovia.

Where there has been security, humanitarian agencies have been successful. In the last month, NGOs and UN agencies have tackled a cholera epidemic in Monrovia. From 16 August until 5 September, WFP aided some 420,000 people by distributing nearly 3,000 metric tons of food. Children are being vaccinated against diseases. Lives have been saved.

Even where security is precarious, humanitarian agencies are bringing aid. For example, a relief ship went on 12 August to the southern port of Harper for the first time since May. Agencies have reached areas such as Tubmanburg and Buchanan.

Conditions in much of the country, however, remain difficult. Recent assessments show that rates of malnutrition—especially among children—and cholera have continued to rise in places like Tubmanburg and Buchanan. Persistent looting and insecurity make aid distribution difficult and dangerous. IDPs in Totota last week asked us not to give them food for fear the rebels would come and steal it. In recognition of this fear humanitarian agencies began to distribute food—mostly to children—in small amounts.

There is a humanitarian agreement signed by the Government of Liberia, UN, MODEL, LURD witnessed by ECOWAS and the AU on 17 August, which guarantees “free and unimpeded” access. The parties have the obligation to honor it. There are obvious problems with command and control of the various armed forces. An estimated 70% of the fighters are under 18 years of age. None of them are paid. They loot to feed themselves. This must be stopped.

Liberia has natural resources to develop (Iron Ore, Gold, Diamonds, Timber). But a series of corrupt and kleptocratic governments have kept the profits for themselves. As a result, Liberia remains near the very bottom of the UN’s Human development index.

Liberians bear primary responsibility for protecting civilians and guaranteeing access and ultimately for rebuilding their own country. But they cannot transform their country without help. That is why we are urging the donors to support the humanitarian plan for Liberia.

You only have to look to Sierra Leone for an example to follow. 5 years ago, Sierra Leone was synonymous with “atrocities” and “kleptocracy”. Today, stability is setting in. Rights are being protected. Development is underway. These positive developments require *sustained commitment* from the international *community*. It requires keeping the peace and meeting humanitarian needs. It requires political resolve to see the transition through. Liberia requires these same things.

In conclusion, the importance of what is happening now in Liberia cannot be overstated. This is Liberia’s best chance in a decade to achieve peace, stability and development. If the opportunity is lost, conditions in the country will worsen and the whole region will be further destabilized.

Thank you.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT OF JACQUES PAUL KLEIN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COORDINATOR OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA, SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs (Mesdames) les Représentants Permanents, Messieurs, Mesdames,

C’est un honneur pour moi que de vous présenter, aujourd’hui, le premier Rapport du Secrétaire général en ma capacité de Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général et Coordinateur des opérations des Nations Unies au Libéria. Au moment où la communauté internationale examine de près le rôle joué et les résultats obtenus par les Nations Unies dans la résolution des conflits de part le monde, j’espère que la situation qui prévaut au Libéria continuera à mobiliser une attention et un engagement soutenus sur le plan international. C’est dans cet esprit, et sous réserve d’être approuvées par les membres de ce Conseil, que les recommandations contenues dans le présent rapport, en vue notamment de la mise en place d’une Mission des Nations Unies au Libéria, ont été formulées.

Liberia’s massive humanitarian and political crisis calls for immediate intervention. Thousands of its citizens do not have access to life’s basic necessities of shelter, water, food or even rudimentary medical care. Their suffering echoes the words of the scriptures—“Eloi, Eloi, lamma sabachthani! My God, my God why hast Thou forsaken us”.

For the past twelve years they have lived in hellish limbo, suffering at the whim of warlords and despots, exploited by a criminal kleptocracy without help or relief in sight. Their lives and their country are held hostage by armed drugged thugs who destroy the state and engulfed the region in chaos. The ravages of self-centred political and criminal ideologies spread the conflict beyond Liberia’s borders and caused enormous suffering and havoc in the neighbouring states.

It is hard to assess the psychological effects of these crimes against justice and humanity. The matter becomes more complex when we think of it as something which a nation has absorbed into its very being—a sort of virus which, through channels of circulation—has infected the entire body politic. The result—the fearful

economic waste; the untimely death of no small part of the population; a measure of terror and pain that can only be partially conceived and estimated; and the collective national consciousness of having been witness to enormous crimes.

This is a fearful legacy to be left to future generations. Life becomes cheap; nothing is absolutely safe or sure; deeds of injustice and violence become common facts in daily life; and there is the ever-present fear of imminent war. Events however revolting, are soon forgotten in our often-tempo centric world. "Bernard Shaw wrote that the worst sin toward our fellow man is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them—that is the essence of inhumanity.

The decent and good people of Liberia, and there are many of them, deserve better from us. Liberia was a founding member of the United Nations. It played a key and critical role in the fight against fascism—Roberts field was built as an entrepot for allied aircraft transiting to Europe; Liberia also produced the majority of the free world's rubber supplies that ensured allied victory after the plantations of Southeast Asia were overrun. Time and again when Liberia was called upon for help or assistance, it gave—does it deserve no less now that they need our help?

Today Liberia is not even listed on the UNDP human development index. Seventy-five percent of its citizens are living below the poverty line; the unemployment rate is eighty-five percent; literacy is at thirty-eight percent; fifty percent of the population is under fifteen years of age. Added to this is that seventy percent of the belligerents are child soldiers, coerced, psychologically traumatized, manipulated and exploited by self-appointed military leaders. We have a phenomenon not known elsewhere in the world where the younger population is less well educated than their parents.

We have an obligation to assist in putting an end to this cycle of brutality, violence, corruption and instability that has destroyed the social fabric of society and has also spilled over the borders of Liberia and profoundly affected the region. This effort will require dramatic, engaged and bold solutions. Liberia and the region need to be stabilized and brought into a larger African framework where it can be given the political support, the encouragement and mentoring required to help it become a stable and self-sustaining member of Africa and the international community.

The first steps have already been taken. We need to pay a special tribute to the courage and diligence of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Nigerian Foreign Minister Olugemi Adeniji, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and to the staff who supported the recent peace talks in Ghana. ECOWAS has played the lead role in creating the conditions for peace in Liberia. Through concerted political action and the commitment of troops, ECOWAS has underscored its importance and its energy as the regional organization committed to ensuring peace, stability and development in West Africa.

To build on the efforts of ECOWAS, the international community must make a strong commitment, now, to Liberia. From disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, establishing a safe and secure environment for refugee return; addressing law and order issues; gender issues; seriously attacking cross-border criminal activities. These efforts if successful will transform Liberia from a failed state at war with itself to a nation at peace. Despite the multitude of challenges facing us, there is room for hope. Progress can be made but it will be expensive, arduous and at times frustrating. At a time of many calls on the attention and resources of the international community, it is necessary to plan next steps not only in Liberia but also in the context of the region on the basis of objective analysis.

We cannot be timid and handicap ourselves from the outset of this enterprise, as we did in Sierra Leone. The international community must be prepared to commit the resources and the personnel needed to help the people of Liberia rebuild their country. And, whilst the international community must provide the resources, this must also be a partnership with the citizens of Liberia for they ultimately have the responsibility for ending the conflict and healing and rebuilding their nation.

An essential part of the healing and rebuilding process is the bringing to justice of those who have committed violations of international law. Without justice, there can be no healing. Without justice, those who believe that they can act with impunity will be tempted to do so again. Without justice, Liberia cannot bring to closure this dark past and look to a brighter future. Ultimately, until you punish the guilty, you cannot absolve the innocent.

During 24–29 August I met with President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Prime Minister Lamine Sidime of Guinea and members of the diplomatic community, the Commander of the French Forces in Cote d'Ivoire, the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and United Nations officials.

On 1 September in Monrovia I met with President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and his Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji. In my meetings all pledged their support

and full cooperation with UNMIL and stressed the need for regional cooperation. It is this cooperation that is crucial if United Nations efforts in Liberia and the region are to be successful.

I turn now to the work facing UNMIL. The Secretary-General's report which is before you (S/2003/875) details key elements that are required if this mission is to achieve its mandate.

SECURITY

I must commend the rapid deployment of ECOMIL to Liberia, and take this opportunity to salute the troops from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin and Togo in the highly visible and volatile situation that they originally faced. Subsequent to the deployment of ECOMIL with support from the off shore assets of the United States, stability has begun to be restored in and around Monrovia. Clearly, however, much more remains to be done.

The multi-national force that is now presently in Liberia, with your approval, will be replaced by a United Nations Force on 1 October. This UN Force must be credible, well trained and fully equipped. Its leadership must be focused, impartial and experienced and professional. Without these ingredients the mission will be in jeopardy. Troops will be asked to carry out extremely difficult tasks such as securing the capital and other major towns, ensuring combatants respect the Peace Agreement, monitoring the borders, establishing cantonment sites for disarmament, overseeing demobilization and ensuring that a safe and secure environment is established for all members of the Liberian population. Therefore, well-led, trained and equipped forces can make the difference between success and failure, between peace and chaos.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

One of the major challenges facing us will be the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of all ex-combatants. United Nations experience in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d' Ivoire, the Congo and Mozambique should serve as lessons learned. Firstly, there cannot be disarmament and demobilization without integration, rehabilitation and reinsertion into society.

Therefore, it must be stressed, adequate and secure financing for the programme is critical and must include the maintenance of cantonment sites, supporting ex-combatants and their families during the process, and providing alternative means of vocational training, employment and education. In this respect, particular attention must be focused on:

- a) Child ex-combatants who face greater difficulty in re-entering civil society and will require special assistance in compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This assistance will focus on family reunification along with special medical, shelter, and education and technical assistance facilitated by UNICEF and other child protection agencies until such time as they can be safely reintegrated into civil society;
- b) Female ex-combatants also face difficulties. They need to receive specialized medical treatment, shelter, education and re-training and counseling assistance; and
- c) The medical rehabilitation of all ex-combatants will be required. Those with physical disabilities must be given high priority assistance.

It should also be noted that most of the ex-combatants have neither completed formal education nor have they acquired the necessary technical skills to compete in the economic development of Liberia. Without the prospect of participating in the economic life of the country, most of the ex-combatants will revert to criminal activities to sustain a livelihood. It is crucial that programmes be created to ensure that ex-combatants have a fair chance to secure employment or educational opportunities if they are to be peacefully reintegrated into Liberian society.

RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Police Reform

One of the yardsticks by which UNMIL's ultimate success will be measured is its contribution to reforming and restructuring the criminal justice system to better reflect the communities they serve and to provide confidence for returnees. I have placed a high priority on this process.

In all of these endeavors our focus is to ensure that police performance meets international standards of policing and human rights. This requires co-location of CIVPOL officers with local police for the purpose of monitoring and mentoring. But

the key to self-sustaining police reform is professional training. We will institute the essential programmes of human dignity and transitional courses and basic and specialized courses such as leadership, management, community policing, firearms and traffic training. Our aim will be to create an effective educational infrastructure within one year so that the local police can become self-sustaining in their training programmes, thus freeing up our resources for the more extensive programme of co-location.

Judicial Reform

We will also work to ensure objectivity in the judicial system that has been rendered dysfunctional through political intimidation and lack of resources. As I have said often, if police reform is not accompanied by judicial reform, it is like trying to clap with only one hand. This is a bitter lesson learned from my last two missions. Those entrusted with this programme and the new Judicial Review process, must be competent professionals who have the confidence and trust of the local judicial community. The overall management of judicial reform and review remains the responsibility of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) with assistance provided by expert international organizations, under the lead of the United Nations through the expertise and resources of the United Nations Development Programme.

Until citizens know and believe that the courts are truly independent bodies with enforceable decisions, with an effective police force trained to international standards of policing and human rights, only then can there be a guarantee of the rule of law.

Corrections

UNMIL will, in partnership with the (NTGL), provide substantive assistance in areas related to the prison system, and will center its efforts on: prison reform, training and development of prison service personnel. This will naturally include monitoring functions to ensure international standards of human rights are protected and ingrained.

A team of correctional system experts will provide assistance, advice and mentoring support to regional institutional and headquarters prison personnel, including administration, human resources and finance, and the Ministry of Justice. As with Police reform, prison reform will entail co-location and monitoring in the prisons and the headquarters with their national counterparts. Also necessary and key to the reform and development of the prison system will be the redevelopment of a national training capacity. This reform of the criminal justice system will not come cheap.

To accomplish these objectives funding of civil institutions is crucial. Therefore, should the Council approve this mandate, I propose to call a conference of potential donors and seek international assistance for the reform and development of civil institutions. These activities will encompass tasks ranging from basic training for civil servants to the provision of essential equipment and infrastructure. I also intend to seek funding for the salaries of civil servants to bridge the interim period until the Liberian Government is able to collect revenue to support its activities. The prompt payment of salaries is a key element in building professionalism and discouraging public employees from seeking bribes to supplement their incomes.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

I have witnessed first hand that Liberia's conflict has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe impacting not only on Liberians but refugees from Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast.

What I also can state is that emergency programmes are beginning to resurface to help alleviate this crisis. As mentioned in the Secretary-General's Report Ms. Carolyn McAskie Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Humanitarian Envoy for the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire and the United Nations Country Team to Monrovia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Red Cross movement are providing emergency interventions, particularly in the food, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, education and protection sectors. Those now engaged in these efforts include: the World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners, The World Health Organization (WHO); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and other health agencies; and the ICRC. UNHCR has re-started its operations. It is assisting refugees from Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast to return to their places of origin.

In addition, humanitarian agencies began relocating IDPs in Monrovia to the camps in Montserrado County on 11 September. Several thousand IDPs in temporary settlements will be assisted to return to their previous camps where they will

continue to receive assistance and protection. Priority is being given to IDPs occupying school buildings in order to enable children to return to school by mid October.

In the last few weeks the UN Special Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Ross Mountain and I have engaged in negotiations with the authorities in the neighbouring countries, as well as the Liberian parties to secure their cooperation in facilitating cross-border humanitarian operations to various parts of Liberia. On 12 September, a 15-member inter-agency team including UN Agencies and NGOs undertook a 3-day mission to Harper, on the southern border with Sierra Leone. The mission, which was undertaken by boat, has paved the way for re-establishing relief programmes in the area and for initiating cross-border activities, particularly for refugees on the Sierra Leone border.

To ensure a coordinated and effective response to humanitarian assistance proper funding is critical. To date donors have been generous in providing start-up resources for life-saving activities, but more is still required to ensure sustainability in all these programmes. I am particularly pleased that a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2004 will be launched at the end of the year.

In sum, a well-planned, coordinated and funded humanitarian programme is a crucial requirement in order for sustained development and peace to flourish in Liberia and give its citizens hope for a productive future. The peace process deserves no less.

Allow me to address the issue of human rights. UNMIL, as an integrated mission will encourage and coordinate international protection efforts and the promotion of human rights in Liberia. I will give priority to the improvement of the human rights situation and the protection of civilians, especially women and children. I assure this Council that human rights protection will include monitoring and publicly reporting on the current situation in this regard.

Distinguished Representatives,

L'avenir du Libéria et de son peuple se trouve à présent entre les mains des membres du Conseil. Le rôle et les objectifs que je viens de présenter pour une mission de l'ONU au Libéria requièrent une mise à disposition de ressources adéquates et l'expression d'un soutien continu de la part du Conseil de sécurité. Si nous voulons le succès de cette mission, il est impératif que les Etats membres fassent montre de leur volonté de nous octroyer le mandat et les ressources nécessaires pour réaliser nos objectifs. Dans le même temps, il est essentiel que le peuple du Libéria reconnaisse et accepte sa responsabilité première dans le développement de sa nation. Cette opération se doit d'être un réel partenariat qui permettra au Libéria de s'engager dans la bonne voie et de faire en sorte que, plus jamais, ses habitants ne soient les victimes de seigneurs de la guerre et que son territoire cesse d'être un refuge pour ceux qui cherchent à déstabiliser la région.

The people of Liberia deserve better. The international community, in partnership with Liberia, must rise to the challenge.

As my Alsatian countryman, Albert Schweitzer wrote many years ago:

“We are not free to choose whether we will or will not do the right thing in Africa—we owe it to them. The good, which we do, is not an act of charity—indeed after we've done everything there is in our power to do—we shall have repaid only a small part of the mistakes committed against them in the past”.

In sum, we are putting together an outstanding group of United Nations staff members, international civil servants and a credible military force. Give us the mandate and the tools and I assure you we will do what is just and what is right. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER SELIGMANN, CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL

Conservation International (CI) is a non-governmental organization dedicated to conserving biodiversity and to demonstrating that human societies can live harmoniously with nature. CI maintains offices in over 30 countries and works with communities, businesses, governments, and others to design and implement conservation strategies.

Liberia is a CI priority. It retains the last significant block of forest in West Africa—nearly half the forest cover left in the Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem, which ranges from Togo to Guinea. This ecosystem is extraordinarily rich in species, with over 2,000 flowering plants, 240 tree species, 150 mammals, 620 birds, 125 reptiles and amphibians as well as abundant freshwater and marine biodiversity. It is one

of CI's 25 global biodiversity "hotspots". At a workshop in Ghana in 1999, CI convened over 150 regional experts to assess biodiversity conservation efforts and needs in the Upper Guinea Forests. They identified several areas within Liberia as the highest conservation priorities in the region and the only chance to protect significant vestiges of this critical ecosystem.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, Liberia received considerable assistance in managing and protecting its natural resources. By the late 1970s, Liberia's Forest Development Authority (FDA) had become an example to other African forest regulatory authorities of the technical skills, equipment and professionalism needed to responsibly manage forests. Yet mismanagement of forest sector revenue by the Samuel Doe government, gradual dissolution of that government in the late 1980s, onset of civil conflict in the 1990s, and the Taylor Administration's use of the forest sector to support armed conflict, have combined to cripple the FDA and its capacity to protect and manage Liberia's forests.

CI is partnering with Liberian and international organizations to rebuild the FDA's capacity. A key project has been the Liberia Forest Re-assessment (LFR), co-implemented by CI and the UK's Fauna and Flora International in partnership with government technicians. The LFR focuses on increasing available scientific information through field surveys and remote sensing and also on building natural resource management capacity. The latter is particularly critical as it recognizes that Liberians must take ultimate responsibility for conserving their resource base. CI's experiences around the world provide ample evidence that strong institutions, good governance, and capable people are essential to responsible natural resource management.

Recognizing the importance of Liberia's biodiversity and based on the initial results of the LFR, CI met with top Liberian officials in January 2002 to promote an appropriate conservation strategy for the country. A framework was agreed upon and signed in a Memorandum of Understanding between CI and the government to: 1) establish a network of protected areas; 2) jointly build capacity in government ministries, civil society and institutions of higher education; and 3) implement a moratorium on logging in forest reserves and proposed protected areas. While CI has consistently met its part of the agreement, the government has continuously stalled and fallen short of its obligations.

Throughout the recent conflict, CI has maintained a presence in Monrovia and a dialogue with the government. We have done so under the leadership of Alex Peal—a Goldman Prize winner and former director of Liberia's Parks and Wildlife Division. CI and partners have raised over US\$1.5 million from donors including the World Bank, European Union, United States, Japan, Global Environment Facility, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Global Conservation Fund for conservation efforts in Liberia. Additional fundraising efforts are ongoing.

The return of peace and stability to Liberia presents the international community, warring factions, and the interim government with the best opportunity since the 1980s to protect and manage Liberia's environmental resources for the benefit of all Liberians, their neighbors and the world. UN Security Council timber sanctions imposed on July 7 provide crucial breathing space to prevent timber revenue from fueling conflict. When the sanctions are lifted, however, mismanagement of forest resources and misappropriation of timber revenue (as documented throughout the Taylor Administration and stated in UN Expert Panel reports) are almost certain to continue absent serious reform of the FDA and institutionalization of the fledgling Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The UN Security Council Panel of Experts has warned that without reform timber revenue is likely to continue fueling conflict and the IMF has expressed concern that, unless restrained, growth in the timber sector may threaten environmental viability and long-term sustainability of the sector. Thus without reform, without building strong governing institutions, relief and development interventions will be severely undermined by corruption in the forest sector that fuels conflict and handicaps Liberia's potential for long-term economic stability, durable peace and prosperity. While the urgent need to create jobs and generate revenue for the interim government is compelling, the imperative of forest sector reform must be considered in concert with any decision to lift the sanctions.

Despite pressure from FDA technicians, rural communities, Liberian refugees, Liberian civil society groups and some private sector timber operators, warring factions and the interim government have failed to make meaningful commitments to forest sector reform. Reports of continued logging in violation of UN sanctions persist, and information on logging company negotiations and preparations indicate increasing pressure to exploit forest resources without regulatory authority. The Accra Peace Agreement places responsibility for the FDA in the hands of the MODEL faction, which currently controls much of southeast Liberia. MODEL must take on the

responsibility to reconstruct the FDA, end corruption, operate transparently, and reform the forest sector for the benefit of the Liberian population. It is critical that the international community assist MODEL and the interim government in this task.

CI offers the following recommendations for US Government action related to the conservation and long-term sustainable management of Liberia's forests:

- 1) Provide financial and technical support to the FDA, EPA and other agencies mandated with protecting and managing Liberia's natural resources and support efforts to establish greater protection for Liberia's biodiversity as outlined in CI's MOU with the Government of Liberia;
- 2) Press foreign governments and the UN to respect current UN timber sanctions;
- 3) Urge that any decision to rescind timber sanctions be linked to the development and implementation of a credible forest sector reform program;
- 4) Support efforts to establish transparency and accountability in natural resource management and private sector operations.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

The people of Liberia have suffered greatly over the past decade. Civil war has led to the deaths of an estimated 200,000 or more people, mostly innocent civilians. This conflict has left many Liberians without food and water, vulnerable to disease, and in great need of assistance.

The U.S. Government has stepped forward to help. We have contributed to date \$35.5 million in humanitarian assistance to meet the emergency needs of Liberians.

In response to the current crisis, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) has provided \$22.5 million to save lives and alleviate suffering in Liberia. The U.S. Government is responding to proposals by nongovernmental organizations and to the activities identified by the United Nations (UN) as most urgent and appropriate. The United States leads the way internationally in responding to this crisis, contributing nearly one-third of the total amount requested by the UN.

On July 20, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the region. The eight-member DART includes technical experts on food, health, water and sanitation, abuse prevention and protection for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees. The team's purpose is to make sure that the U.S. identifies and meets the critical needs of Liberians. The DART accomplishes this through a variety of activities, including assessing the humanitarian situation; coordinating with relevant parties in the region, including the U.S. military and the UN; providing technical assistance to the humanitarian response; identifying appropriate U.S. Government humanitarian activities; and providing timely information to decision makers in Washington.

In response to needs identified by the DART, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided nearly \$6 million to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies for programs targeting health, water, sanitation, emergency nutrition, shelter, coordination and logistical support of humanitarian assistance, and protection on behalf of internally displaced persons and war-affected populations. Over 81,000 children have now been vaccinated against measles, with more to be treated soon. Thousands of families who fled their homes in haste have received basic household supplies to help them cook and clean. Each day, more and more Liberians are served by OFDA assistance programs.

The military and economic disruptions created by this crisis have also resulted in extensive hunger across Liberia. USAID is providing generous food aid to feed those in need. USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) is providing 24,480 metric tons (MT) of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance, valued at \$16.7 million, to Liberia. The agricultural commodities include a combination of cereals, pulses, vegetable oil, and corn soya blend (CSB) for therapeutic and supplementary feeding. USAID emergency food assistance is provided to internally displaced persons, refugees and other vulnerable populations through direct distribution, food for work programs, maternal and child health programs, and supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs. USAID's food assistance program in Liberia is implemented through the World Food Program.

In addition to sustaining lives over the short run, USAID is implementing programs aimed at fostering a peaceful, thriving Liberia over the long run. Reinvigorating social services and cultivating safer communities are two of our primary aims. In conjunction with its main mandate of delivering primary health services to communities, the USAID Africa Bureau's NGO partner, Africare, has assisted local NGOs in providing ambulance services to various IDP settlements in the Monrovia area. Through its existing network of clinics and hospitals established prior to the current crisis, Africare will be able to re-start the delivery of sustainable primary health services to communities in Bong and Nimba Counties, outside Monrovia. USAID's Africa Bureau is working to strengthen the capacity of its local partners and prepare public information messages related to health, reconciliation and peace building. USAID's Community Peace-Building and Development project has been working in 100 villages and will expand over the next two years to target 300 communities. A key feature of the project will be the reintegration of ex-combatants into their home communities. Creating livable communities is the first step in rebuilding a vibrant society.

USAID has helped sponsor important public information campaigns. USAID assistance brought together a team of Liberian producers and radio personalities to produce a twice weekly radio program for ECOMIL, which was broadcast on several Liberian radio stations. This programming provided key information to Liberians concerning the deployment of peacekeepers and distribution of humanitarian relief. This project has been a unique example of interagency cooperation, with U.S. military information specialists, State Department staff, and USAID technical experts working together early in a humanitarian crisis to produce a public information campaign serving the purposes of all three agencies.

As is the case in many modern emergencies, the most limiting factor in the provision of humanitarian aid in Liberia continues to be security. Through the organizations it funds, USAID will expand assistance to include newly accessible populations as security improves.

As this situation evolves, USAID will continue to assess, identify and meet emerging needs in Liberia. Our DART team is working with relief agencies and local authorities to ensure that the right aid is reaching the right people at the right time. The U.S. Government is committed to assisting our Liberian friends in their time of need.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOHAMMED S. KROMAH, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, UNION OF LIBERIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN THE AMERICAS (ULAA)

The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) expresses its thanks and appreciation to the members of the Subcommittee on African Affairs for holding this hearing on US policy on Liberia. This hearing, and the policy that develops thereafter, are very crucial for the future democratization and reconstruction of Liberia. The timing of this hearing, after the indictment and exile of former President Charles Taylor and the expected seating of the Transition Government of Liberia, is a positive indication that the United States of America will remain fully engaged in the present and future of Liberia.

ULAA and the Liberians at home and abroad express their gratitude to the US Government and the American people for their efforts to end dictatorial rule, civil war, and human suffering in Liberia by steadfastly supporting peace, security, political stability, economic recovery and national reconstruction for the well-being of the people of Liberia. No doubt that Liberians in the United States, in Liberia, and on the refugee camps in the West African sub-region are counting on the US Congress and Administration to bring lasting peace and security, and humanitarian relief to Liberians.

It is obvious to the Liberian people, the international community, watchers of US-Liberia relations, and interested members of Congress that the United States will not at this critical juncture demonstrate any lack of 'interest' in Liberia. The US has already spent millions of dollars and used its leverage to help freed Liberia from tyrannical rule and self-annihilation. Again, since it is now poised to further contribute millions for peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction, it is imperative that the United States does not sit on the sidelines or merely observe as nation-building events unfold. During the heydays of the Liberian crisis, the United States was the only Western country that maintained an embassy—a fully functional one—in Liberia. We are therefore optimistic that the United States will not write off Liberia now or in the immediate future.

In the last two decades of Liberian life, Liberians and friends of Liberia have witnessed the enormity of war, political and economic crimes meted out against ordi-

nary and defenseless Liberians and foreigners residing within our borders. Past and present human rights abuses, wanton killings, physical destruction, lawlessness, high crimes, rampant corruption, and other social vices, which sapped our country, would definitely discourage any nation, institution or well-meaning individual to take Liberians seriously. Be as it may, each nation has a period of 'historical awakening' during which times its people fall on hard times. For us Liberians, our situation is a self-inflicted deep wound.

The United States should not relegate itself to the role of 'observer' in Liberian affairs, as was the case during the recent Liberian peace conference in Ghana. As the head of the ULAA delegation at this conference, and one seated as one of 3 representatives of Liberians in the Diaspora, much was expected, given our ultimate desire and mandate to form a strong, independent and technocratic interim government—one in which the warring factions would have very minimal power and authority. The opposite was the case. This outcome in itself has given rise to despair by some Liberians and friends of Liberia. As a result of the situation we now find ourselves, those who have waged war have been rewarded with the transitional governance. The future of Liberia cannot be left entirely to the Transitional Government, which is dominated by the warring factions.

We, the people of Liberia, would like to see concerted action taken in the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive US policy towards Liberia, as follows:

1. That the UN and US must ensure that Charles Taylor is fully brought to justice. His co-conspirators in crimes committed against humanity must also face justice before the UN Special Court on Sierra Leone.
2. That the US supports the independence of the Liberian National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Its findings, if deemed criminal and egregious as to be in flagrant violation of international rule, must lead to the formation of a UN Special Court on Liberia to prosecute key perpetrators of crimes against humanity as committed within the borders of Liberia.
3. That the US supports the UN Mission in Liberia led by Mr. Jacques Klein, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Liberia, in carrying out the will and mandate of the international community. For Liberia to fully recover from the present horrors of civil wars and renewed fears of civil strife, as well as to be transformed from a criminal state enterprise, international pariah state, and a regional terror base, the international community must carry out a comprehensive national reformation mission covering all aspects of the governance and management of Liberia's transition to civility.
4. That the US must ensure that during this transitional period credible efforts are made to reform the Liberian government. No peace and security will be sustained if the executive branch remains imperial, the legislative branch remains weak, and the judiciary branch remains corrupt.
5. That the transitional government is not given a free hand in fiscal and monetary policies, and financial management without the institution of processes and procedures that bespeak of good governance, accountability and transparency.
6. That the US specifically undertakes the training and formation of a professional Liberian national army and a national police force.
7. That the US and the UN must ensure that all necessary terms and conditions are in place before the holding of free and fair elections in Liberia.
8. That the US grants permanent resident status to all eligible Liberians on Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for over a decade. They are nation builders.

ULAA is the umbrella group of Liberians and our various organizations in the United States. Our Union seeks the general welfare of the Liberian people, is a watchdog on the Liberian Government, and works with the American government and people towards building and sustaining freedom, democracy and development in Liberia.

I thank the honorable members of this Committee for providing an opportunity to hear from me.

BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY ALICE BLONDEL, LEAD CAMPAIGNER, GLOBAL WITNESS

For further detail, please refer to the Global Witness briefing document, 'Against the People, for the Resources', as sent to the United States Mission to the United

Nations on Thursday, 4 September 2003. The full briefing document is also available on the Global Witness web page, www.globalwitness.org

While the UN-mandated peacekeeping force is slowly deploying and a new interim administration will assume control in October 2003, Liberia remains primarily under rebel occupation and armed conflict continues. Global Witness believes that lifting timber sanctions now, before both Liberian government and extractive industries have been reformed, will lead to further diversion of revenue and the perpetuation of conflict, undermining the best efforts of the United States and the United Nations.

The role of the Liberian logging industry in fuelling regional insecurity

Liberia has decayed under 14 years of continued conflict and insecurity, beginning in 1989 with the invasion by then-warlord Charles Taylor and his rebel group, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL). Charles Taylor supported the NPFL's violent insurrection in part through revenue generated from the export of natural resources, including timber, from territory under NPFL control. Upon assuming control of Liberia, President Charles Taylor intensified his use of the Liberian logging industry both to enrich a criminal elite and to financially and logistically support domestic instability and rebel fighters in neighbouring Sierra Leone¹ and Cote d'Ivoire².

More than just serving as a source of revenue for extra-budgetary expenditures, Global Witness and UN investigators have documented how some elements of the Liberian logging industry actively helped perpetuate regional conflict, through payment for weapons and import of arms in violation of UN sanctions³, the creation of abusive militias, and support of foreign rebel groups. The UN has placed numerous personalities involved in the Liberian logging industry on a travel ban for their support of RUF rebels during Sierra Leone's civil war, including arms dealers Victor Bout, Sanjivan Ruprah and Leonid Minin, who also owned the Liberian logging company, ETTE; and Gus Kouwenhoven, head of the largest logging company in Liberia, the OTC⁴.

The Liberian logging industry still poses a threat to international peace and security

While logging companies have largely halted operations due to the ongoing conflict, the rainy season and the UN sanctions on Liberian timber and timber products, the Liberian logging industry still threatens international peace and security. Armed non-state actors in Liberia have already made contact with loggers and NGOs, showing interest in restarting logging in order to generate revenue⁵. LURD and MODEL control the majority of the country's logging concessions and log stockpiles, MODEL controls numerous logging ports as well as the porous border region with Cote d'Ivoire, which has historically been a transit point for illegal Liberian timber exports. This opportunity for illegal exports and abuse is exacerbated by MODEL's control of the new interim administration Forestry Development Authority (FDA), which oversees the country's timber resources. Without proper accounting and evidence to the contrary, the Expert Panel states that, 'it must be assumed that [the government of Liberia] and non-State actors will continue to exploit the resource to foment conflict'⁶.

Restarting the Liberian logging industry now will not provide an economic panacea and will undermine Liberia's security.

Global Witness understands the need for revenue generation in Liberia and agrees that if managed properly the logging industry could provide a sustainable source of income for Liberia. However, without thoroughly reforming Liberian government and industry procedures first, restarting logging operations will open up Liberia to the same weapons imports and unscrupulous companies that perpetuated recent conflict. The latest Expert Panel report on Liberia (S/2003/779) concurs, holding that, 'before logging should resume, significant reform is required in forest governance . . . this will require time and effort. Therefore, the Security Council

¹ UN Expert Panel report on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195); 'Taylor-made: the pivotal role of Liberia's forests and flag of convenience in regional conflict', Global Witness, September 2001.

² 'The Usual Suspects: Liberia's weapons and mercenaries in Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone', Global Witness, March 2003.

³ UN Expert Panel on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195), UN Expert Panel report on Liberia (S/2001/1015).

⁴ 'Revised list of persons subject to travel restrictions pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) on Liberia, updated 6 June 2003'; UN Expert Panel on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195); UN Expert Panel on Liberia (S/2001/1015).

⁵ UN Expert Panel report on Liberia (S/2003/779).

⁶ Ibid.

should maintain the timber ban until governance in Liberia has improved.’⁷ The Panel continues, ‘in the short term, logging poses a large risk that: (a) the establishment of legal trade will have the perverse effect of facilitating illegal logging; and (b) parties will misappropriate the revenue and fund conflict.’ Global Witness believes that timber should not be looked at as a quick fix to Liberia’s economic and humanitarian problems, and agrees with the Panel’s conclusion that, ‘it will not be possible to alleviate suffering through the immediate resumption of resource extraction’ and that the Security Council must ‘accept its responsibility for the negative impact of the timber sanctions and ensure that emergency relief aid is provided.’⁸

Moreover, it must be noted that the Liberian logging industry provides neither reliable wages nor significant employment opportunities for Liberians, especially rural Liberians, and logging company militia members have been involved in abuses against local populations. As the UN Expert Panel states, some logging companies do not pay their workers for work performed⁹, and ‘few rural people were hired by the logging companies (less than 0.2 per cent of the population), and communities were no better served by clinics or schools, for example, whether they were inside or outside logging concessions.’¹⁰ Also, as Global Witness has reported previously and the latest UN Expert Panel has recognised, ‘the departure of some logging companies (the Oriental Timber Company (OTC), the Royal Timber Company (RTC) and the Maryland Wood Products Industry (MWPI)) has relieved many Liberians of human rights abuses, intimidation of local people and alleged sexual exploitation of women and girls’¹¹.

The UN must effectively enforce the current sanctions regime, with particular attention to Liberia’s borders with Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

The new UN peacekeeping force must ensure tighter control of Liberia’s borders, so that its natural resources are not smuggled into neighbouring countries, and military supplies transported back into Liberia, in violation of UN sanctions. This illegal export of timber products is highly likely, given rebel control of logging areas, ports and government ministries, as detailed above. Global Witness, in its latest briefing document, ‘Against the People, for the Resources’, provides a detailed description of where the UN should focus monitoring activities, and how it will be feasible to more effectively oversee key export routes to prevent violations of the UN sanctions regime¹².

The UN must implement a thorough Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation programme (DDRR)

Having an effective Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) programme, as called for in Security Council Resolution 1509 (S/2003/1509), is of critical importance to the future stability of Liberia and the surrounding region. There are thousands of armed combatants from numerous countries, some of them children, who have fought for LURD, MODEL and pro-government militias. Not unlike the DDR process in Sierra Leone, it will be necessary to organise educational and employment opportunities for ex-combatants, with an emphasis on local reintegration initiatives, to prevent the influx of ex-combatants to the capital, as was seen in Sierra Leone, and encourage reintegration across the country.

Before sanctions can be lifted, the following checklist of basic reforms must be implemented:

Liberia’s logging industry must be free of ties to arms imports, mercenaries and the abuse of local populations. Logging companies should not, in any way, facilitate weapons imports, either financially or logistically, nor should they be engaged in the hiring and maintenance of mercenary fighters and abusive militias for either their or another parties’ use.

The Liberian government must undergo a comprehensive review of financial and administrative procedures, instituting transparency and accountability at all levels. The US and UN must ensure that systems are put into place at all levels of government to institutionalise an open decision-making process and proper accounting of revenue intake and expenditure. There must also be transparency in the way the government interacts and makes agreements with the extractive industries, espe-

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² ‘Against the People, For the Resources’, a briefing document by Global Witness, September 2003.

cially the timber industry. All concession applications, taxes, payments and environmental and social impact assessments should be made public.

The Liberian government must have the capacity to investigate and prosecute violators of national environmental and labour laws. Logging operations must be made open and accountable to the monitoring and scrutiny of the Liberian government, whether it is through a reconstituted and improved Forestry Development Authority (FDA), or an independent monitor acting on behalf of the new Liberian government. The FDA, which is mandated to oversee the nation's forest resources and which will be controlled by MODEL forces in the upcoming interim administration, must also be reformed to rule out conflicts of interest that may hinder its investigative and enforcement capabilities.

A comprehensive review of Liberian forest resources and forestry law must be undertaken. A moratorium on all logging and processing should be maintained until a national forest policy is created and a review of existing forest resources completed. How logging companies operate, both environmentally and socio-economically, must be reviewed, with the emphasis on transparency, accountability and respect for the individual and the community in which the company operates. Such a legal review must include a reconsideration of all existing concessions, as many were granted under questionable legal authority.

Global Witness is cautiously optimistic about the future for Liberia, given the United States' activities there and the UN's recent decision to commit its resources, both militarily and politically, to helping solve the problem. However, to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated, and to make certain that a reconstituted logging industry no longer undermines Liberian security and threatens regional peace, Global Witness holds that the current timber embargo must be maintained until good governance and the reforms outlined above are instituted.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE WALTER H. KANSTEINER III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, TOGETHER WITH RESPONSE

Question:

What is the Administration's position on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border demarcation? How does it view Ethiopian calls to set up a new border demarcation commission?

Answer:

The Administration's position remains constant—the Boundary Commission's decision is binding. From the outset, both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed that the arbitration by the Boundary Commission was final and binding. For that reason, the Boundary Commission remains the appropriate mechanism to demarcate the border.

The Ethiopia—Eritrea border is a bilateral issue. Ultimately, it is up to both parties to discuss any concerns and implement the decision together. The United States remains willing to help both nations to the extent possible during this difficult process.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FINAL REPORT ON LIBERIA DATED JULY 16, 2003 BY THE
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT SURVEY TEAM

United States European Command
Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team
Final Report on Liberia
16 July 2003

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Executive Overview

The EUCOM Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) arrived in Monrovia, Liberia 7 July in order to assess the extent of the current humanitarian crisis and to make recommendations for an appropriate level of intervention.

The following report follows the format of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Field Operations Guide (FOG). This publication is a product of the U.S. Agency for International Development. There is one addition that is not covered in the FOG: the Public Affairs Section because it is presumed that there will continue to be great press interest in the events in Liberia.

Regarding the data in the report, it has been difficult and in some cases impossible to acquire accurate quantitative data. The HAST has gathered large amounts of qualitative data and this data is presented along with information and data provided by the U.S. Embassy, Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO's) and International Organizations (IO's).

The crisis in Liberia has multiple causes; some of the problems are chronic and will require long-term attention while others are acute and need immediate attention to prevent problems of even greater proportion and scale. The chronic problems are rooted in the political structure, are historical in nature, and are beyond the purview of the assessment team. The acute problems, though springing directly from the chronic difficulties the country has had, revolve around the lack of security for the populace and for the NGO's, PVO's and other IO's that are trying to get aid to the people.

The civilian population is caught between rebel factions and government forces in many cases, and occasionally between governmental factions. Recent fighting between government and insurgent forces in Liberia has driven many civilians from their homes. Both government and insurgent forces have accused non-combatant civilians of giving support to the opposing side, and have looted the possessions of civilians taking virtually everything from their homes. In many cases, civilians have been injured, raped, or killed. In response to this, civilians have fled to the greater Monrovia area, where the availability of perceived security, food, and water serve as a magnet for displaced people.

Since the attacks in June of this year, greater numbers of people have gravitated to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps especially in the Monrovia area seeking safety. Fear of the Liberian Military Services, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and to a lesser extent the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and most importantly militia groups have driven the people out of their homes. Attacks on camps in the outlying areas by all parties are not uncommon. The militia in particular are unpaid, undisciplined, and untrained 10-17 year olds are dangerous to IDP's. They are at liberty (the government has sanctioned them) to steal whatever they can from the camps and the camps' occupants. They frequently abduct IDP's, both men and women, to perform the most menial tasks for them. When the abducted individual is no longer useful, he or she is frequently killed. The women are subjected to rape on a regular basis. One of the most disturbing aspects of the militia is that they are not

controlled by anyone, though they are ostensibly under some government control. Most operate in free-roaming bands primarily in the northern part of the country.

The worst of the humanitarian crisis is in the greater Monrovia area. The city is overpopulated by at least 300,000 people. Approximately half of those people are in IDP camps while the balance are "invisible" IDP's who are living with relatives, friends, are on the street, or are squatting at some available location.

All IDP camps in Liberia are having serious difficulty with food, water, sanitation and medical care. There is a shortage of trucks in the country and many drivers were of Mandingo ethnicity and have fled due to ethnic pressure. A multitude of water wells exists in the greater Monrovia area. Contamination of hand dug wells in high population areas has become a serious health problem. A 9000-liter per day reverse osmosis processing units has been installed at SKD stadium. Even this high tech NGO solution is at best filling water needs far below the minimal living standards of 3-4 liters per day for drinking only. This water figure does not include food preparation or body maintenance. Water shortages combined with massive population shifts have increased the incidents of cholera and diarrhea cases in the area. There is a shortage of medical care in the camps, often monies are given to local NGO's by larger NGO's to support the medical efforts. There is a shortage of both medical supplies and trained people. The current sanitation situation in the city is appalling. Latrines in the camps are over taxed with to many IDP per toilets. Additionally in larger camps, walking distances from dwelling to toilet exceed the one minute OFDA standard.

Summary

As a result of fighting that broke out in and around greater Monrovia on 6 June between the rebel group LURD and forces loyal to President Charles Taylor, hundreds of thousands of IDP's are now residing in appalling conditions in and around the capital city of Monrovia. Outside of the greater Monrovia area, the number and condition of civilians affected by the disaster remains largely unknown, since at least 80% of the country is inaccessible to aid workers. As a direct result of the fighting between government and opposition forces and the general instability of the area, the aid community has evacuated a significant number of workers including virtually all international staff. This situation has created an immense gap between the needs of the affected populations and the ability of the aid community to respond. An appropriate stabilization force must be placed in Liberia in order to ensure the safety of Liberian civilians and allow aid workers unhindered access to needy populations.

General Situation

Combined estimates from UNOCHA and NGO's in Liberia indicate that at least 600,000 Liberians are currently displaced as a result of the ongoing civil war. Since 6 June, approximately 150,000 known IDP's have fled into Monrovia as fighting spread through the IDP camps located on the outskirts of the capital. In addition to the 150,000 identified IDP's, NGO estimates of the "invisible IDP" population within Monrovia to be between 150,000-250, 000. These are individuals who have taken refuge with friends, family or are in unidentified locations throughout the city. In the few accessible areas remaining outside of Monrovia, another 160,000 IDP's have been identified in camps in

Montserrado, Margibi, Bong and Grand Bassa Counties. No one has been able to confirm the numbers and condition of the IDP's who exist outside of the areas accessible to aid workers.

During the period 8-15 July, the HAST visited 9 of the approximately 90 temporary IDP sites, including SKD stadium, which holds the largest concentration of IDP's in the city. Schools, churches, public facilities, abandoned buildings and other places that have been turned into irregular IDP camps. The living conditions in all camps visited are unsanitary, and food and clean water are in extremely short supply. Sanitation facilities, when present at all, are grossly inadequate for the population served. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions facilitate the spread of disease; diarrhea is a problem, especially for young children. Malaria is the most common cause of death, again disproportionately affecting young children. The effects of malaria and diarrheal disease are both worsened by malnutrition.

In addition to the 150,000 IDP's identified in makeshift camps, NGO's estimate that anywhere between 150,000 – 250,000 IDP's have taken refuge with friends, family, or in as yet unidentified locations throughout the city. As a result of the IDP influx on top of the general poverty already existing in Monrovia, all humanitarian agencies have reported that the crisis has affected nearly every household in Monrovia. Therefore, out of an estimated population of up to 1 million, it can be said that more than 50% of Monroviens are lacking access to health care, water, sanitation and adequate food.

A survey of IDP camps was conducted by the European Commission (EC), United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the Government of Liberia (GoL) Planning Ministry and Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN) during 20 – 24 June in order to determine the number of IDP's in and around Monrovia, their locations and services needed. The map has since been turned into a matrix that is updated regularly, the most recent was circulated by the EC on 15 July. This matrix shows that the level of basic services being made available across the numerous IDP sites in and around Monrovia. Relief services are insufficient for the need. Only 38% of the 90 recognized camps have an NGO that has assumed responsibility for food distribution; 39% have NGO-provided water; 16% have sanitation facilities. This does not mean that those camps that have these services have them adequate to their need. The rest are completely lacking. At SKD Stadium where the IDP population fluctuates wildly and where the largest IDP population in Monrovia is located, there are ten latrines for 25,000-35,000 people (accepted OFDA ratio is 1:20); 19% of camps have had distribution of basic non-food items (blankets, sleeping mats, cooking utensils, jerry cans, and tarpaulins).

Prior to the 6 June hostilities, UNOCHA estimated the IDP population at the nine IDP camps that surround Monrovia in Montserrado County (VOA, Wilson, Jahtondo, Blamasee, Seighbeh, Plumkor, Ricks, Perry Town, and Banjor) at between 150,000 and 200,000. Information from a 15 July EC/NGO mapping team indicates that the 9 camps now have a total population estimated to be 50,700 the probability that IDP's have moved into the greater Monrovia area seeking the relative safety of the city. Currently at these

nine camps, 52% of IDP's have some potable water supplied; 53% have some sanitation facilities; 55% have some access to medical care; 53% have some distribution of non-food items; and 29% have received some food aid.

Outside of the greater Monrovia area, limited access to the general population exists in Bong, Margibi and Grand Bassa Counties. The EC/NGO matrix dated 15 July, provides an estimated total of 108,900 IDP's spread throughout all three counties in at least nine camps and various scattered sites. At these camps in the surrounding counties, 77% have some access to potable water; 82% lack access to sanitation; 11% lack access to health care; almost all have received some Non-Food Items (NFIs), and 84% have received some food aid. Although these numbers reflect higher rates of provision of services than for IDP's closer to Monrovia, these IDP's are much more subject to predation by militia and government forces.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Officer in Charge (OIC) in Monrovia reports that 15,200 Sierra Leonean refugees registered in the Montserrado camps before 6 June. All have been located in either their original camps or in irregular camps in Monrovia. Since 4 July, UNHCR has repatriated 1,056 Sierra Leonean refugees by sea to Freetown. UNHCR also reports that of the estimated 38,354 Ivoirians and Third Country Nationals (TCNs) registered in March, only 800 have been accounted for since the Movement for a Democratic Liberia (MODEL) incursion into eastern Liberia in late March 2003. There is no reliable information as to the whereabouts or the condition of the remaining refugees.

Food and Logistics

Food

The traditional Liberian meal consists of rice or cassava with a sauce. The sauce contains essential nutrients for the prevention of anemia. During pregnancy, local beliefs prohibit eating wild animals and vitamin C-containing fruits. Liberia is not self-sufficient in food and imports more than 25% of the rice it consumes. A noon meal is usually the heaviest and consists of cereal and/or rice. This is the only meal for most of the population. The majority of food purchases occur in centrally located outdoor markets operated by private vendors. Indigenous food processing capabilities are nonexistent. Flour, rice and other staples are either imported or processed by hand. Indigenous food stocks exist in the fashion of cassava, rice, tomatoes, mangoes and other succulents. Most of the population of Liberia is unemployed and do not have the money to buy food. One team member saw two people running a sieve through a water-filled culvert on Bushrod Island earlier this week and discovered that they were catching large guppies and crayfish from a storm drain. They remarked that they would eat their catch with rice. In the camps where there is no food, the people are consuming cassava, which is noteworthy for its poor nutritional content. It is peeled, soaked in water for a few hours, then ground into a paste and stored outside the huts wrapped in burlap. In many instances, that is all people have eaten since the international NGO workers left in June.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs are implemented in Liberia through World Food Program (WFP). As the food aid arm of the United Nations (UN), WFP uses its food stocks to meet emergency needs and support economic & social development. The agency also provides the logistics support necessary to get food aid to needy people at the right time and in the right place. WFP will store and distribute that food to one of five partners. Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Liberian Islamic Union for Rural Development (LIURD), World Vision International (WVI), United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), and Lutheran World Federation (LWF) form an aid cooperative, each taking responsibility for a specific region. The partners register qualified needy people and issue them a ration card with personal and family information on the card. The NGO's local agents sign the ration card and record data on the issued rations. Normal deliveries are once a month. Deliveries have recently been changed to 15-day intervals due to unstable security, which is inefficient since a 15-day delivery is not cost effective and causes WFP to double the number of deliveries required to distribute the same amount of food. The looting of IDP's personal stock by GoL Forces makes this 15-day schedule more practical. Recently, ICRC has helped deliver food ration for WFP in Monrovia. They are hoping to deliver food to 50,000 IDP's in the current week. WFP employees are planning a strike for 17 July; they are protesting lack of salary payment due to the evacuation of international management and are said to be planning to block access to WFP warehouses.

A report prepared by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) on the food supply situation, estimates that 35,000 metric tons of food aid will be required for CY 2003. A shortage of staple grains has always existed. Pre-war numbers indicate that 30% of cereals were produced locally and Liberia depended upon imports and food aid to make up the remaining 70%. However, imported food and food aid had only provided about 70-85% of the demand expected to be satisfied by imports. Serious food shortages have emerged in the Monrovia region as a result of the recent civil strife. Many farmers have been displaced from their property and fields are left unmanaged. Current conditions allow only 10% of cereals to be produced locally while imports and food aid remain constant. The rise in the price of basic food commodities such as rice and cassava coupled with the depreciation of the Liberian dollar has increased the hardship for Liberian households. Fifty kilograms of rice cost \$21 US and average monthly wages are \$12 US.

Currently, the WFP has 8K MT (WFP claims 12K however, the warehouse supervisor claimed 8K) of food in its port warehouse which is enough to for a maximum of 3 months' distribution. The recent fighting has caused food distribution to halt to a slow trickle. For safety concerns the WFP has been advised against delivering into rebel (LURD/MODEL) held territories. Security concerns have halted food imports to the Free Port and caused truck drivers and their equipment to flee Monrovia. Even prior to the recent fighting, the port had only one operating berth and limited material handling equipment. The present situation does not warrant a change in the overall humanitarian strategy, but rather calls for additional resources to enable the world community to

effectively respond to the needs of the situation.¹ There is enough food aid on hand and in neighboring countries to adequately cover the current situation. Security of food is an urgent concern throughout the country due to frequent theft by both government and rebel forces. Fighting and looting has decimated the agriculture infrastructure.

The existence of several established units of special military or paramilitary groups within the Liberian armed forces, most of them under equipped, under paid or not paid for several months, does not augur well for the strengthening of the security environment for displaced persons and refugees. GoL forces continue to make regular incursions into IDP and refugee camps looting food from IDP's. Food insecurity is likely to remain an acute problem in all counties except Grand Gedeh and Bong where returnee populations have resumed farming on a pre-war scale. Food shortages are most severe in Grand Cape Mount, Bomi, Rivercess, Grand Bassa and Lofa counties because of the continuing insecurity.

Logistics

The Monrovia Free Port is an operational port that is in overall poor condition. Water depth at pier is approximately 9 meters at MLW. Water depth in the channel is 9.5 meters. Although the condition is poor, small container ships can moor for offloading. There is effectively only one ship berth that has adequate mooring and access to the main road. The pier is a cement deck on pilings and is in bad condition. Most cleats and bollards are heavily corroded but will hold a ship pier side in good weather. None of the container cranes is operational however a 30-ton hydraulic crane is in the port and is operational at reduced loading (approximately 20-ton lifts). Ships with shipboard cranes can offload. Container ship Tom Alexandria is sunk at the pier and is lying on its port side. There are several wrecks in the harbor though none appears to be directly blocking the channel. There is an additional pier, approximately 800 feet in length and 30 feet wide, that currently has an abandoned ship moored on it. The other side of the pier is used for local fishing craft, all of which are in poor condition.

Neither lighting nor security is available at the wharf or pier locations. Electrical power is provided by three 50 KW diesel generators @ 220 volts AC. Area flood lighting is minimal and would need to be augmented by portable units or upgrade. There are numerous empty warehouses and shipping containers located in the port area and within 30 feet of the wharf area and within 200 feet of the pier. Any ship mooring at this port would be vulnerable and would need additional security personnel (FAST TEAM) and equipment while moored, portable lighting, barriers, communication equipment etc to reduce vulnerability. Hotel services, shore power, CHT, waste oil removal, etc are not available. One container lifting forklift is available for use; two others are inoperable. One tug 2500 HP is moored in the basin but is currently inoperable due to a shaft seal problem. A pilot boat is available but its condition and operational status is questionable. Local support of police, medical, fire, EOD, ambulance, HAZMAT etc. is not available.

Monrovia Roberts International Airport (GLRB): Monrovia Roberts VORW-DME and ILS is operational, but requires DOD approval for use of Jeppesen approach plates. This

¹ Reliefweb Report www.reliefweb.int

is a single use operational civilian airport with very few (2-5) flights weekly. A Boeing 747 is the largest aircraft to have landed at this field. This field can accommodate a C-5. Airfield equipped with PAPI only, not VASI. ILS certification is unknown. There is no radar coverage for this area. Communication at the field is good, VHF and HF only. Runways: 04 – 22 (11,000 X 150). Most landings are conducted on 04 and takeoffs on 22. The runways are in operational condition. Information from airport personnel is that there have been repairs, no date specified, but there is still minor cracking. The ramp is large and is mostly available for use. There is enough room to provide sufficient stand off from other aircraft and buildings. Currently, there are three aircraft that appear to have permanent parking spaces but aircraft parking aprons are in good condition and it's estimated that there is parking space for an additional 4 to 5 C-141 size aircraft. Electrical power is provided by a hydropower unit, backed up by three manually operated diesel generators. Runway lights are 85 percent operational. Taxiway lights are present, but were not on during our assessment. Lighting in the ramp area is insufficient.

Fire fighting equipment is operational and in use. They have three Crash-Fire-Rescue (CFR) vehicles and one ambulance. A typical shift consists of 7-8 people. Condition of equipment appears to be good. Expect proficiency to be adequate. AFFF supply "extremely short supply". CFR capability rated as category 8 (NFI).

There is no fuel available at the field, however local authorities report a 30,000-gallon storage capacity. Expect fuel to be trucked in from Exxon-Mobil when/if available (See Appendix A) for more details on fuel. Defueling is unavailable at this field. A full operational assessment of GSE and MHE was unavailable however, one 15K forklift, one 20K "K" Loader were sighted and said to be operational. Airport crew reported having only one working piece of required GSE & MHE, without spares should breakdown occur. Cargo handling/delivery services are available from local contractors. The team was told that although most NGO supplies are brought in through the port, a few items such as medical supplies often come in on cargo flights. There are adequate roads and bridges for transportation of organic CESE to the airport (32 miles from AMEMB).

Currently, there is a Liberian Civil Aviation Authority based at Roberts International Airport. See Appendix A for more details on points of contact. It is questionable whether this agency will retain its' authority when the Government of Charles Taylor dissipates. Regardless, the Embassy expects to receive prompt overflight and landing clearances at the airport – they will simply notify the airport of pending flights. It is expected that the current air controller operations will continue regardless of the political situation and there are no known "no-objections" or "royalty" fees expected.

Monrovia Spriggs-Payne Airport (GLMR): This is a single use government airport, mostly used by helicopters, Mi-2 (police) and Mi-8 (military). C-130's are the largest aircraft this field can handle. The tower is reportedly VHF capable and powered by a 125 KVA generator. The Non-directional Beacon (NDB -MHW) is missing from this field, suspected victim of looters. There are no other navigational aids available for this field. The nearest navigational aid is located approximately 50 km away at Roberts

International. Night vision devices notwithstanding, the facility would be usable in the day under VFR only.

Runways: 05 – 23 (6,000 X 100) - prevailing winds cause 23 to be used most often. The runway is in poor to fair condition. Small potholes and standing water were observed. Debris (stones and over growth) can be found along the entire length of the runway and ramp area. This presents a serious Foreign Object Damage (FOD) hazard. There is a potential hazard to structurally delicate residences on the approach end of runway 05 from rotor wash. Houses are located approximately 400 feet left of centerline on the left side and 150 feet right of centerline approximately 1,500 feet down the runway.

Tall grass obscures any runway lighting. If located, expect them to be inoperable. There is no lighting for the ramp area; a complete tactical airfield lighting system with generator power will be required. The parking ramp has capability of at least four CH-53s or equivalent simultaneously. The existing apron would have to be cleaned, due to the FOD hazard. The runway and a majority of the apron are constructed from asphalt. There is a 600-sqft area of the apron that would have to be replaced. The recommended repair would be to remove the damaged areas and replace with concrete. The existing area is lower than the airfield and has poor drainage. Drainage of the runway and apron area would have to be improved. This would be done by clearing and grading existing drainage swales and ditches. The area will also have to be mowed and cleared of FOD hazard. Additional culverts may have to be installed. A temporary maintenance facility would have to be installed if required. The surrounding area would need improvement if berthing/messing facilities were to be constructed. There are two Hangars available that could accommodate 1 H-53 each. Only one hangar has a 10KW generator with a 100 AMP, 3-phase load center for power. Building wiring and light fixtures appear to be intact. All other required power will have to be provided by generators.

There is one CFR located at the field, mechanical condition is reported as good (HAST has reservations); it arrived three months ago. The CFR vehicle is equipped with a roof mounted high-pressure water nozzle. The CFR vehicle does not have extraction capability. Expect firefighters to lack proficiency. No medical services are available, nor is GSE or MHE.

There is no fuel available at the field nor is defueling available. Expect fuel to be trucked in from Exxon-Mobil when/if available See Appendix A for more details on fuel. Cargo handling/delivery services are available from local contractors. There are adequate roads and bridges for transportation of organic CESE to the airport (8 miles to AMEMB).

Transport Issues

The major roadways and bridges within the greater Monrovia area are asphalt 2-lane and 4-lane roads in poor to moderate condition. There are no power lines or traffic lights to hamper movement and the roads appeared to be capable of handling cargo trucks and civil engineering equipment. The only vertical obstructions noted were a cement structure straddling the road approximately 300 meters west of Spriggs-Payne airfield

and an out of use overhead railroad crossing approximately 18 feet high near the Free Port. Traffic in the city is relatively light with few trucks and POVs.

The preponderance of vehicles are old taxis. Currently, the main inhibitors of traffic in the city are roadblocks, which are manned by various military personnel. Farther out from the city road conditions deteriorate with travel becoming slowed due to numerous potholes, missing pavement, and wash-outs due to lack of maintenance.

Trucking capabilities in Monrovia are limited. There are currently few commercial trucks available in Liberia. There was one trucking company belonging to members of the Mandingo tribe but due to ethnic violence, the tribe and the company moved out of the country. The lack of available trucking exacerbates the difficulty in food distribution. The only trucks that can be used for food distribution at present are the eight EU trucks that are about ten years old and have been heavily used on substandard roads. The World Food Program (WFP) reported that it lost eight trucks and seven light vehicles in the fighting in June.

The potential to procure supplies and services from the local economy relies heavily on the ability of supply ships to offload at the free port of Monrovia. The port director indicated that the last cargo ship was received approximately six months ago. Additional shipments have been delayed or canceled due to recent civil disturbance. Additionally, storage facilities of many companies were looted or destroyed during the recent invasion by rebel forces. However, commodities such as: construction materials, office supplies, furniture, fax, printer, copier, and bottled water appear to be available on limited basis from the local economy. Services available are cell phone, passenger bus, laundry, stevedore, and refuse collection.

There are no railroad facilities or services available in Monrovia.

Health

Health Issues Summary

The living conditions in all IDP camps are unsanitary; food and clean water are in extremely short supply. Sanitation facilities, when present at all, are grossly inadequate for the population served. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions facilitate the spread of disease; diarrhea is a problem, especially for young children. Malaria is the most common cause of death, again disproportionately affecting young children. The effects of malaria and diarrheal disease are both worsened by malnutrition.

Medical care is as scarce as clean water and sanitation. Most trained physicians have left the country, hospitals and clinics have been looted, and supplies cannot be delivered because of high commercial shipper insurance, pilferage of shipments in transit, or graft demanded by government officials to clear relief supplies through customs.

Without immediate stability and security, the outlook is bleak. Medically, August is the peak month for diarrheal diseases such as cholera. With the rainy season moving into full swing, clean water wells are easily contaminated during flooding due to fecal runoff from

insufficiently prepared and maintained latrines overburdened by too many people. Unalleviated, the shortage of food and clean water may drive ordinary, normally non-violent people to acts of desperation and change the current scenario from a crisis into a disaster.

IDP Population

The IDP population count estimates forwarded to UNOCHA by the NGO's operating in the greater Monrovia area indicate 150,000 IDP's in recognized camps, not all of which have relief services. In addition to IDP's who have sought assistance at the camps, it is estimated that at least as many more have sought shelter with relatives or friends. There is no way to estimate the number of people who obtain support apart from that provided by NGO's.

These additional people place a strain on a host population that are themselves already poor, overburdening limited sources of food, water, and sanitation. By virtue of the crowding they cause, they promote permissive conditions for epidemic disease. In addition to the 300,000+ IDP's estimated to be in Monrovia proper in camps and the homes of friends and relatives, the 13 July 03 census tally prepared by the European Commission identifies another roughly 160,000 IDP's in recognized camps in the counties of Montserrado, Margibi, Grand Bassa, and Bong. These counties are contiguous with Monrovia, extending northeast and southeast, and represent the limits in which NGO's are currently able to provide relief services. Reportedly, as has been seen in IDP camps, average family size is roughly 7 – 10 persons. The population is strongly weighted toward the young, with children under 5 constituting 17-20% of the population and women of childbearing age constituting 25%. The population at IDP camps in the Monrovia area continues to grow; we attribute this to the perception that safety, food, and water are more available in Monrovia than in the outlying areas. One camp reports that more than 10 families continue to arrive every day.

Relief services are insufficient for the need. Only 38% of the 92 recognized camps have an NGO that has assumed responsibility for food distribution; 39% have NGO-provided water; 16% have sanitation facilities (this does not mean that those camps that have these services have them adequate to their need) and the rest are completely lacking. At SKD Stadium, the largest IDP camp in Monrovia, there is only one latrine hole per 2000+ people. Wells that are chlorinated are regularly recontaminated. Diarrhea is a problem even at Grey Stone, considered one of the very best IDP camps; recently a special diarrhea ward had to be opened there.

As in other situations involving absence of well-developed health infrastructure it is impossible to obtain detailed quantitative data on the health of the population. That is the present case in Liberia. The most readily available health statistic is the crude death rate; unfortunately this is available only for IDP camps administered by NGO's that have some data gathering ability. Crude weekly mortality rates of 1 per 10,000 per week are considered acceptable (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Field Operations Guide); some of the NGO's are reporting crude death rates as high as 8 per 10,000 per week in specific IDP camps. The NGO's disaggregate only by age, splitting children < 5 years of

age from all others. They do not disaggregate by sex. The two most common causes of death, in descending order, are malaria and diarrheal disease, both of which are exacerbated by malnutrition. The primary vectors are mosquitoes, flies and rodents.

Available data are insufficient to estimate the monthly prevalence of malaria and diarrhea for the general population. However, for two reasonably large camps having a combined population of 16,000, rates of malaria for children < 5 years of age and all others are 10% and 1% respectively. At the same two IDP camps, the monthly prevalence of diarrhea for children < 5 yrs old and all others > 5 years old were ~1% and 0.3% respectively for June 2003. These numbers will be an underestimate of actual malarial and diarrheal infection, since those not ill enough to seek medical care or be brought to medical care will not be included. Malnutrition worsens both of these conditions, by decreasing the population resistance to infection.

The most worrisome epidemic disease in the humanitarian disaster situation is measles, which has disproportionate mortality among children and is exacerbated by malnutrition, especially deficiency in Vitamin A. UNICEF has been actively vaccinating children and women of childbearing age. According to the Minister of Health (MOH), prior to the recent conflict, the percentage of the population vaccinated was 57%. Vaccinations are reportedly being provided by UNICEF and the MOH is targeting 40% of the under 5 population. As of this report, UNICEF states that in the current vaccination campaign (measles and tetanus), it has vaccinated 129,000 children 6-9 years old and 209,000 women of childbearing age. It is uncertain what degree of measles vaccine coverage has been achieved because the NGO's have extreme difficulty in estimating the size of the target population, but the fact that there have been only 8 scattered cases of measles in the largest IDP camp (population 35,000) suggests good coverage to date. The continued influx of IDP's into the area will mandate continued aggressive vaccination efforts. UNICEF has plans to conduct another round of vaccination in more outlying areas beginning in August, but additional efforts in Monrovia itself will also be required.

Food and Nutrition

Action Contra la Faim (ACF – French for Action Against Hunger) is the only NGO working on the evaluation or amelioration of malnutrition. In screenings of children in IDP camps referred for evaluation, ACF has found either moderate or severe malnutrition in over 50% of cases. ACF itself, however, notes that the evaluated cases are not representative of the population experience. In a telephone conversation with CDR Clagett and in their 15 Jul 03 report to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, they state explicitly that the situation is still too volatile for them to perform population based nutritional surveys. While no quantitative statistical data are available, our observations while touring IDP camps indicate that low weight for height appears common among children. In a meeting with the Minister of Health, the minister cited a child malnutrition rate of 27% prior to the current conflict; his own epidemiologist revealed that the ministry has no systematic means of data collection, and analysis is limited to paper and pencil because there is no electricity with which to run computers.

Water

UNICEF estimates that there are over 5000 wells in the greater Monrovia area, although CDR Clagett and CDR Smallwood find this estimate questionable. If correct, that would mean one well per 200-300 people, assuming a population 1-1.5 million in the Monrovia area. Also, it is not clear how this estimate was made. In any event, it is clear that what wells do exist are often contaminated by improper use or infiltration through the ground. At the IDP camps, many well hand pumps simply do no work. Where water is supplied by NGO's, it is not always in adequate quantity; water has the potential to become critical in some areas. The Catholic archdiocese in Monrovia has installed a 15,000-liter bladder of chlorinated water at the West Point camp, which they run, however this may be insufficient for the actual population of the camp (estimated pop. 12,000-15,000), let alone anybody else. Additionally, the archdiocese, which operates clinics in the community, reports that diarrhea cases are now originating out in the community as well as in the IDP camps. The community knows that the West Point camp has a large (although, not large relative to potential demand) supply of clean water, and people in the community (estimated pop. 40,000) want access to that water. The archdiocese fears riots over both food and water.

Sanitation

Sanitation throughout the Monrovia area is horrendous. There are very few actual latrines draining to either septic fields or collecting and holding tanks. Sewage bins, trash dumps and latrines are located close to living areas and are overflowing with garbage and excrement. Most people in the IDP camps simply deposit their excrement in a corner of the camp or out in the jungle. At one camp, the stench of the latrines was so overpowering that the camp residents refuse to use them, defecating in plastic bags and then tossing the bags in the latrine, where the excrement will have an extremely long biodegradation time. The only handwashing stations we observed anywhere were outside the diarrhea wards. There are no hand-washing stations and no water to rinse or flush after defecation/urination. The MOH states access to proper sanitation facilities (for bathing, hand-washing, etc) is available to only 20% of the population.

Medical

The principle sources of medical care are clinics run by NGO's and a few government run clinics. Trained medical personnel are scarce. Prior to the conflict there were no more than 70 physicians in this country of 3.2 million, or one physician per 50,000 people. At present there may be no more than 15 physicians. Many current providers of health care have been trained on the job. Primary shortfalls in the healthcare system, after personnel, are fuel for generators to provide electrical power to clinics and hospitals, medicines, and clean water. Laboratory and other diagnostic capabilities are limited to microscopy and basic chemistries. Only the ICRC-run section of JFK Hospital has anything approaching western standards of diagnosis and treatment. Detailed statistics on the hospital caseloads are not available. War related trauma to civilians in the current period of unrest is increased compared to previous ones. The ICRC-run trauma referral center in Monrovia reports that in April of 2003 the ratio of war injured combatants to

civilians was 70/30; in June it was 50/50 as militia and government troops have each accused civilians of aiding the other side.

There are 7 major hospitals in Liberia. Four are located in Monrovia proper, and all four still exist to greater or lesser degree. There are two hospitals in Buchanan, the second largest city in Liberia, one run by the government and the other by the Oriental Trading Company. The government hospital is extremely short of supplies. The OTC hospital is better equipped, being funded by the corporation, but people must pay to be treated there. Phebe hospital in Bong County was forced to evacuate to escape militia violence, and still exists as approximately 20 clinics scattered in Bong County.

The total number of hospital beds in Monrovia proper, nominally, is about 300. This figure is nearly meaningless as we have observed up to four people on a single bed (two mothers, each with an infant), and most beds are actually nothing but metal frames without mattresses or, alternatively, mattresses on the floor with no bed frame. In addition to major and minor equipment, medical facilities are in great need of oral rehydration salts, antibiotics and other medications necessary to treat myriad medical conditions that present during a humanitarian crisis.

Environmental

Liberia's tropical climate has two rainy seasons in the south (May through July and October through November) and one rainy season (May through October) in the rest of the country. Rainfall is heaviest along the northwest coast, where mean annual rainfall is about 180 inches. In the southeast and inland areas, amounts decrease to about 90 inches annually. Most rainfall comes in the form of heavy downpours that last hours to several days. Coastal temperatures are uniformly high, while in the interior; seasonal temperatures may exceed 111 degrees Fahrenheit and fall below 48 degrees Fahrenheit. Tornadoes are common at the beginning and end of the rainy season. Liberia consists of three geographic regions. The coastal region is a 20 to 30 mile wide belt of gently rolling hills broken by tidal creeks, shallow lagoons, and swamps. During high water, creeks, rivers, tidal swamps, and lagoons swell greatly in size, often flooding adjacent areas. The plateau region rises from the coastal plain to elevations between 600 to 2,000 feet. The rugged and densely forested mountainous region of eastern and northern Liberia has peak elevations between 4,530 to 5,740 feet above sea level.

Water and Sanitation

Water/Sewage

The Liberia Water Sewage Company is a for-profit business with current income roughly equaling expenses. The primary source (2/3 of revenues) is the White Plains Water Treatment Plant, located about 25km northeast of Monrovia. The contractor, Geoscience SRL, Italy, through the European Commission (EC) operates it. The water quality is good due to the treatment process that removes turbidity with aluminum sulphate, filters through sand filters and post chlorination with chlorine gas. A secondary source of water, (1/3 of revenues), are two bore holes at Paynesville where each has a kiosk for retail sales. The water is sold at these points for approximately \$20 USD per 1000 gal. The

water system is functional to several water points where water is distributed via trucks and transported to various IDP camps, Hospitals, Clinics etc at no charge. Prior to the civil unrest, the water treatment facility at White Plains was intact and operating but was already in bad condition because of poor maintenance **(1)**.

Prior to disruption by conflict, 16 to 17 million gallons per day were delivered to 400,000 to 500,000 residents, an apparent average daily delivery per capita of more than 100 liters, although the real figure is closer to 50 liters per day taking losses in the distribution system into account. The actual amount of water available per person is equal to 4 liters per person per day (4L/P/D-the OFDA minimum consumption requirement) where the normal amount is equal to 15L/P/D (drinking, bathing, clothes washing etc). **(3)** The distribution main consists of a 16" cast iron pipe that reaches the town via Caldwell Street along UN Drive. It narrows to 12" at the bridge over the Mesurado Channel and continues on to Mamba Point. The 36" pre-stressed concrete main reaches Paynesville from White Plains, continues on to Congotown and Sinkor and narrows to 24" and then to 16" before reaching the Mamba Point Booster. There are reservoirs at Ducor (2200 m3) and City (3785 m3) that could be utilized to provide water to the Mamba Point area if water theft from the 16" iron line through Bushrod Island could be minimized. Overall, there are 25 km of 36" mains and 20 km of 16" mains. Before the war they supplied approximately 75% of the city through nearly 20,000 connections. **(3)**.

About 40% (400,000) of the city's population receives water from high quality piped water and the remaining 60% (600,000) from ground water from shallow wells. **(1)**.

The sanitation facilities at the IDP camps are basic latrines that receive little or no service.

The Sewage Treatment facility is approximately 1000 m NNW of JFK Hospital. It consists of a primary basin, settling basin, two digesters and two trickling filters. It was commissioned in 1970 and needed extensive repairs by 1980. By 1990 it was barely operational. There is no power available and the facility is not in operation.

The hydroelectric facility at the Mount Coffee Dam is no longer in use. The Dam failed in 1990 and the plant has since been severely vandalized to the point of needing a complete refit of all components.

Sources:

1. Water Business in Monrovia, Geoscience SRL, Italy, April, 2003
2. UN report, 02 July, 2003
3. Geneva Foundation Paper no. 4, 04 Nov 2001

Sanitation

During May and June the EC Water and Sanitation (WATSAN program installed 1843 family latrines in the following counties: Margibi, Bong, Grand Bassa, Rivercess and Montserrat. UNICEF has organized a Monitoring team, from the other NGO's, to inspect and monitor the progress of sanitation at the camps. They are currently developing a standard, and then will begin inspection and monitoring. Specific topics of

interest are quality and quantity of water, latrines, sludge disposal, garbage disposal, bathhouses, personal hygiene issues, as well as water storage for the families and individuals. Site drainage of the camp and outlying areas will also be examined. Currently, some of the latrines are being cleaned out and the sludge is transported to the sewage treatment plant for storage. (3).

Garbage removal is to be reviewed by the NGO's. Currently, there is one NGO (RCIA) that has a truck, and is attempting to collect garbage, but they are not reaching all of the IDP camps. (3).

Reportedly, many residents of Monrovia have illegally connected their sewage lines into the city's storm drains which dries during the dry season and causes the storm drains to clog and overflow into the streets and sidewalks after rains in the rainy season. Liberia Water Sewage Company (LWSC) is working to unclog the drains. The storm drain effluent empties directly into the ocean. The sewage treatment plant is out of operation and the effluent drains into the Mesurado River. (4).

Sources:

1. OCHA, 10 July 2003
2. EU, Humanitarian Situation Update, 04 July 2003
3. WATSAN meeting 11 July 2003
4. Ministry of Public Works

Shelter

Affected Population Profile

The facilities being used as IDP sites vary from small abandoned schools to large sports stadiums. Many vacant buildings or structures are being utilized. The expected timeframe for shelter is indeterminate. This will depend upon cessation of hostilities and establishment of a secure and stable environment that allows people to return to their homes.

It is not possible to accurately determine the number of people in each dwelling or to make a standard assumption, since structures that are being occupied by the IDP's vary widely. At the SKD Stadium approximate room sizes vary, most average 7 x 6 meters with 60+ people living in each room. OFDA minimum shelter/space requirements formula allots 3.5m² per person. This space requirement accommodates 12 IDP residents vice the 60+ occupants observed by the HAST. This appears to be an average ratio. People were occupying all available spaces, to include areas beneath the seating, locker rooms, walkways and under stairwells.

The main obstacle that prevents victims from meeting their own needs, both for temporary and permanent shelter, is that they are destitute and have no assets. Many of the IDP's that have moved into the sites within Monrovia have relocated from IDP sites

from outside of the city. Most are unable to purchase food, supplies and materials to meet their needs and are completely dependent upon the assistance of the local NGO's.

The buildings, within Monrovia, that are being utilized are in a general state of disrepair, to point of decay. Many of the metal roofs have been removed; doors and windows have been removed or destroyed. Electrical wiring and components have been stripped. Piping and plumbing fixtures have been removed.

IDP's only have access to clean water when it is provided and delivered by a local NGO. Sanitation is provided by the use of a latrine, if available.

Materials

The majority of the structures within Monrovia are concrete reinforced, slab-on-grade construction. The structures that are outside of Monrovia are of wood and brick construction with sheet metal roofs. Currently the types of materials that are required to meet the immediate needs are those necessary for building basic structures, latrines, bathhouses, water and food distribution points. These materials would include lumber, plastic sheeting, tarps, sheet metal, concrete/cement, gravel, fencing, sand, piping and plumbing supplies, and basic electrical supplies, including generators.

The availability of these materials in the Monrovia is limited. There is a basic inventory at local suppliers and contractors. It is reported that lumber would be easy to obtain, once the local situation improves and hostilities cease. Currently, there is not a functional concrete batch plant in Monrovia. All concrete must be batched on-site, with the cement being delivered in bags. Currently, all cement will have to be imported. Also, there is not a crusher at the local quarry, all work is done by hand. Some limited supplies are available in Monrovia which could be utilized by local NGO's to provide basic assistance on a small scale. For a major relief effort, the required materials will have to be transported to Monrovia. The quantity of material required will have to be estimated once the number and type of facilities that are to be constructed is determined.

Suitable material substitutes that would provide relief would be tents or any other structure that would provide shelter from the elements. These could be used for housing of IDP's or berthing of relief workers. For sanitation, wood construction elevated latrine and dug and burnout latrines would be expedient. The primary consideration would be the availability of fuel for the burnout latrines.

Issues of concern related to temporary shelters located at the IDP camps would be security and safety of the personnel and the facilities. The camps would have to be secured and maintained by a local NGO or agency to ensure that all residents are safe from militia and that the facilities are not looted and /or destroyed. Also, safety and security is a major consideration during the construction of the facilities and transportation / storage of the equipment and materials. Once locations of projects are determined, main supply routes would have to be established. These routes would be from key staging and supply points; security along these routes would have to be maintained, to prevent looting of material in route.

At this time the urgent need is to provide assistance at the established IDP camps, to include latrines and basic shelter. Relocation of the personnel at this time is not an option due to the lack security and potential hostilities. Once new facilities are constructed the IDP's can then be relocated safely. Accessibility to the affected areas is capable utilizing the existing roadways. Supply routes will have to be established and maintained. At this time the only viable means to establish a shelter program and distribute shelter material are the local NGO's operating in the area. There are no government agencies capable of performing this work.

Communications

GSM (European mobile phone system), Lone Star, is the only reliable telephone service provider. Lone Star has seventeen operational base stations (repeaters) and one non-functioning base station in Brewerville that was damaged in June fighting. Currently, the subscriber network consists of 27,000-28,000 users. The Lone Star base stations in Liberia are various models manufactured by Erickson. In Liberia, there is a single microwave link between Harbel and Buchanan allowing GSM coverage in Buchanan but not in the areas between the cities.

Other GSM geographical limitations are Kakata, Harbel/Roberts International Airport, and Firestone. Lone Star is owned by President Taylor, but uses several of his close associates as fronts for the company. The Lone Star parent company is located in Lebanon and owned by The Minister of Public Works for Lebanon.

Landline communications are non-existent due to obsolete 1960's technology and the damage sustained to the central switch.

FM radio is the primary means of communications to the people of Liberia in the cities and Short Wave is the primary means to rural communities outside the reach of FM broadcasting. An estimated 85 percent of Liberians regularly listen to radio due to the limited circulation of newspapers, absence of television, and high illiteracy rates. Monrovia has five radio stations operating. Radio Veritas, Monrovia, is owned by the Catholic Church and operates both FM and high power Short Wave stations. The condition of Radio Veritas is good as it has not been looted and has been maintained. Monrovia radio DC 101 is privately owned and is operating with a reception radius of 50 kilometers on FM. Ownership of Monrovia radio ELWA is the Sudan Interior Mission. ELWA conducts religious broadcasting on both FM and Short Wave. ELBC/LBS is a government owned station on FM only, but previously also had a Short Wave capability. ROCKS FM is an internationally owned station conducting religious broadcasting on FM. Monrovia radio KISS FM is owned by Charles Taylor and is part of Liberia Communications Network. There are two stations known to be operating outside of Monrovia. STONE FM, located at the Firestone plantation, and LOVE FM in Buchanan, which is owned by Charles Taylor. There are eleven radio stations outside of Monrovia that are of unknown operational status as of July.

Roads and Bridges

The majority of the paved roadways in Monrovia are constructed from a single layer of asphalt, 4" on average, but there are roads in which the thickness is up to 8". The method of construction was to level the sub-grade material and then place a 4" course of asphalt, this just being a wear course. A base course and/or binder course was not applied.

There are small sections of reinforced concrete road in Maryland County, the City of Buchanan, and on Bushrod Island in Monrovia. These roads are 6"-8" thick, reinforced concrete. In towns outside of Monrovia, there maybe a single paved road with all others being a hard-pack dirt. The majority of the roads have very poor or even none existent drainage along the shoulder. This has lead to failures and washouts on the sides of various roads. Due to the existing terrain, culverts have been installed, most being constructed from corrugated steel pipe and some with reinforced concrete pipe, but box culverts have not been utilized.

The main bridge in the greater Monrovia is the Johnston St. Bridge, which crosses the Mesurado River; this bridge was completed in 1976. It was designed by Stanley and T.Y. Lin International and constructed by Dragages et Travaux Publics. The load ratings and design calculation are not available in Monrovia. Currently, there are no record documents for this or any other public structure available in Monrovia. It was reported that all documentation at the Ministry of Public Works was destroyed in 1990. In addition, the Ministry of Public Works has placed a 2-ton limitation on the Old Via Town Bridge in Monrovia. This is due to the failing structural integrity of the bridge.

It was reported that in the interior regions of Liberia, bridges were destroyed in 1996 and that some were replaced with Bailey Bridge-type structures. The exact number and locations was not provided. We were unable to locate a source of asphalt material and the local means to construct or repair any roadways. There is no batch plant for the asphalt and the equipment is not available locally.

Search and Rescue (SAR)

The predominant buildings in Monrovia are reinforced concrete structures, brick in-fill, with concrete/brick load-bearing walls. None have been noted to be completely collapsed but many buildings have been damaged during the past twelve years of fighting and unrest. There are noticeable bullet holes and areas that have been hit by rocket propelled grenades.

The current structures that are being utilized as IDP camps are all available private and public facilities. These include schools, sports stadiums, hospitals, churches, and municipal buildings. The general condition of the buildings is a state of disrepair, to the point of decay. A majority of buildings were constructed with sheet metal roofs; many of which have been removed. Also, many of the windows and doors have been removed or destroyed, allowing rain to enter and thus contributing to the degradation of the buildings.

If required there are no local authorities that would be able to provide any Search and Rescue capabilities. The only services that are available are 2 patrol craft that operate out of the port, but are not reliable. If fighting commences or there is an emergency that results in damaged and collapsed buildings, there are no local authorities or agencies that have the capability or equipment to respond to provide emergency repairs, shoring of structures, or removal of hazardous materials.

Coordination and International Staff

Coordination of the humanitarian response has become a challenge, since all available aid staffs are overwhelmed with the enormity of the task of responding to immediate needs. Thus, they find it difficult to spend the time for meetings, gathering and disseminating key information and undertaking joint planning to maximize resources. In the absence of expatriate leadership, UNOCHA national staff seems not to be empowered to utilize their resources to play an appropriate coordination role, particularly in the area of gathering and disseminating vital data on the humanitarian situation.

The fact that more than 150,000 IDP's are scattered across 90 different locations across the greater Monrovia area makes providing adequate services to a significant number nearly impossible. The limited human and material resources that exist in country cannot cope with accessing so many different locations spread across the city; thus the majority do not have access to even the most basic services.

Most of Monrovia's water supply is provided through an EC managed facility that sustained significant damage during the June attacks on the city. Although still operational, pipes and tanks have not been given definitive repairs, and without more comprehensive rehabilitation, most of Monrovia's water supply could be compromised.

Recommendations

Security must be established so that humanitarian organizations can undertake an appropriate emergency response. The US should provide and/or support a security force which will ensure safe access of NGO/IO's to needy populations and protect civilians from human rights violations.

UN agencies, particularly WFP, UNICEF and UNOCHA should be lobbied to bring back the international leadership staff.

Discussions should be undertaken with the EC in Liberia to explore if the US can assist in stabilizing the water supply system for Monrovia. Assistance should include technical specialists, water purification equipment and Humanitarian Affairs funding.

If the security situation stabilizes, many of the IDP's currently in temporary sites within Monrovia will most likely begin returning to the Montserrado County camps. Appropriate planning to ensure that critical services are being met once they return will need to take place. This will require effective coordination among all agencies. Security along IDP supply and transit routes must occur in order to ensure NGO shipments of food

are not looted prior to or after delivery to the populace. Utilization of a PSYOP information campaign will facilitate in the IDP returns process to their homes.

Security is the primary step to success in the humanitarian assistance effort in Monrovia. The movement of IDP's into Monrovia is a direct result of the fighting that has transpired between opposition and government forces. The ongoing and unchecked looting and acts of violence carried out by government, militia and opposition forces have impaired the ability of IO's and NGO's to provide basic Humanitarian Assistance. Our findings parallel the opinions expressed by the NGO's and local populace. Providing an immediate credible stabilization force will facilitate the conditions necessary to stabilize the acute humanitarian crisis occurring in Monrovia.

Public Affairs

Situation

As the introduction of the HAST into Liberia has already attracted significant worldwide media attention, the establishment of any future contingency operation here will continue to be followed closely. The HAST PAO has now been fully integrated into the Embassy country team, and has developed a solid professional relationship with the Ambassador. The HAST PAO has been assigned to the Political office space next to the Office of the Ambassador. Processes for communication with the media in this environment have been developed, are in place and are fully functional. Access to the HAST team members is now routinely facilitated, adding to the significant level of trust and confidence between the media the HAST. The HAST PAO credibility is established with the media, and the relationships built with the Ambassador and Country Team under the present circumstances are excellent. Media reporting out of Liberia has been exceptionally positive for these reasons.

Media

Currently, the following news organizations have representatives operating in Monrovia: ABC News, AFP, AP, BBC, Boston Herald, CNN, Die Welt-Sonntag(German), Discovery Channel, Fox News, Frankfurter Allegmagne, Getty Images, The Independent (UK), Jane's, Knight Ridder, Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Nue Zurcher (German), New York Times, Reuters, RFI, Time, and Washington Post. (Approximately 35 personnel total.)

The HAST PAO does not anticipate this number to grow significantly with the introduction of American forces into Liberia, as most news organizations that wish to cover this event are already here, anticipating the next move. Smaller numbers of additional media may still arrive, although air transportation links are becoming increasingly unreliable.

Additionally, the infrastructure of Monrovia is incapable of handling an influx of additional media requiring adequate food and security, and the media all know this. Already some media team sizes have been reduced. The media are all staying in the only functional, barely adequate hotel next to the American Embassy.

Proposed Mission Statement

Establish a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) at the Embassy Public Affairs compound to provide full public affairs support for the JTF Commander. The JIB will be responsible for two-way communication between media operating in the local area and the JTF Commander and his staff. The JIB will act as a single point of information for local media, providing them information about current operations in accordance with official EUCOM guidance.

Concept of Operations

Upon establishment of the JTF, a JIB shall be established at the American Embassy Public Affairs compound in Monrovia to support the JTF Commander. The JIB shall be manned by 4 personnel - two public affairs officers and two enlisted journalist staff members to permit flexibility of operations.

The senior PAO ("PAO") will be responsible for the establishment and operation of the JIB. As the JIB OIC, he will be responsible for ensuring that media are provided access to proper information and access to military operations, as appropriate. He will keep an updated list of names, organizations and contact information for all media in Liberia interested in covering U.S. operations. The PAO will operate at an office on the 2nd deck of the Embassy in the proximity of the Office of the Ambassador (and JTF Commander), and be in internal phone and unclassified LAN/Internet communication with the Public Affairs office/compound across the street.

The junior PAO ("Deputy PAO") will act as the JIB DOIC and Media Escort Officer to assist media with access to operations occurring away from the immediate vicinity of the compound. The media escort officer will be responsible for informing media about military activity, and act as liaison to ensure proper access to U.S. forces. Additionally, the Deputy PAO will be overall responsible for the media embark program, should afloat forces be designated that are of interest to the media. He will also be responsible for media training/briefing to military personnel who would come into contact with media in the course of their duties. The Deputy PAO will establish himself in the office of the Embassy Public Affairs Officer (now vacant due to evacuation) on the second deck of the Public Affairs compound. The office is provided with internal phones and unclassified LAN/Internet communications. It is also sufficiently large for some storage of gear. This office has a secondary desk and LAN/Internet-capable computer suitable for use by one of the two enlisted personnel.

The two journalists (1 E-7 or above, and 1 E-6 or below) will share duties as internal and external information specialists. One will be responsible for compiling stories focused on the Soldiers, Sailors and Marines from a human interest angle, and personalize stories for the services and military families back home – stories news press may not cover. The other will compile information from DOD/EUCOM and other sources that prove valuable to personnel serving here that might not otherwise be available to them in such a remote area, with the idea of keeping personnel updated with service and other issues back home. In addition, the two enlisted journalists will be expected to assist as the PAO and Deputy PAO as directed. One of the two will work in the office of the Deputy PAO.

A smaller second office is available on the second deck of the Public Affairs compound with an internal phone and unclassified LAN/Internet-capable computer, and will be the primary office for the production of stories and press releases as needed. This will be the office for the second of the two journalists.

The lower (ground) floor of the Public Affairs compound, also serving as the Embassy library (and open for public use by cleared individuals), contains the embassy's press conference room, where the Ambassador assembles media and interested organizations for public announcements. This room will provide a forum for the Commander and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to discuss the details of humanitarian operations by U.S. forces in Liberia. Rectangular in shape, it seats approximately 50 people and has a sound (PA) system, podium and American flag backdrop. Lighting is adequate, and the room also has two functional air conditioning units. The facility is well presented and makes a suitable location for any media event.

Accreditation of media for access to military operations or to the Embassy compound will be done in close coordination with the Embassy Public Affairs office, and with EUCOM Public Affairs as appropriate. EUCOM PA will assist in contacting media home offices for media personnel who lack proper credentials.

A USAFE Visual Information unit will be deployed to provide video/photographic support to public affairs efforts, as well as document the operation. It will report directly to PAO while in the AOO, and will be permitted use of all facilities at the JIB.

Command/Control/Communications

The PAO will report directly to the JTF Commander, and will support him on all PA requirements in execution of the operation. The PAO will ensure all public affairs activities are carried out in accordance with EUCOM guidance, and provide the media information and access on an as available basis. The PAO will establish communications with public affairs officers of units assigned to the JTF to ensure PA guidance is provided throughout the chain of command.

The PAO will ensure maximum media access to both ashore and at-sea forces. COMSIXTHFLT [C6F] PAO will be responsible for coordinating media embarks aboard afloat units prior to unit arrival in the Area of Operations [AOO] (i.e. media desiring transit into the AOO). Media embarks commencing in Liberia to afloat units will be coordinated at the local level by the JIB, keeping ECPA, CNE PAO and C6F PAO informed.

American Embassy offices are all provided internal phone lines. However, external (dial-out) landlines are non-existent, so cellular phone usage is the standard for all external calls locally, to Europe and the United States. The PAO will ensure procurement of local cell phones for JIB personnel. This will facilitate personnel recall, out-of-office communication, and communication with local media, most of whom will have local cell phones as well. In addition, the PAO will ensure adequate "top up" cards for the cell

phones, as no permanent SIM cards are available in Liberia. Cell phones will be the primary method of communication both locally and with the chain of command.

While SIPRNET is available at the Embassy, the Public Affairs compound is NIPRNET capable only. JIB personnel will therefore not access classified information. The PAO will have access to both SIPRNET and NIPRNET from his/her office at the Embassy.

The Public Affairs compound does not have secure communications. Secure communications are available at the Embassy through comm technicians.

The Public Affairs shop has the ability to move copy and digital imagery via NIPRNET. The Embassy Public Affairs Office has only video receivers and no access to transmitters through normal Embassy channels.

Force Protection

The Embassy Public Affairs compound, located across United Nations Avenue from the main embassy compound, is ideal for military public affairs in the scope of an operation here for a number of reasons.

The two-story building is in excellent condition. On the second floor lays the Embassy Public Affairs Office, made secure by a cipher-lock combination device on the outer steel door.

Although the office lies across the street from the main embassy compound, the street has been cordoned off with concrete barricades and concertina wire. Additionally, the walls around the Public Affairs compound are secured with concertina wire and the whole area is patrolled by Embassy guard or Marine FAST security. Force protection is equivalent to that provided the primary compound. As the Public Affairs compound is distinctly separate from the Embassy, requirements for entry into the compound can be adjusted by the Public Affairs office for media events etc., without sacrificing embassy compound security.

Other

The U.S. military assumes no responsibility for in-country media, nor is under any obligation to provide transportation, food or lodging services to them, unless specifically directed by higher authority, or in the execution of a military mission with media assigned. In that case, the media escort officer shall attempt to provide, within reason, adequate safety measures for media members. In case of actual evacuation, the military will attempt to evacuate those desiring to depart, with priority given to American citizens.

The Embassy, like all of Liberia, operates on 110V with American-style plugs. Forces coming from Europe should note the difference and plan accordingly.

